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This dissertation poses two basic questions: (1) Under what conditions are leaders 
more or less likely to publicly acknowledge cooperative security negotiations or to 
pursue talks secretly? (2) What impact does this decision have on leaders’ subsequent 
bargaining behavior and their overall prospects of achieving cooperation? To answer 
these questions, I develop a realist-inspired theoretical framework that advances two 
main arguments about leaders’ management of national security information. First, 
international audiences – namely, third-party states – rather than domestic audiences 
often constitute the principal targets of official secrecy and public acknowledgement. 
Second, leaders’ control of information is shaped primarily by the international 
strategic context and the scope of their states’ national security interests rather than 
domestic political incentives and institutions. My central claim and finding is that 
states’ power positions in the international system fundamentally influence not only 
the way that leaders control information during cooperative security negotiations but 
also the impact that information management has on leaders’ subsequent willingness 
to make concessions during talks and their likelihood of reaching an agreement. 
 I evaluate these arguments empirically by studying leaders’ control of 
information during negotiations for foreign military base rights. Based on extensive 
archival research, I have constructed an original comprehensive dataset of 218 
negotiation rounds and 59 agreements for U.S. overseas base rights during 1939 – 
1971. I use this dataset to test seven novel hypotheses through rigorous statistical 
analyses that produce strong support for my argument about international power 
position and strategic context while systematically controlling for the effects of 
important domestic political factors. Additional support comes from rich historical 
examples and comparative case studies based primarily on declassified government 
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Henry Kissinger once remarked that “the way negotiations are carried out is almost as 
important as what is negotiated.”1 One prominent way in which the conduct of 
international negotiations varies is the level of transparency to outside audiences. 
Whether distinguished in terms of front- versus back-channel communication, open- 
versus closed-door bargaining, or public versus private diplomacy, leaders must 
decide whether to directly invoke the attention of outside audiences by publicly 
acknowledging the occurrence of negotiations (if not the content) or to pursue talks 
secretly. Building on Kissinger’s insight, this dissertation addresses two sets of 
questions regarding leaders’ management of information during cooperative security 
negotiations. First, what role does secrecy play in leaders’ pursuit of security 
cooperation? More specifically, under what conditions are leaders more or less likely 
to withhold or disclose information about cooperative security negotiations? Second, 
does the way cooperative security negotiations are carried out (i.e., publicly or 
privately) affect what is negotiated (i.e., bargaining behavior) and how the 
negotiations end (i.e., the prospects of cooperation)? More specifically, does public 
                                               
1 Henry A. Kissinger, “The Viet Nam Negotiations,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 2 (January 1969), p. 




acknowledgment of the negotiations affect leaders’ willingness to make concessions 
during talks and their likelihood of reaching an agreement? 
 Consider, for instance, the United States’ negotiations with the United 
Kingdom for military base rights in various North Atlantic and Caribbean territories. 
Perhaps the most famous early case of U.S. basing abroad, the so-called Destroyers-
Bases Deal of 1941 granted the United States rights to construct air and naval bases 
on eight British transatlantic possessions in exchange for fifty overage destroyer 
warships. American and British officials publicly acknowledged both rounds of 
negotiations prior to their commencement in August – September 1940 and January – 
March 1941.2 A little known fact, however, is that these negotiations were preceded 
by highly secretive talks during June – August 1939 regarding naval base rights in 
Trinidad, Bermuda, and St. Lucia. So secretive were these early negotiations that 
upon their completion nearly all of the official records were burned at the urging of 
U.S. Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles.3 In fact, these negotiations and the 
resulting arrangements were not publicly acknowledged until March 1946.4 Why did 
American and British officials pursue highly secretive basing negotiations in June – 
August 1939 but openly acknowledge their negotiations in August 1940 – March 
1941? 
                                               
2 See, for instance, “U.S. is Negotiating for British Bases,” New York Times, 17 August 1940, p. 1; 
“U.S. Delegation in Britain to Act on Deal for Bases,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 25 January 1941, p. 3. 
 
3 F. A. Baptiste, “The British Grant of Air and Naval Facilities to the United States in Trinidad, St. 
Lucia, and Bermuda in 1939 (June – December),” Caribbean Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2 (July 1976), pp. 
5-43. 
 




 Similarly, the recent leak of hundreds of thousands of classified U.S. 
government documents by the whistle-blower website WikiLeaks shed light on the 
full extent of U.S. military activities in Yemen, which American and Yemeni officials 
had publicly denied and disguised as Yemeni operations since late 2009.5 This leak 
raises one of the critical puzzles examined in this dissertation: Why does the United 
States pursue military cooperation secretly with some countries, such as Yemen, but 
publicly with others, such as Djibouti, where officials have openly acknowledged 
U.S. military bases and operations since 2002?6 
 Alternatively, consider the United States’ bilateral basing negotiations with 
Denmark and Norway during 1951 – 1953. Why did Danish authorities launch a 
publicity campaign to draw attention to their talks with the United States, while 
Norwegian officials insisted on maintaining a high degree of secrecy in their 
negotiations? To what extent do these choices explain the divergent outcomes across 
these two cases – that is, the stalemate and breakdown of the negotiations with 
Denmark and the successful conclusion of the talks with Norway, despite the United 
States’ greater willingness to make concessions in the former compared to the latter? 
To answer these questions, I develop a realist-inspired theoretical framework 
that advances two main arguments about leaders’ management of information during 
                                               
5 “Yemen Sets Terms of a War on Al Qaeda,” New York Times, 3 December 2010, p. 1. On WikiLeaks, 
see Alexander Star, ed., Open Secrets: WikiLeaks, War, and American Diplomacy (New York: Grove 
Press, 2011). 
 
6 See, for instance, “U.S. Turns Horn of Africa into a Military Hub,” New York Times, 17 November 
2002, p. 1. These negotiations resulted in the public Agreement between the United States and the 
Republic of Djibouti on Access to and Use of Facilities in the Republic of Djibouti, signed 19 February 
2003, in Consolidated Treaties and International Agreements 2003: Vol. 1 (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana, 




negotiations for overseas military basing rights. First, international audiences – 
namely, third-party states – rather than domestic audiences often constitute the 
principal targets of official secrecy and public acknowledgement during cooperative 
security negotiations. Second, leaders’ control of information is shaped primarily by 
the international strategic context and the scope of their states’ national security 
interests rather than domestic political institutions. My central claim and finding is 
that states’ power positions in the international system fundamentally influence not 
only the way that leaders control information during basing negotiations but also the 
impact that information management has on leaders’ subsequent bargaining behavior 
and the outcome of talks. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I identify this project’s primary theoretical, 
empirical, and historical contributions by reviewing and critiquing relevant 
scholarship on secrecy, audience costs, bargaining, and security cooperation. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the importance of this study and an outline of 
the dissertation’s remaining chapters. 
 
Secrecy and the Pursuit of Security Cooperation 
Existing scholarship suggests that leaders engaged in bilateral security negotiations 
employ official secrecy to withhold sensitive information from each other or domestic 
audiences. Rationalist accounts of dyadic bargaining suggest that leaders use secrecy 
to keep the other side guessing about their exact reservation point or level of military 
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capabilities7 or when invoking the attention of domestic audiences threatens to 
significantly decrease the prospects of cooperation, escalate the risk of costly 
fighting, or increase the political fallout from a foreign policy failure.8 Realist 
scholars similarly argue that leaders resort to secrecy or deception when they 
anticipate domestic opposition to unpopular foreign policies ranging from the use of 
force abroad to the terms of postwar settlements.9 Thus, whereas David Gibbs once 
suggested that the desire to “withhold information from potential foreign rivals…is, 
by far, the most widely accepted explanation for government information policy,”10 
John Mearsheimer’s recent survey of lying in world politics concludes that leaders 
rarely attempt to deceive one another, focusing instead on misleading their citizens.11 
                                               
7 Brian Lai, “The Effects of Different Types of Military Mobilization on the Outcome of International 
Crises,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 2 (April 2004), pp. 211-229; Adam Meirowitz 
and Anne E. Sartori, “Strategic Uncertainty as a Cause of War,” Quarterly Journal of Political 
Science, Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 2008), pp. 327-352; Branislav L. Slantchev, “Feigning Weakness,” 
International Organization, Vol. 64, No. 3(Summer 2010), pp. 357-388; Philip Arena and Scott 
Wolford, “Arms, Intelligence, and War,” International Studies Quarterly, Forthcoming. 
 
8 Matthew A. Baum, “Going Private: Public Opinion, Presidential Rhetoric, and the Domestic Politics 
of Audience Costs in U.S. Foreign Policy Crises,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 48, No. 5 
(October 2004), pp. 603-631; David Stasavage, “Open-door or Closed-Door? Transparency in 
Domestic and International Bargaining,” International Organization, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Fall 2004), pp. 
667-703; Bahar Leventoğlu and Ahmer Tarar, “Prenegotiation Public Commitment in Domestic and 
International Bargaining,” American Political Science Review, Vol., 99, No. 3 (August 2005), pp. 419-
433; Shuhei Kurizaki, “Efficient Secrecy: Public versus Private Threats in Crisis Diplomacy,” 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 101, No. 3 (August 2007), pp. 543-558; Ahmer Tarar and 
Bahar Leventoğlu, “Public Commitment in Crisis Bargaining,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 
53, No. 3 (September 2009), pp. 817-839. 
 
9 Norrin M. Ripsman, Peacemaking by Democracies: The Effect of State Autonomy on the Post-World 
War Settlements (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002); John M. 
Schuessler, “The Deception Dividend: FDR’s Undeclared War,” International Security, Vol. 34, No. 4 
(Spring 2010), pp. 133-165. 
 
10 David N. Gibbs, “Secrecy and International Relations,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 32, No. 2 
(May 1995), p. 214. 
 
11 John J. Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie: The Truth about Lying in International Politics (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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Liberal theorists, such as Charles Lipson, also share this view that leaders “maintain 
secrecy mainly for domestic reasons.”12  
This prevailing focus on the efforts of negotiating parties either to mislead 
each other or to circumvent domestic constraints neglects the fact that public 
disclosure of pending cooperation also invokes the attention of other state leaders 
who are not participants in the negotiations. With few exceptions, existing 
scholarship gives scant treatment to third-party states – both allies and adversaries – 
as targets of official secrecy.13 In this dissertation, I argue that third-party states often 
constitute the principal targets of information control during cooperative security 
negotiations. In making this argument, I do not suggest that dyadic bargaining 
dynamics and domestic audiences are unimportant. Rather, the purpose of this project 
                                               
12 Charles Lipson, Reliable Partners: How Democracies Have Made a Separate Peace (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 87. 
 
13 For instance, Jeffrey Ritter argues that leaders may employ secret alliances as a deterrence strategy 
that increases the attacker’s uncertainty but preserves the war-fighting advantages of military 
coordination should deterrence fail. See Jeffrey M. Ritter, “Silent Partners and Other Essays on 
Alliance Politics” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 2004), pp. 36-81. Similarly, Robert Jervis and 
James Morrow each suggest generally that states may enter into secret alliances when they want to 
avoid communicating the limits of their commitments to outside states. See Robert Jervis, System 
Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 262; 
James D. Morrow, “Alliances: Why Write Them Down?” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 3 
(2000), p. 70. Alternatively, numerous studies address leaders’ efforts to utilize third parties, whether 
international organizations or outside states, for information transmission purposes ranging from 
legitimizing the use of force to conflict mediation. See, for instance, Erik Voeten, “The Political 
Origins of the UN Security Council’s Ability to Legitimize the Use of Force,” International 
Organization, Vol. 59, No. 3 (Summer 2005), pp. 527-557; Alexander Thompson, “Coercion Through 
IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of Information Transmission,” International Organization, 
Vol. 60, No. 1 (Winter 2006), pp. 1-34; Kyle C. Beardsley, “Pain, Pressure and Political Cover: 
Explaining Mediation Incidence,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 47, No. 4 (July 2010), pp. 395-406; 
Terrence L. Chapman and Scott Wolford, “International Organizations, Strategy, and Crisis 
Bargaining,” Journal of Politics, Vol. 72, No. 1 (February 2010), pp. 227-242; Mark Fey and 
Kristopher W. Ramsay, “When Is Shuttle Diplomacy Worth the Commute? Information Sharing 
through Mediation,” World Politics, Vol. 62, No. 4 (December 2010), pp. 529-560; Terrence L. 
Chapman, Securing Approval: Domestic Politics and Multilateral Authorization for War (Chicago: 




is to rectify the relative neglect of international audiences as targets of official secrecy 
in previous scholarship. 
A corollary of this neglect is the literature’s failure to capture how a state’s 
place in the international system – namely, whether it is a great power – affects its 
leader’s management of national security information.14 Consistent with the 
prevailing focus on domestic audiences, most existing scholarship examines either the 
effects of regime type on leaders’ control of information, where the conventional 
wisdom is that autocratic leaders are more prone to secrecy,15 or the effects of secrecy 
on democratic leaders’ accountability for national security policy.16 Without 
discounting the important role played by domestic political factors, I argue that 
leaders’ use of secrecy is shaped principally by the international strategic context and 
the scope of their states’ national security interests. Specifically, a state’s power 
                                               
14 One exception is Robert Jervis, who notes generally that “Throughout history, and especially for the 
great powers…, states have often cared about specific issues less for their intrinsic value than for the 
conclusions they felt others would draw from the way they dealt with them.” See Robert Jervis, The 
Logic of Images in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 7. 
 
15 See, for instance, Lipson, Reliable Partners, pp. 87-93. 
 
16 See Francis E. Rourke, Secrecy and Publicity: Dilemmas of Democracy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1961); Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, eds., Secrecy and Foreign Policy 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1974); Itzhak Galnoor, ed., Government Secrecy in Democracies 
(New York: New York University Press, 1977); John M. Orman, Presidential Secrecy and Deception: 
Beyond the Power to Persuade (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980); Mark J. Rozell, Executive 
Privilege: Presidential Power, Secrecy, and Accountability, 2nd ed. (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 2002); Alasdair Roberts, Blacked Out: Government Secrecy in the Information Age (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Miroslav Nincic, Democracy and Foreign Policy: The 
Fallacy of Political Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), pp. 124-152; Michael 
Colaresi, “The Benefit of the Doubt: Testing an Informational Theory of the Rally Effect,” 
International Organization, Vol. 61, No. 1 (Winter 2007), pp. 99-143; Alexander B. Downes and Mary 
Lauren Lilley, “Overt Peace, Covert War?: Covert Intervention and the Democratic Peace,” Security 
Studies, Vol. 19, No. 3 (July – September 2010), pp. 266-306; Jonathan N. Brown and Anthony S. 
Marcum, “Avoiding Audience Costs: Domestic Political Accountability and Concessions in Crisis 




position in the international system shapes its leaders’ management of national 
security information by affecting the size and attentiveness of international audiences, 
the types of assets it brings to the negotiating table, and the benefits it seeks to realize 
through military cooperation. In these ways, this dissertation makes novel theoretical 
contributions by extending the analysis of secrecy beyond purely dyadic and domestic 
political incentives and impediments. 
Reconsider the two cases of U.S – U.K. basing negotiations in the British 
North Atlantic and Caribbean territories during 1939 – 1941. These cases pose an 
empirical puzzle for the prevailing perspective on leaders’ management of national 
security information, given that the domestic political situations facing American and 
British officials were not dramatically different across the two cases. The theory 
developed in this dissertation suggests instead that this puzzle can be explained by 
changes in the international strategic context after September 1939 that altered both 
states’ incentives to signal strength to adversaries – rather than avoid provoking them, 
which was the case prior to that point – and offered the United States an opportunity 
to demand highly favorable terms of agreement that could be used as precedents for 
future basing negotiations with other potential cooperative partners in Central and 
South America. 
 
Public Acknowledgement, Bargaining Constraints, and the Prospects of Security 
Cooperation 
 
Bargaining theorists highlight a dilemma arising from actors’ efforts to manipulate 
constraints that simultaneously enhance their bargaining leverage but decrease the 
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overall probability of cooperation. As Thomas Schelling notes, “the power of a 
negotiator often rests on a manifest inability to make concessions and to meet 
demands.” Negotiators who pursue a strategy of constraints, however, “run the risk of 
establishing an immovable position that goes beyond the ability of the other to 
concede, and thereby provoke the likelihood of stalemate or breakdown.”17 Public 
acknowledgement is one strategy of constraints that formal theorists have linked – via 
domestic political institutions – to variation in the process and outcome of 
international negotiations. Specifically, democratic leaders can use public statements 
about acceptable terms of agreement to create political costs for making concessions 
by invoking the attention of domestic audiences that can punish them for poor 
performance. While this constraint may improve such leaders’ bargaining position, it 
often does so at the cost of shrinking the set of terms that both negotiating parties can 
openly accept by inducing them to adopt uncompromising demands.18  
                                               
17 Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 
pp. 19, 28. 
 
18 See, for instance, James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of 
International Disputes,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 577-
592; Stasavage, “Open-Door or Closed-Door?”; David Stasavage, “Polarization and Publicity: 
Rethinking the Benefits of Deliberative Democracy,” Journal of Politics, Vol. 69, No. 1 (February 
2007), pp. 59-72; Leventoğlu and Tarar, “Prenegotiation Public Commitment”; Kurizaki, “Efficient 
Secrecy”; Tarar and Leventoğlu, “Public Commitment.” A similar strategy of constraints that links 
domestic political institutions to bargaining leverage in international negotiations focuses on the need, 
primarily in democratic states, for legislative ratification of executive policies. See, for instance, 
Robert D. Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International 
Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-460; Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and 
Robert D. Putnam, eds., Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); Keisuke Iida, “Involuntary Defection in Two-Level 
Games,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37, No. 3 (September 1993), pp. 403-426; Jongryn Mo, 
“Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Role of Agent Veto in Two-Level Games,” 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 914-924; Helen V. Milner, 
Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1997); Ahmer Tarar, “International Bargaining with Two-Sided Domestic 
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Reconsider, however, Danish and Norwegian basing negotiations with the 
United States during 1951 – 1953. Despite having nearly identical domestic political 
systems and situations, Danish authorities publicly acknowledged their talks with the 
United States while Norwegian officials shrouded their negotiations in secrecy. 
Though the United States proved more willing to make concessions to Denmark, 
those talks stalemated and broke down while the negotiations with Norway ended 
successfully in an agreement. These decisions and outcomes pose a puzzle for the 
conventional perspective, for they cannot be explained by domestic political factors. 
Specifically, as diplomatic historians Thorsten Olesen and Poul Villaume note, “there 
was no obvious internal party, parliamentary, or electoral pressure for a ‘no’ on the 
[Danish] Social Democratic leadership.”19 
This dissertation expands on the general proposition linking public 
acknowledgement and bargaining constraints by moving the analysis beyond 
domestic political institutions and incentives to examine instead the effects 
international strategic factors and audiences. I argue that states’ power positions in 
the international system shape the distribution of constraints in cooperative security 
relationships by affecting the balance of vulnerability between the negotiating parties 
to abandonment and entanglement. Public acknowledgement, in turn, enhances the 
                                                                                                                                      
Constraints,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 45, No. 3 (June 2001), pp. 320-340; Ana Carolina 
Garriga, “Regime Type and Bilateral Treaty Formalization: Do Too Many Cooks Spoil the Soup?” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vo. 53, No. 5 (October 2009), pp. 698-726. 
 
19 Quoted in Hans Mouritzen, “A Hundred Years of Danish Action Space,” in Nanna Hvidt and Hans 
Mouritzen, eds., Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2006 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for 




weaker or more vulnerable partner’s bargaining position by invoking the attention of 
third-party states, whose opposition to the pending relationship generates “scrutiny 
costs” that the weaker partner can use as leverage during the negotiations.20  While 
the attendant scrutiny costs of transparency put pressure on the stronger, less 
vulnerable partner to make concessions, these costs also can motivate the weaker, 
more constrained partner to adopt uncompromising demands. Ultimately, then, public 
acknowledgment of cooperative security negotiations produces a short-term 
bargaining advantage for the weaker, more vulnerable side but has the long-term 
effect of reducing the overall likelihood that the two sides will reach an agreement. 
By emphasizing international power position rather than domestic political 
institutions, this dissertation thus generates different expectations about which states’ 
bargaining positions benefit from public acknowledgement than previous scholarship 
on audience costs. Furthermore, my argument differs from other realist theories, 
which suggest generally that the bargaining advantage during security cooperation 
rests with the less vulnerable and less constrained state.21 
This argument also helps to explain the divergent outcomes in the cases of 
Denmark and Norway. Through public disclosure of their basing negotiations with 
the United States, Danish authorities invoked international scrutiny costs by 
providing grist for Soviet propaganda and diplomatic protests and by inviting 
                                               
20 On scrutiny costs, see Thompson, “Coercion Through IOs,” pp. 10-11. 
 
21 For a neorealist perspective, see Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1997), pp. 166-168. For a neoclassical realist perspective, see Evan N. Resnick, “Strange 
Bedfellows: U.S. Bargaining Behavior with Allies of Convenience,” International Security, Vol. 35, 




unnecessary pressure from the governments of Sweden and Finland to reject the 
bases, lest these two countries be negatively affected by Russian countermeasures. 
While this external opposition served to strengthen Denmark’s bargaining position 
vis-à-vis the United States, it effectively foreclosed any chance of reaching an 
agreement by forcing Danish authorities to adopt an uncompromising position that 
went beyond the United States’ ability to make concessions. Thus, the negative 
feedback from Denmark’s acknowledgement of the pending basing relationship 
undercut its original objective of achieving cooperation on terms that improved its 
security relative to the Soviet Union by establishing a hard-line bargaining stance that 
provoked stalemate with the United States. Alternatively, by not acknowledging their 
negotiations with the United States, the Norwegians deprived the Soviets of an 
important peg on which to base propaganda and diplomatic protests. Though this 
approach may have weakened Norway’s bargaining position vis-à-vis the United 
States, it enabled the Norwegians to accept a level of military cooperation deemed 
highly important by their Defense Ministry but considered otherwise impossible to 
attain in light of that country’s public no-bases policy and renewed Soviet threats of 
retaliation and strained relations. 
 
Security Cooperation and Foreign Military Basing 
I evaluate these general arguments about secrecy, public acknowledgement, and 
security cooperation by studying leaders’ control of information during negotiations 
for foreign military base rights. I chose this substantive domain for two reasons. First, 
13 
 
foreign basing is among the most controversial – and therefore secretive – forms of 
security cooperation, often perceived internationally as an instrument of aggression or 
a blight on sovereignty.22 Yet leaders – particularly in host states – regularly invoke 
public attention to basing negotiations, thus posing an interesting puzzle. Second, 
whereas most previous work on secrecy, deception, and public acknowledgment 
focuses on conflict scenarios between adversaries, the study of basing negotiations 
permits an analysis of information control in cooperative security relationships during 
wartime and peacetime. 
Foreign military basing is a prominent type of cooperative security 
relationship, where the sending state is granted privileges to station its military 
personnel at naval, air, or ground-force installations on the host state’s territory.23 It is 
regularly implicated in the study of grand strategy,24 extended deterrence,25 alliance 
                                               
22 See, for instance, Joseph Gerson and Bruce Birchard, eds., The Sun Never Sets…: Confronting the 
Network of Foreign U.S. Military Bases (Boston: South End Press, 1991); Chalmers Johnson, The 
Sorrows of Empire: Militancy, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic (New York: Henry Holt, 2004); 
Kent E. Calder, Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2007); Alexander Cooley, Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. 
Military Overseas (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008); Catherine Lutz, ed., The Bases of Empire: 
The Global Struggle against U.S. Military Posts (New York: New York University Press, 2009); 
Andrew Yeo, “Not In Anybody’s Backyard: The Emergence and Identity of a Transnational Anti-Base 
Network,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 3 (September 2009), pp. 571-594. 
 
23 Robert. E. Harkavy, Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases: The Geopolitics of Access 
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Foreign Military Presence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); James R. Blaker, United States 
Overseas Basing: An Anatomy of the Dilemma (New York: Praegor, 1990); Richard L. Kugler, 
Changes Ahead: Future Directions for the U.S. Overseas Military Presence (Santa Monica: Rand, 
1998). 
 
24 See, for instance, Michael C. Desch, When the Third World Matters: Latin America and United 
States Grand Strategy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); Barry Posen, “Command of 
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politics,26 international trade,27 foreign direct investment,28 the provision of economic 
aid,29 arms transfers,30 and host-state defense expenditures,31 economic growth,32 and 
democratization.33 Yet outside of historical and policy studies of specific access 
relationships and issues,34 foreign basing has received scant theoretical analysis or 
                                                                                                                                      
25 See, for instance, James D. Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking 
Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 1 (February 1997), pp. 68-90; Paul K. Huth, 
“Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates,” Annual Review 
of Political Science, Vol. 2 (1999), p. 36. 
 
26 See, for instance, James D. Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability 
Aggregation Model of Alliances,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 4 (November 
1991), pp. 904-933; Brett Ashley Leeds and Sezi Anac, “Alliance Institutionalization and Alliance 
Performance,” International Interactions, Vol. 31, No. 3 (July – September 2005), pp. 183-202. 
 
27 Glen Biglaiser and Karl DeRouen, “Economics and Security: The Interdependence of U.S. Troops 
and Trade in the Developing World,” Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 5, No. 3 (July 2009), pp. 247-263. 
 
28 Glen Biglaiser and Karl DeRouen, “Following the Flag: Troop Deployment and U.S. Foreign Direct 
Investment,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 51, No. 4 (December 2007), pp. 835-854. 
 
29 See, for instance, Harkavy, Bases Abroad, pp. 346-356; Duncan L. Clarke and Daniel O’Connor, 
“U.S. Base Rights Payments after the Cold War,” Orbis, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 441-457. 
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Overseas Bases,” in Stephanie G. Neuman and Robert E. Harkavy, eds., Arms Transfers in the Modern 
World (New York: Praeger, 1979), pp. 131-151. 
 
31 David A. Lake, “Escape from the State of Nature: Authority and Hierarchy in World Politics,” 
International Security, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Summer 2007), pp. 47-79. 
 
32 Tim Kane and Garett Jones, The Impact of U.S. Troop Deployments on Economic Growth, Report 
CDA05-03 (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, April 2005). 
 
33 Carol Atkinson, “Constructivist Implications of Material Power: Military Engagement and the 
Socialization of States, 1972-2000,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 50, No. 3 (September 2006), 
pp. 509-537; Cooley, Base Politics. 
 
34 See, for instance, Edward W. Chester, The United States and Six Atlantic Outposts: The Military and 
Economic Considerations (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1980); John W. McDonald, Jr., and 
Diane B. Bendahmane, eds., U.S. Bases Overseas: Negotiations with Spain, Greece, and the 
Philippines (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990); C. T. Sandars, America’s Overseas Garrisons: The 
Leasehold Empire (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Anni P. Baker, American Soldiers 
Overseas: The Global Military Presence (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005); Elliott V. Converse III, 
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(Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 2005); Franklin D. Kramer and C. Richard 
Nelson, Global Futures and Implications for U.S. Basing, Working Group Report (New York: Atlantic 
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rigorous empirical testing as a topic unto itself. This dissertation addresses three areas 
of scholarship in which further work is essential. 
Traditional basing scholarship focuses largely on the sending state’s interests 
and power, assuming implicitly that these constitute the determinants of basing 
politics,35 while an emergent revisionist literature shifts the explanatory focus to 
political and social dynamics within host states.36 These literatures talk past one 
another, generating partial answers and non-cumulative findings. To address this 
limitation, this dissertation carefully theorizes both states’ interests and influence 
simultaneously, shifting analytical attention back to international strategic as opposed 
to domestic political factors. 
A second area of scholarship in which further work is needed concerns the 
causal pathways associated with the development of basing relationships. All 
cooperative security relationships evolve over a series of sequential stages, from 
entering into negotiations to reaching an agreement and from cooperating under that 
agreement to negotiating a change in its terms. Since the advancement of cases from 
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earlier to later stages is a nonrandom process, a rigorous analysis must carefully 
model these stages.37 Current basing scholarship fails to do this, focusing almost 
exclusively on later stages of cooperation: namely, the renegotiation of basing 
agreements.38 This failure to systematically model the evolution of cases through each 
stage and to account for possible selection dynamics leaves our understanding of 
basing relationships incomplete, at best, and potentially biased, at worst. This 
dissertation project takes a first step toward addressing this limitation by examining 
the early stages of basing relationships – that is, the decisions to enter into talks, make 
concessions during negotiations, and reach an agreement. 
A final area of concern is the scope of empirical analyses. Historically, the 
origins and basic contours of most U.S. basing relationships were set immediately 
prior to or during wartime and often with host states that were not formal allies. 
Existing literature, however, focuses almost exclusively on peacetime basing 
relationships between the United States and major allies in Western Europe and East 
Asia, thus leaving the history of most access relationships unexamined in any 
significant detail. The majority of recent U.S. basing relationships similarly have 
emerged and taken shape in active conflict zones and outside the context of formal 
alliances. This pattern is likely to continue as the U.S. basing system expands into 
unstable regions where it previously had little or no presence. Methodologically, 
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current scholarship is limited to qualitative analyses of a small number of cases. 
While these studies have usefully illustrated the way in which specific theoretical 
arguments play out in particular cases, the literature as a whole has yet to conduct 
rigorous statistical tests on a sufficiently large sample of cases to produce 
generalizable findings. Based on extensive archival research, this dissertation 
addresses these limitations by constructing an original, comprehensive dataset on 
U.S. basing proposals, negotiations, and agreements during 1939 – 1971. I then use 
this dataset to test seven novel hypotheses about leaders’ management of information 
during each stage of cooperation through statistical analyses that produce strong 
support for my theoretical argument about power position and strategic context while 
systematically controlling for the effects of important domestic political factors. In 
this way, the project also advances the empirical study of international cooperation 
more broadly, since most existing datasets code the final terms of formal agreements 
but collect no data on prior stages of cooperation or on cases of negotiations that 
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Why is this Study Important? 
Why should we care about leaders’ management of information during foreign 
military basing negotiations? There are at least two general reasons. 
First, as the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy 
noted in 1997, “Information is power, and it is no mystery to government officials 
that power can be increased through controls on the flow of information.”40 For this 
reason, concludes Kenneth Mayer, “The availability of information…and the 
[reasons] for restricting the distribution of that information are central issues of 
government power, national security, and political legitimacy.”41 Whereas previous 
scholarship has focused primarily on the dyadic and domestic political reasons for 
leaders’ control of information, this dissertation shows that leaders’ use of secrecy 
also is motivated – often principally – by international strategic pressures related to 
power position and third-party states. 
Second, the Overseas Basing Commission recently concluded that “the basing 
posture of the United States, particularly its overseas basing, is the skeleton of 
national security upon which flesh and muscle will be molded to enable us to protect 
our national interests and the interests of our allies.”42 Yet, as Paul Huth notes, “the 
timely projection of military power with forward deployments of ground troops can 
                                               
40 U.S. Senate Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, Secrecy: Report of the 
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be undercut by domestic and regional political constraints that preclude extensive 
military preparations early in a crisis, when they are most critical.”43 This dissertation 
explores and demonstrates the central role that both sending- and host-state leaders 
attribute to information management in their often difficult pursuit of vital military 
cooperation. In these ways, this dissertation provides new insights and evidence on 
the potential national security implications of the current “war on government 
secrecy.”44 
 
Overview of the Dissertation 
In chapter 2, I first present my definition of a foreign military basing relationship and 
discuss explicitly what types of cases are included in and excluded from my analysis. 
I then identify and broadly describe the population of U.S. basing proposals, 
negotiations, and agreements during 1939 – 1971. I conclude this chapter with a brief 
discussion of the sources used to construct the dataset.  
In chapter 3, I first outline the three general dilemmas that leaders face when 
choosing to withhold or disclose information about pending military cooperation. I 
then develop my theory of how states’ power positions in the international system 
shape leaders’ decisions to go public or private during basing negotiations and the 
effects of those decisions on their bargaining behavior and the prospects of 
                                               
43 Huth, “Deterrence and International Conflict,” p. 36. 
 
44 See, for instance, Philip H. Melanson, Secrecy Wars: National Security, Privacy, and the Public’s 
Right to Know (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2001); Gabriel Schoenfeld, Necessary Secrets: National 
Security, the Media, and the Rule of Law (New York: Norton, 2010). 
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cooperation. This theory generates seven novel hypotheses, which are then tested 
empirically in chapters 4 – 5.  
In chapter 4, I present the empirical analysis of sending- and host-state 
leaders’ decisions to go public or private during basing negotiations. This analysis 
consists primarily of statistical tests of the first five hypotheses developed in chapter 
3. This quantitative analysis, however, is then supplemented with historical examples 
that illustrate the causal processes underlying each of the main findings. 
In chapter 5, I present the empirical analysis of sending- and host-state 
leaders’ decisions to make concessions and to reach an agreement during basing 
negotiations, with a particular focus on the effects of host-state leaders’ decisions to 
publicly acknowledge the pending relationship. I first conduct statistical tests of the 
remaining two hypotheses presented in chapter 3. To illustrate the causal processes 
underlying these quantitative findings, I then present comparative case studies of 
Danish and Norwegian basing negotiations with the United States during 1951 – 
1953. 
In chapter 6, I begin with an overview of the theoretical argument and 
empirical findings. I then examine the project’s relevance to the study of overseas 
basing and leaders’ management of national security information in the twenty-first 








CHAPTER 2:  







In the first section of this chapter, I present my definition of a foreign military basing 
relationship and discuss explicitly what types of cases are included in and excluded 
from my analysis.  In the second section, I identify and broadly describe the 
population of U.S. basing proposals, negotiations, and agreements during 1939 – 
1971. I conclude this chapter with a brief discussion of the sources used to construct 
the dataset. 
 
Conceptualizing Foreign Military Basing 
Foreign military basing is a prominent type of cooperative security relationship, 
where the sending state is granted privileges to station its military personnel at naval, 
air, or ground-force installations on the host state’s territory during wartime or 
peacetime. Foreign military installations, in turn, are defined as any real-property 
entity at a fixed land location used to launch or support military activities by foreign 
forces deployed on a permanent or rotating basis.1 
                                               
1 Robert. E. Harkavy, Great Power Competition for Overseas Bases: The Geopolitics of Access 
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To avoid practical problems of data collection and cross-case comparability, 
several types of cases are excluded from my analysis. First, various lesser elements of 
foreign military presence, if found by themselves or solely in combination with one 
another, are not included in the dataset: namely, privileges of military overflight, air 
transit, en route access, ad hoc staging, or technical stop; naval port calls; use of 
offshore anchorages within sovereign maritime limits; military missions (i.e., small 
groups of military advisors); pre-positioned materiel, fuel depots, or pipelines; 
weapons systems (i.e., missiles); and training exercises, maneuvers, or weapons 
testing.2 Though these constitute important and often quite secretive types of military 
cooperation, the access privileges encompassed by such policies are qualitatively and 
quantitatively different from those related to the deployment and hosting of foreign 
troops at fixed installations. 
The Swedish government’s consent in the 1950s to the United States’ 
utilization of a secret flight path over the southwestern part of Sweden, for example, 
does not qualify for inclusion in the dataset because the United States sought only to 
                                               
2 See, for instance, Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces 
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use Swedish airspace.3 U.S. negotiations with Norway, however, do qualify for 
inclusion because the United States sought to deploy its troops and aircraft at 
Norwegian airfields. Thus, what matters for purposes of inclusion in the dataset is 
that the United States specifically requests rights to station its military personnel at 
fixed installations on the host state’s territory. 
Also excluded are instances where bases develop organically during the 
course of fighting a war rather than as a result of a specific proposal to enter into a 
basing relationship. As Bernard Brodie notes, many combat “operations are 
undertaken for the purpose of capturing places already functioning as air or naval 
bases, or which might be made to serve as such. The intention may be to use such a 
base for oneself, or to deprive the enemy of its use, or both.”4 For example, as 
American forces pushed northward toward the Japanese-occupied Gilbert Islands in 
September 1943, bases were constructed on Nanomea in the British-held Ellice 
Islands “as a part of military operations without specific undertakings regarding 
them.”5 Such cases may eventually make their way into the dataset, but only when a 
                                               
3 Mikael Nilsson, “Amber Nine: NATO’s Secret Use of a Flight Path over Sweden and the 
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specific proposal for base rights is made. Thus, the Ellice Islands entered the dataset 
in November 1945, when American officials approached their British counterparts 
with a proposal to open negotiations for permanent base rights in the island group.6  
Alternatively, cases where a proposal is made and an agreement is reached but 
bases are never actually built or garrisoned do qualify for inclusion in the dataset. In 
late 1944, for instance, the United States opened negotiations with Yugoslavia for the 
construction and use of an airbase at Zara. While an agreement was signed on 18 
January 1945, construction of the base was delayed initially by adverse weather and 
then indefinitely on 18 May following the cessation of hostilities in Europe.7 As the 
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff note in this regard: 
There is a distinction between “rights” desired which can be exercised when 
necessary, and the actual establishment, garrisoning, and maintenance of 
bases. Whether or not the United States intends to take advantage of rights at 
any particular site will depend on a number of factors, such as current 
strategic concept, the international situation, new weapons of war, and the 
material and manpower resources available to the armed forces of the United 
States.”8 
 
Thus, what ultimately matters for purposes of inclusion in the dataset is that the 
United States specifically proposes to open negotiations for base rights – and, then, 
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whether the host state accepts or declines the proposal – rather than the actual 
construction or use of bases. 
Finally, renegotiations of existing agreements are not included in the analysis 
for theoretical and practical reasons. On the one hand, renegotiations are subject to 
different dynamics and are therefore not strictly comparable to talks for the original 
agreement.9 On the other hand, the data collection effort for the initial negotiations 
proved more time consuming than expected, thus making further research on 
renegotiations impractical at this point. 
 
The Population of U.S. Overseas Basing Relationships, 1939 – 1971 
Table 1, which is posted at the end of this chapter, provides a comprehensive list of 
U.S. proposals, host state acceptances/rejections, negotiations, and agreements for 
base rights on foreign territory where the United States did not already legally possess 
such privileges during 1939 – 1971. I chose this time period because the United 
States began to expand its foreign basing network in 1939 and official records after 
1971 are not widely accessible due to the minimum 30-year closure period for 
classified national security documents.10 During this period, the United States issued 
90 proposals to open basing negotiations, of which 82 were accepted by the potential 
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host state. These acceptances led to 218 rounds of bilateral talks and resulted in 59 
agreements. For each case in the table, I list the host territory/state, the month and 
year of the United States’ proposal to open talks, the month and year of the host 
state’s acceptance or rejection of the proposal, the negotiation time period, the total 
number of negotiation rounds, and the month and year of any agreement that was 
reached. Appendix A presents a summary description of each case. 
The observational referents for U.S. proposals, host state acceptances or 
rejections, and final agreements are relatively intuitive and straightforward: namely, 
identifying verbal requests and responses for negotiations by state officials and then 
the existence and text of a signed document. Rounds of talks, however, are more 
difficult to classify. In fact, though the process of international negotiations is widely 
characterized as a protracted “rebounding of ‘rounds,’”11 scholars have yet to provide 
a clear conceptualization of a negotiation round, instead using the term loosely in at 
least four ways. The first option is to treat each meeting as a round of talks. This 
conceptualization is problematic for two reasons. First, it offers too fine of a 
measurement for studying a large number of cases, which is why datasets capturing 
daily events must be aggregated in a substantively meaningful way for statistical 
analysis.12 Second, as any given case of basing negotiations can involve hundreds of 
individual meetings, this conceptualization risks inflating the number of observations 
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in the dataset. The second option is to group meetings covering individual issues as 
separate rounds. The problem with this conceptualization is that basing negotiations 
do not unfold in a set, predictable, or neat fashion, with each issue being raised, 
discussed, and resolved before moving onto the next issue. As most meetings can 
encompass multiple issues at a time, each of which may be tabled, withdrawn, or 
reopened at any point, the use of this conceptualization would raise concerns about 
the independence of observations in the dataset. The third option is to treat each 
iteration of the proposal/counterproposal process as a round of talks. As any given 
meeting can involve multiple proposals and counterproposals on individual issues, 
this option raises all of the aforementioned concerns. The final option is to separate 
negotiation rounds according to identifiable beginning and end points or periods of 
inactivity/impasse that last at least one month. I used this option to construct my 
dataset because it offers the most operationally feasible and substantively meaningful 
conceptualization of a negotiation round for studying a large number of basing 
relationships. 
 The United States’ basing negotiations with Norway during 1951 – 1952 
provide an example of a case where all of the rounds are easily separated by 
identifiable beginning and end points. Specifically, the first round of talks began on 
27 August 1951, as a telegram from the American Embassy in Oslo to the State 
Department indicated that the “first meeting regarding military operating rights [was] 
28 
 
held this morning.”13 After twelve meetings, this round ended on 20 December 1951 
with the signing of a memorandum of conversation that indicated “that we have, so 
far, terminated the negotiations on our agreement” and then summarized the 
trajectory of the talks up to that point.14  
On 4 July 1952, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Halvard Lange, informed 
the American Ambassador in Oslo, Charles Bay, that his “government would be 
ready [to] resume discussions by the middle of the month.”15 Accordingly, the second 
round of talks began on 24 July 1952, when Norwegian negotiators handed their 
American counterparts a new draft of the proposed agreement.16 After nine meetings, 
this round ended with the signing first of an Aide Memoire by Foreign Minister 
Lange and Ambassador Bay on 17 October 1952 and then of a military-level 
agreement the following day by the Chief of the Norwegian Air Force, Lieutenant 
General Finn Lambrechts, and the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, General Hoyt 
Vandenberg.17 
 The United States’ negotiations with the United Kingdom for airbase rights on 
Ascension Island during 1941 – 1946 provide an example of a case where some of the 
                                               
13 NOREP 1 from Oslo to Washington, 27 August 1951, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 
2. 
 
14 NOREP 27 from Oslo to Washington, 20 December 1951, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, 
Box 2. 
 
15 Telegram 19 from Oslo to Washington, 5 July 1952, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 3053, Box 2. 
 
16 Telegrams 77 and 78 from Oslo to Washington, 24-25 July 1952, NARA, RG 84, 350/66/2/7, Entry 
3053, Box 2. 
 





rounds can be separated according to identifiable beginning and end points while 
other rounds are separated by periods of inactivity/impasse lasting at least one month. 
On 27 January 1941, the American Ambassador in London, John Winant, and the 
British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Anthony Eden, commenced the first 
round of talks regarding the establishment of a U.S. Army air base on Ascension 
Island in the South Atlantic. Four days later, British officials indicated their general 
acceptance of the project. This round ended on 7 February 1941, when Secretary 
Eden presented a formal note that expressed his government’s willingness “to agree 
to this [project] being started immediately, leaving [further] discussions…to be 
undertaken as soon as is mutually convenient.”18  
The second round of talks began on 11 March 1942, when American officials 
tabled a draft agreement at a meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS). This 
text was under consideration and subject to regular revision by the CCS until 
American and British military officials reached an impasse on formalizing the 
existing working arrangements and suggested, on 25 December 1942, “that as this 
document is predominantly of a political nature, and on the assumption that it will 
eventually be agreed as between the U.S. Government and His Majesty’s 
Government, negotiations on the final draft of this agreement should be undertaken 
                                               
18 Telegrams 445, 463, and 568 from London to Washington, 30-31 January and 7 February 1942, in 
Foreign Relations of the United States: 1942, Vol. 1: General; The British Commonwealth; The Far 




by the State Department and Foreign Office.”19  U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull 
never acted on this recommendation, however, for the following reason: “As the 
operation of the base was proceeding smoothly under the informal arrangement in 
effect with the British Government, it seemed advisable not to disturb the situation,” 
given the “material differences between the British and the United States drafts of the 
proposed agreement.”20  
As a result, a period of inactivity ensued for thirty-four months until 6 
November 1945, when U.S. Secretary of State James Byrnes approached British 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Ernest Bevin with a proposal to reach a formal 
exchange of notes establishing long-term U.S. base rights on Ascension.21 British 
officials agreed to hold a third round of talks, which commenced on 13 March 1946 




                                               
19 CCS 121/2, 25 December 1942, “Formal Agreement for Use of Ascension Island,” NARA, RG 218, 
190/1/6/7, CDF 1942-45, CCS 373 1-29-42: “Protection of Air Routes from Brazil to the Middle East 
and Far East via Africa,” Box 290. 
 
20 Memorandum of Conversation, 24 April 1945, Subject: “Air Base on Ascension Island,” NARA, RG 
59, CDF 1945-49, 811.24549F/4-2745, Box 4655. 
 
21 Aide-Memoire from the Department of State to the British Embassy, 6 November 1945, in Foreign 
Relations of the United States: 1945, Vol. 6: The British Commonwealth; The Far East (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 206-211. 
 
22 See Foreign Relations of the United States: 1946, Vol. 5: The British Commonwealth; Western and 
Central Europe (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 11-16, 20-26, 28-30, 35-
45; C. T. Sandars, America’s Overseas Garrisons: The Leasehold Empire (Oxford: Oxford University 




A Comment on Sources 
I identified this population of cases primarily through extensive archival research at 
the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, MD) and the 
U.S. Center for Military History (Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.). This archival 
research, which resulted in digital scans of more than 17,000 pages of formerly-
classified records from the State, War, and Defense Departments, was supplemented 
with further research in official published document collections: namely, the Foreign 
Relations of the United States series, the Treaties and Other International Acts Series, 
the Executive Agreement Series, the Public Papers of the Presidents series, the 
Department of State Bulletin, and the Declassified Documents Reference System. I 
also consulted relevant secondary historical sources on diplomatic and military 
history for the United States and each host state. Appendix A presents a full list of the 
sources consulted for each case. 
 The fact that the vast majority of my primary source materials comes from 
U.S. archives and document collections leaves this study open to a charge commonly 
leveled against American diplomatic historians: namely, that the work only captures 
the “view from Washington.” In other words, by failing to consult relevant foreign 
archives, this dissertation is not fully capable of weighing important differences in the 
perceptions and impressions of situations across American and host-state officials.23 
My response to this critique is threefold. 
                                               
23 See, for instance, Sally Marks, “The World According to Washington,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 11, 
No. 3 (July 1988), pp. 265-288; John Lewis Gaddis, “New Conceptual Approaches to the Study of 
American Foreign Relations: Interdisciplinary Perspectives,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 14, No. 3 (July 
1990), pp. 405-423; Michael H. Hunt, “Internationalizing U.S. Diplomatic History: A Practical 
32 
 
 First, it is not problematic to rely primarily on American documents to 
identify and determine the basic population and general contours of cases – that is, 
the United States’ proposals to open negotiations, the host states’ acceptances or 
rejections of those proposals, the beginning and end points of negotiation rounds, and 
the signing of agreements. The dates associated with these events are not likely to 
vary dramatically – if at all – in the official accounts kept by host states. 
 Second, even the coding of more substantive details – such as demands or 
concessions made during negotiations – can be accomplished with a reasonable 
degree of accuracy based largely on American primary sources. After all, U.S. 
archives often contain documents and materials – for instance, position papers and 
draft agreements – written and presented by host state officials during the 
negotiations. American records also capture the give-and-take between sides during 
each meeting, which helps to provide at least superficial insight into host state 
perspectives, concerns, and bargaining positions. 
 Third, for more nuanced information on the internal dynamics shaping host 
state decisions, I rely on the work of historians – often host-state nationals – who 
have researched these cases using foreign archives. I have read extensively in relevant 
secondary historical scholarship, much of which provides rich accounts of the host 
state’s side of the story. For example, approximately one-third of María Emilia Paz’s 
excellent book Strategy, Security, and Spies is devoted to the United States’ efforts to 
                                                                                                                                      
Agenda,” Diplomatic History, Vol. 15, No. 1 (January 1991), pp. 1-11; Robert J. McMahon, “The 
Study of American Foreign Relations: National History or International History?” in Michael J. Hogan 
and Thomas G. Paterson, eds., Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations (New York: 




secure air and naval base rights in Mexico during World War II. She presents a 
parallel, comparative account of the various basing negotiations using primary source 
materials from the U.S. State and War Departments, which I also have accessed, and 
from Mexico’s Archivo Histórico, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores and the 
Archivo de la Secretaría de la Defensea Nacional.24 Similarly, the Danish Institute for 
International Studies recently produced a four-volume white book on Denmark’s 
national security policy during the Cold War. One chapter is devoted entirely to the 
United States’ failed efforts to secure air base rights in Jutland during 1951 – 1953. 
This account is written almost exclusively from declassified documents from the 
archives of the Danish Foreign and Defense Ministries.25  
With regard to the use of secondary historical sources, I am certainly 
sympathetic to Ian Lusticks’ argument that “the work of historians is not understood 
by historians to be, and cannot legitimately be treated by others as, an unproblematic 
background narrative from which theoretically neutral data can be elicited for the 
framing of problems and the testing of theories.”26 At the same time, though, this is 
                                               
24 María Emilia Paz, Strategy, Security, and Spies: Mexico and the U.S. as Allies in World War II 
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997). 
 
25 Danish Institute for International Studies, Denmark during the Cold War: National Security Policy 
and the International Environment, 1945-1991: Vol. 1, 1945-1962 (Copenhagen: Gullander, 2005), pp. 
249-291. For an assessment of this study, see Thorsten Borring Olesen, “Truth on Demand: Denmark 
and the Cold War,” in Nanna Hvidt and Hans Mouritzen, eds., Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2006 
(Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2006), pp. 80-113. For a broader assessment 
of prior research on this case, see Poul Villaume, “Post-Cold War Historiography in Denmark,” in 
Thorsten B. Olesen, ed., The Cold War – and the Nordic Countries: Historiography at a Crossroads 
(Odense: University Press of Southern Denmark, 2004), pp. 17-41. 
 
26 Ian S. Lustick, “History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the 





precisely why I do not rely exclusively on secondary sources but instead employ a 
combination of such materials with primary sources gathered through original 
research at American archives. The juxtaposition of secondary sources and original 
primary research enables me to carefully judge between competing claims and to 
recognize incomplete accounts presented by historians and thus to produce a more 
balanced, fine-grained analysis of each case.27 
A final issue to address is the empirical scope of this project. All large data 
gathering efforts are susceptible to the question: How can we be sure that all cases 
have been identified? A study of secrecy is especially likely to raise this concern. The 
short answer is simply that we will never know definitively if the full universe of 
cases has been identified. In some respects, then, this is a cheap critique, for the 
reader must entertain at least a basic level of trust in the researcher’s thoroughness 
and diligence. At the same time, I welcome and encourage anyone who feels that a 
case is missing to contact me directly and recommend it for inclusion.  
That being said, state officials certainly can attempt to destroy, distort, or 
otherwise contaminate contemporaneous records.28 As discussed in the previous 
chapter, for instance, nearly all of the official American records on the highly 
secretive talks during June – August 1939 between the United States and the United 
                                               
27 See Deborah Welch Larson, “Sources and Methods in Cold War History: The Need for a New 
Theory-Based Archival Approach,” in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, eds., Bridges and 
Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2001), pp. 327-350. 
 
28 For a brief discussion of this issue, see Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the 




Kingdom regarding naval base rights in Trinidad, Bermuda, and St. Lucia were 
burned at the urging of U.S. Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles.29 As Fitzroy 
Baptiste’s superb historical research on this case demonstrates, though, foreign policy 
decisions – even the most secretive – tend to leave a paper trail, despite some 
officials’ deliberate efforts to conceal it. Accordingly, the two years of careful and 
exhaustive historical research that went into constructing my dataset on U.S. basing 
negotiations should go at least some distance toward satisfying those who are 
skeptical of the feasibility of large data gathering projects. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter presents my definition of foreign military basing and identifies the 
population of cases for my analyses. The next chapter develops a realist-inspired 
theoretical framework for thinking about leaders’ management of information during 
basing negotiations. This framework generates seven hypotheses that are then tested 
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      Date 
    Host State 
Response: Date 
   Negotiation 
  Time Period 
Number  of   
  Rounds 
   Agreement:  
       Date 
Brazil    5/1939    A: 5/1939 5/1939 – 5/1942 4    Y: 5/1942 
Bermuda, St. Lucia, & Trinidad/ 
United Kingdom 
   6/1939    A: 6/1939 6/1939 – 11/1939 2    Y: 11/1939 
Fakarava Island/France    8/1939    A: 8/1939 8/1939 – 11/1939 1    N 
Mexico    8/1939    A: 6/1940 7/1940 – 1/1943 5    N 
Galapagos Islands/Ecuador    10/1939    A: 10/1939 11/1939 – 3/1947 9    N 
Panama    11/1939    A: 11/1939 7/1940 – 3/1942 2    Y: 5/1942 
Cuba    5/1940    A: 5/1940 8/1940 – 9/1942 4    Y: 9/1942 
Dominican Republic    5/1940    A: 5/1940 8/1940 – 12/1941 2    Y: 12/1941 
Haiti    5/1940    A: 5/1940 8/1940 – 12/1941 2    Y: 12/1941 
Venezuela    5/1940    A: 6/1940 8/1940 – 7/1942 3    N 
Uruguay    5/1940    A: 6/1940 6/1940 – 10/1940 2    N 
Peru    5/1940    A: 6/1940 9/1940 – 7/1942 3    Y: 7/1942 
Colombia    5/1940    A: 6/1940 9/1940 – 9/1942 4    Y: 9/1942 
Ecuador    5/1940    A: 6/1940 9/1940 – 1/1942 2    Y: 1/1942 
Chile    5/1940    A: 6/1940 8/1940 – 9/1940 1    N 
Argentina    5/1940    D: 10/1940 NA 0    N 
Costa Rica    6/1940    A: 6/1940 8/1940 – 1/1942 2    Y: 1/1942 
Nicaragua    6/1940    A: 6/1940 8/1940 – 11/1942 4    Y: 11/1942 
Honduras    6/1940    A: 6/1940 9/1940 – 9/1942 3    Y: 9/1942 
Guatemala    6/1940    A: 6/1940 9/1940 – 11/1942 3    Y: 11/1942 
El Salvador    6/1940    A: 6/1940 9/1940 1    N 
Caribbean & North Atlantic 
Territories/United Kingdom 
   8/1940    A: 8/1940 8/1940 – 3/1941 2    Y: 3/1941 
Canada    8/1940    A: 8/1940 8/1940 – 2/1944 4    Y: 2/1944 
Paraguay    8/1940    A: 8/1940 8/1940-9/1940 1    N 
Bolivia    8/1940    A: 8/1940 9/1940 – 4/1942 2    N 
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      Date 
    Host State 
Response: Date 
   Negotiation 
  Time Period 
Number  of   
  Rounds 
   Agreement:  
       Date 
United Kingdom    1/1941    A: 1/1941 1/1941 – 7/1942 3    Y: 7/1942 
Greenland/Denmark    2/1941    A: 2/1941 4/1941 1    Y: 4/1941 
Liberia    6/1941    A: 6/1941 6/1941 – 3/1942 2    Y: 3/1942 
Iceland    6/1941    A: 6/1941 6/1941 – 5/1942 2    Y: 5/1942 
Surinam/Netherlands    9/1941    A: 9/1941 9/1941 – 11/1941 1    Y: 11/1941 
Fiji/United Kingdom    10/1941    A: 10/1941 10/1941 – 8/1942 2    Y: 8/1942 
Dutch East Indies/Netherlands    10/1941    A: 10/1941 10/1941 – 11/1941 1    N 
Phoenix Islands/United 
Kingdom 
   10/1941    A: 10/1941 10/1941 – 4/1947 3    N 
Australia    10/1941    A: 10/1941 10/1941 – 5/1942 2    Y: 5/1942 
Line Islands/United Kingdom    10/1941    A: 10/1941 10/1941 – 4/1947 3    N 
Western Samoa/New Zealand    10/1941    A: 10/1941 10/1941 – 3/1942 2    Y: 3/1942 
Solomon Islands/United 
Kingdom 
   10/1941    A: 10/1941 10/1941 – 5/1946 2    N 
New Caledonia/France    11/1941    A: 11/1941 12/1941 – 3/1942 2    Y: 3/1942 
New Hebrides/United Kingdom    11/1941    A: 11/1941 12/1941 – 5/1946 5    N 
Dutch Antilles/Netherlands    12/1941    A: 12/1941 12/1941 – 1/1942 1    Y: 1/1942 
Bora Bora/France    12/1941    A: 12/1941 12/1941 – 2/1942 2    Y: 2/1942 
Ascension Island/United 
Kingdom 
   1/1942    A: 1/1942 1/9142 – 5/1946 3    N 
French Equatorial Africa/France    2/1942    A: 2/1942 2/1942 – 9/1942 3    Y: 9/1942 
Tongatabu/United Kingdom    2/1942    A: 3/1942 5/1942 – 8/1942 2    Y: 8/1942 
Oman    7/1942    A: 8/1942 8/1942 – 11/1942 1    Y: 11/1942 
Eastern Siberia/Soviet Union    7/1942    D: 1/1943 NA 0    N 
Iran    10/1942    A: 11/1942 11/1942 – 3/1945 3    N 
French North Africa/France    11/1942    A: 11/1942 11/1942 1    Y: 11/1942 
French West Africa/France    12/1942    A: 12/1942 12/1942 – 2/1944 2    Y: 2/1944 
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      Date 
    Host State 
Response: Date 
   Negotiation 
  Time Period 
Number  of   
  Rounds 
   Agreement:  
       Date 
French Guiana/France    3/1943    A: 3/1943 3/1943 – 4/1943 2    Y: 5/1943 
Ukraine/Soviet Union    10/1943    A: 12/1943 2/1944 – 3/1944 1    Y: 3/1944 
Azores/Portugal    11/1943    A: 11/1943 11/1943 – 7/1945 4    Y: 7/1945 
Eastern Siberia/Soviet Union    11/1943    A: 2/1944 6/1944 – 4/1945 3    N 
Saudi Arabia    7/1944    D: 7/1944 NA 0    N 
Yugoslavia    12/1944    A: 12/1944 12/1944 – 1/1945 1    Y: 1/1945 
Philippines    4/1945    A: 4/1945 5/1945 – 3/1947 3    Y: 3/1945 
Saudi Arabia    5/1945    A: 5/1945 5/1945 – 8/1945 1    Y: 8/1945 
Kurile Islands/Soviet Union    8/1945    D: 8/1945 NA 0    N 
Ellice Islands/United Kingdom    11/1945    A: 2/1946 3/1946 – 12/1946 2    N 
Gilbert Islands/United Kingdom    11/1945    A: 2/1946 3/1946 – 12/1946 2    N 
Admiralty Islands/Australia    3/1946    A: 4/1946 4/1946 – 7/1947 4    N 
Newfoundland/Canada    10/1946    A: 10/1946 11/1946 – 3/1952 3    Y: 3/1952 
Belgian Congo/Belgium    3/1948    D: 3/1948 NA 0    N 
Ethiopia    11/1948    A: 11/1948 3/1952 – 5/1953 3    Y: 5/1953 
Sri Lanka    1/1949    D: 9/1949 NA 0    N 
Libya    6/1950    A: 6/1950 8/1951 – 9/1954 6    Y: 9/1954 
Federal Republic of Germany    9/1950    A: 9/1950 1/1951 – 5/1952 3    Y: 5/1952 
Iceland    9/1950    A: 1/1951 2/1951 – 5/1951 1    Y: 5/1951 
Japan    2/1951    A: 2/1951 2/1951 – 2/1952 2    Y: 2/1952 
France    3/1951    A: 3/1951 4/1951 -10/1952 2    Y: 10/1952 
Norway    4/1951    A: 4/1941 8/1951 – 10/1952 2    Y: 10/1952 
Spain    6/1951    A: 6/1951 7/1951 – 9/1953 4    Y: 9/1953 
Denmark    1/1952    A: 1/1952 9/1952 – 1/1953 2    N 
Turkey    9/1952    A: 9/1952 2/1953 – 6/1954 2    Y: 6/1954 
Italy    12/1952    A: 12/1952 1/1953 – 10/1954 4    Y: 10/1954 
Greece    4/1953    A: 4/1953 8/1953 – 10/1953 1    Y: 10/1953 
39 
 




      Date 
    Host State 
Response: Date 
   Negotiation 
  Time Period 
Number  of   
  Rounds 
   Agreement:  
       Date 
Republic of Korea    8/1953    A: 8/1953 8/1953 – 7/1966 7    Y: 7/1966 
Netherlands     2/1954    A: 2/1954 2/1954 – 8/1954 3    Y: 8/1954 
Thailand    5/1954    A: 5/1954 11/1966 – 7/1968 2    N 
Republic of China (Taiwan)    2/1955    A: 2/1955 8/1955 – 7/1965 5    Y: 8/1965 
Pakistan    12/1965    D: 12/1965 NA 0    N 
Morocco    6/1956    A: 11/1956 5/1957 – 12/1959 5    N 
Pakistan    12/1957    A: 12/1957 4/1958 – 7/1959 2    Y: 7/1959 
Federation of the West Indies    12/1959    A: 12/1959 12/1959 – 2/1961 5    Y: 2/1961 
Guyana    12/1959    A: 9/1965 9/1965 – 5/1966 2    Y: 5/1966 
Surinam/Netherlands    4/1960    A: 4/1960 4/1960 – 4/1962 4    Y: 4/1962 
Australia    9/1960    A: 9/1960 9/1960 – 5/1963 2    Y: 5/1963 
Indian Ocean Territories/United 
Kingdom 
   10/1960    A: 10/1960 9/1962 – 12/1966 5    Y: 12/1966 
Onn Kyunt Island/Bangladesh    3/1971    D: 3/1971 NA 0    N 
Bahrain    4/1971    A: 4/1971 7/1971 – 12/1971 1    Y: 12/1971 








CHAPTER 3:  
A THEORY OF POWER, SECRECY, AND INTERNATIONAL AUDIENCES IN 







In this chapter, I develop a theory of how states’ power positions in the international 
system shape (1) leaders’ decisions to go public or private during military basing 
negotiations and (2) the effects of those decisions on leaders’ bargaining behavior and 
the prospects of cooperation. This theory abstracts from purely dyadic and domestic 
political factors, holding constant any influence they may exert on leaders’ use of 
secrecy in pursuit of security cooperation. In doing so, I am not suggesting that these 
are unimportant, for leaders engaged in negotiations clearly have incentives to 
withhold information from each other and domestic audiences. Rather, the purpose of 
this theory is to rectify the relative neglect of international audiences – namely, third-
party states – as targets of information control in previous scholarship.  
In the first part of this chapter, I outline the three general dilemmas that 
leaders face when choosing to disclose or withhold information about pending 
military cooperation. In the second part, I argue that a state’s power position in the 






Dilemmas of Information Disclosure in Cooperative Security Negotiations 
Leaders engaged in cooperative security negotiations must decide whether to directly 
invoke the attention of outside audiences (going public) or to pursue talks secretly 
without their knowledge (going private). For the purposes of this study, then, the 
concept of secrecy or going private captures leaders’ concealment of the occurrence 
as well as the content of negotiations rather than simply the latter.1 Leaders face three 
general dilemmas when choosing to disclose or withhold information about pending 
military cooperation. In confronting these dilemmas, leaders are assumed to act 
rationally, choosing the most efficient means for the attainment of identified ends, 
and strategically, calculating options based on expectations of other actors’ behavior. 
 
Constraints, Bargaining Leverage, and the Prospects of Cooperation 
The first dilemma arises from leaders’ efforts to manipulate constraints that 
simultaneously enhance their bargaining leverage but decrease the overall probability 
of cooperation. As Thomas Schelling notes, often in bargaining situations “we must 
maneuver into a position where we no longer have much choice left. This is the old 
business of burning bridges – of maneuvering into a position where one clearly 
cannot yield….In strategy…the advantage goes often to the one who arranges the 
                                               
1 This point is similar to Dean Pruitt’s distinction between back-channel communication, which is 
completely unknown to outside audiences, and front-channel communication, which is known but not 
necessarily witnessed by outside audiences. See Dean G. Pruitt, “Back-channel Communication in the 
Settlement of Conflict,” International Negotiation, Vol. 13, No. 1 (April 2008), pp. 37-54. Similarly, 
David Pozen distinguishes between deep secrets, where leaders conceal from outside audiences the fact 
that they are concealing information, and shallow secrets, where audiences understand that they are 
being denied certain items of information. See David E. Pozen, “Deep Secrecy,” Stanford Law Review, 




status quo in his favor” and thus relinquishes to the other side the initiative to 
concede.2 Going public is one prominent strategy of constraints, where leaders invoke 
the attention of outside audiences to generate opposition as a tactic for signaling their 
resolve to stand firm in negotiations or for enhancing their bargaining leverage by 
creating additional costs for accepting less favorable terms of agreement.  As Duncan 
Black observes, however, in light of the obstinacy attendant to such a strategy, “it is 
quite possible that no agreement will be reached,” for “a nation may refuse to move 
from its more-preferred solutions, in the hope that it may thereby force the others to 
make the concessions.”3 Thus, formal theorists have shown that when public 
acknowledgement generates a higher level of constraints for one of the negotiating 
parties, that leader’s bargaining position often improves, though at the cost of 
shrinking the set of terms that both negotiating parties can openly accept by inducing 
them to posture and adopt uncompromising demands.  This bargaining inefficiency 
creates an incentive for leaders to pursue talks secretly.4 
                                               
2 Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 43-45. 
 
3 Duncan Black, The Theory of Committees and Elections (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
1998), p. 177. 
 
4 See, for instance, James D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International 
Disputes,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, No. 3 (September 1994), pp. 577-92; David 
Stasavage, “Open-door or Closed-Door? Transparency in Domestic and International Bargaining,” 
International Organization, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Fall 2004), pp. 667-703; David Stasavage, “Polarization 
and Publicity: Rethinking the Benefits of Deliberative Democracy,” Journal of Politics, Vol. 69, No. 1 
(February 2007), pp. 59-72; Bahar Leventoğlu and Ahmer Tarar, “Prenegotiation Public Commitment 
in Domestic and International Bargaining,” American Political Science Review, Vol., 99, No. 3 
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For instance, when the United States approached Greece in April 1953 with a 
request for base rights, Prime Minister Alexandros Papagos agreed to hold talks but 
desired to release a press statement shortly before the negotiations commenced in late 
August.5 In a telegram to the American Embassy in Athens, Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles gave the following reasons for the United States’ opposition to invoking 
public attention: (1) “Greece constitutes [a] sensitive peripheral area and it 
would…constitute useful grist [for] Soviet propaganda”; (2) “Certain arrangements 
are politically sensitive….We are attempting [to] avoid…public speculation and 
discussion”; and (3) “We fear [the] inference that [the] Greeks might use [the] grant 
[of] base rights as leverage [to] obtain concessions….Public announcement would 
strengthen [the] Greek hand [in] this respect.”6 Not wishing to jeopardize the 
negotiations, Papagos ultimately decided to withhold the announcement.7 Similarly, 
when approached by American officials in June 1940 to discuss the construction and 
use of air and naval bases, Uruguayan Foreign Minister Alberto Guani agreed to hold 
                                               
5 Letter from President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Papagos, 5 June 1953, and Telegram 431 from 
Athens to Washington, 14 August 1953, in Foreign Relations of the United States: 1952-1954, Vol. 8: 
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711.56381/8-1453, Box 3198. 
 
7 Telegram 668 from Athens to Washington, 1 September 1953, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1950-1954, 




talks but, anticipating opposition from Argentina, insisted that “any actual agreement 
to use the bases by the United States might be the subject of a secret agreement.”8 
 
Precedents: The Benefits of Success and the Costs of Failure 
The second dilemma is that the attentiveness of outside audiences to leaders’ foreign 
policy behavior simultaneously increases the benefits of success and the costs of 
failure.9 In particular, leaders manage information to accrue (or avoid) the precedent-
setting benefits (or costs) of concessions.10 As Paul Anderson notes, “Governments 
care about the expectations other governments infer from their behavior because 
expectations make a difference….Unlike public diplomacy, secret foreign policy 
actions will be relatively unconstrained by the influence of…precedents on 
expectations.”11 Thus, leaders may go public to set favorable precedents for future 
negotiations with third-party states – namely, other potential cooperative partners – or 
pursue talks privately to minimize the precedent-setting nature of their concessions. 
For instance, when the United States sought to release a public statement regarding its 
                                               
8 Despatches 999, 7 June 1940, and 1003, 10 June 1940, from Montevideo to Washington, NARA, RG 
59, CDF 1940-1944, Confidential File (250/34/16/3-4), 810.20 Defense/864 and 871, Box C19. 
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basing negotiations with Ethiopia in 1952, Foreign Minister Ato Aklilou demanded 
that the negotiations remain secret, fearing otherwise that “many European bees will 
want an equal right to sip the Ethiopian honey.”12 
 
Deterrence, Provocation, and Surprise 
The final dilemma confronting leaders engaged in cooperative security negotiations is 
the potential trade-off between the deterrent or coercive benefits from publicly 
signaling strength to an adversary and the risk of diminishing the military 
effectiveness of the relationship by unnecessarily provoking an opponent to take 
preventive measures or sacrificing the tactical advantages of surprise.13 Returning to 
the case of Greece, for instance, Prime Minister Papagos sought to release a press 
statement prior to the negotiations partially in an effort to deter a possible Bulgarian 
attack.14 Alternatively, when asked at an October 1943 news conference whether the 
United States would approach Russia for airbase rights in Siberia for bombing raids 
against the Japanese home islands, President Franklin Roosevelt dismissed the 
                                               
12 Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary Acheson and Foreign Minister Aklilou, 21 
October 1952, in Foreign Relations of the United States: 1952-1954, Vol. XI: Africa and South Asia 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 430. 
 
13 See, for instance, Bernard Brodie, “Military Demonstration and Disclosure of New Weapons,” 
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question by responding rhetorically, “What do you think Japan would do? Try and 
stop it—yes. The Japanese would start invading Siberia. The Russians would, of 
course, resist. But suppose Russia wasn’t prepared to fight a two-front war; suppose 
she had all she could do to fight the Germans.”15 Shortly thereafter, however, in a 
private meeting with Marshal Joseph Stalin, President Roosevelt requested rights to 
construct airbases and station one thousand American heavy bombers in Siberia, 
emphasizing that the project must be “accomplished with the utmost secrecy.”16  
In the remainder of this chapter, I argue that the international strategic context 
and the scope of states’ national security interests are primary causal factors 
influencing the way leaders handle these three dilemmas. 
 
A Theory of Power, Secrecy, and International Audiences in Basing Negotiations 
I develop a theory of how states’ power positions in the international system shape 
leaders’ decisions to go public or private during military basing negotiations and the 
effects of those decisions on leaders’ bargaining behavior and the prospects of 
cooperation. The basic logic of the theory is rooted in two general propositions 
traditionally associated with a realist perspective on international politics. First, given 
the lack of a supranational authority with the power to protect states’ independence, 
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leaders are on their own to promote their state’s national interests. Accordingly, 
ensuring the security of their state from external threat and preserving the autonomy 
of their foreign policy from external influence constitute basic goals. Second, the full 
scope of a state’s national interests and efforts to advance them is driven principally 
by its power position in the international system.17 In particular, the security interests, 
goals, and concerns of great powers are more complex and multidimensional than 
those of weaker states. Whereas small powers focus primarily on preserving the 
security and independence of their national territory, great powers seek to advance 
myriad military, political, and economic interests that implicate the security of their 
homeland and various extended territories.18 
In the first subsection below, I argue that a state’s power position also shapes 
its leaders’ management of national security information by affecting the size and 
attentiveness of international audiences, the types of assets it brings to the negotiating 
table, and the benefits it seeks to realize through military cooperation. This argument 
generates five novel hypotheses about leaders’ decisions to go public or private 
during military basing negotiations. In the second subsection, I extend this argument 
to show how states’ power positions and leaders’ management of national security 
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18 See Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 
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information affect their bargaining behavior and the prospects of cooperation, 
generating two novel hypotheses about the effects of public acknowledgement on 
leaders’ willingness to make concessions during basing negotiations and their 
likelihood of reaching an agreement. 
 
Power, Secrecy, and the Pursuit of Security Cooperation 
A state’s power position in the international system shapes its leaders’ management 
of information – and thus the decision to go public or private – during military basing 
negotiations in three ways: by affecting the size and attentiveness of international 
audiences, the types of assets it brings to the negotiating table, and the benefits it 
seeks to realize through military cooperation. 
THE SIZE AND ATTENTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL AUDIENCES. The first way 
a state’s power position shapes its leaders’ management of national security 
information is by affecting the size and attentiveness of international audiences. Put 
simply, a great power’s foreign policy choices are likely to receive more attention 
from a wider international audience, including allies and adversaries, because its 
behavior affects a broader range of actors and interests. Consequently, a great 
power’s pursuit of a controversial foreign policy, such as a military basing 
relationship, is likely to generate a higher level of international attention and thus 
possibly increased opposition. For the same reason, the precedent-setting effects of 
concessions – whether positive or negative – are also likely to be more expansive for 
great powers, given the scope of their other international relationships.  
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Most basing relationships are characterized by a dramatic asymmetry of 
capabilities between the sending and host states. The sending state is invariably a 
great power and often enjoys a preponderance of material capabilities relative to the 
receiving state.19 Some hosts, however, are also great powers, accounting for 41 (or 
18.8%) of the 218 rounds of U.S. negotiations during 1939 – 1971.20 The argument 
above implies that leaders should be less inclined to disclose information during 
basing negotiations when both sending and host states are great powers for two 
reasons. First, military cooperation between two great powers holds significant 
international implications simply by virtue of their potential aggregate capabilities. 
Consequently, public acknowledgement of pending great-power cooperation will 
attract the attention of a wider international audience and thus invite enhanced 
opposition, particularly from adversaries. Second, the decision by one great power to 
host another great power’s military forces on its territory may be perceived by 
international audiences as a signal of the former’s diminishing status as a major 
player. Given that they “must rely upon their own power for the protection of their 
existence and power position, [great powers] can hardly neglect the effect that 
                                               
19 Specifically, the mean ratio of aggregate power for the United States and the host states was 0.92 for 
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a…loss of prestige will have upon their power position on the international scene.”21 
This suggests the first hypothesis. 
H1: Sending- and host-state leaders are less likely to go public when both states 
are great powers. 
 
ASSETS, COERCION, AND BARGAINING LEVERAGE. The second way a state’s 
power position shapes its leaders’ management of national security information is by 
affecting the types of assets it brings to the negotiating table. The assets states bring 
to a cooperative security relationship vary in their specificity, ranging from aggregate 
resources that are “highly flexible and easily transferred from one application to 
another” to issue-specific assets that are “highly specialized and difficult to 
redirect.”22 When security cooperation is symmetrical in terms of assets, both parties 
bring primarily aggregate or issue-specific resources to the negotiating table. In 
asymmetrical relationships, one party possesses primarily aggregate and the other 
issue-specific assets. Whereas great powers exert influence by virtue of their 
aggregate economic and military capabilities, weaker states gain bargaining leverage 
by manipulating relationship-specific assets needed by the stronger state.23 Basing 
relationships are characterized by this type of asymmetry of assets, for each host state 
enjoys an advantage in issue-specific power by virtue of its sovereign control over 
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site-specific resources.24 In particular, a weak state that controls access to 
strategically-located territory can use the threat of territorial denial to effectively 
reduce the overall leverage that the superior sending state can wield during the 
negotiations.25 Consequently, the sending state’s material predominance does not 
necessarily translate into a clear bargaining advantage,26 except in cases where its 
capabilities carry an explicit threat of coercion. For instance, some basing agreements 
are outgrowths of colonial relationships (e.g., the Philippines in 1947) or military 
occupations imposed on vanquished enemies (e.g., Germany and Japan in 1952). In 
such cases of “imposed cooperation,” the host-state leader’s contractive capacity is 
sufficiently impaired that she has little choice but to make any desired concessions 
                                               
24 The general point being made here is that the nature of basing relationships is such that the host state 
always enjoys an advantage in issue-specific power relative to the sending state because it controls 
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base or host state does vary depending on numerous contextual factors. As Alexander Cooley and 
Hendrik Spruyt note, “the particular asset specificity of each overseas U.S. military installation will 
depend on a number of factors, including the importance of an installation to a major theater of 
operation, its functional importance within a particular operational or logistics network, and/or its 
positional importance to a regional command. In addition, the value and specificity of a base might be 
subject to particular doctrinal or institutional innovations that may alter the relative strategic value of 
that installation. Technological innovations may render certain assets and installations obsolete or 
increase the value of others. A final factor determining the specificity of certain bases to the overall 
U.S. network is the periodic consolidation and reorganization of redundant sites.” See Alexander 
Cooley and Hendrik Spruyt, Contracting States: Sovereign Transfers in International Relations 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009). Consequently, one host state may possess more issue-
specific power relative to another host state due to any one of these or other factors. The theoretical 
argument developed here, however, does not attempt to assess or capture the specificity of one host 
state compared to another. Instead, it focuses on the broader point about host states’ general advantage 
in issue-specific power relative to the sending state. 
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and to do so publicly.27 All else equal, I argue that sending-state leaders can attempt 
to use such unequal agreements to set favorable precedents for future negotiations 
with other states. This suggests a second hypothesis. 
H2: Sending- and host-state leaders are more likely to go public when the host 
state was recently subjugated by the sending state. 
 
THE BENEFITS OF SECURITY COOPERATION. The third way a state’s power 
position shapes its leaders’ management of information is by affecting the benefits it 
seeks to realize through security cooperation. In general, a military relationship can 
advance a state’s security (i.e., its ability to preserve a desired status quo) or 
autonomy (i.e., its ability to pursue desired changes in the status quo). When military 
cooperation is symmetrical, both parties receive either security or autonomy benefits. 
In asymmetrical relationships, one party receives security and the other autonomy.28 
Basing relationships, by definition, involve the host state offering concessions (i.e., 
access privileges) that increase the sending state’s freedom of action by extending its 
ability to project power abroad. In return, the host state can receive a variety of quid 
pro quo, though most enter into basing relationships primarily for the security 
benefits implicit in hosting a foreign military. This asymmetry of benefits, with the 
sending state receiving autonomy and the host state security, shapes leaders’ 
                                               
27 On imposed cooperation, see Helen Milner, “International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: 
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management of information during basing negotiations by affecting how they assess 
the dilemma between deterring and provoking adversaries in light of the international 
strategic context. 
A state’s ability to quickly project power declines with distance, while the 
threat posed by an adversary increases with proximity.29 A primary purpose of 
foreign military basing is to enhance the sending state’s ability to overcome the time-
distance problem inherent to power projection by establishing a forward presence 
near potential theaters of operation ahead of time.30 Foreign basing relationships are 
perceived as security-enhancing by host states and provocative by adversaries, in 
turn, precisely because they bring the sending state’s military capabilities into closer 
proximity to both. As a great power seeking to enhance its autonomy by expanding its 
forward presence abroad, the sending state will be more inclined to pursue a basing 
relationship secretly when it expects an adversary to have heightened incentive and 
ability to forcefully oppose particular negotiations. The argument above suggests that 
this is especially likely in two situations. The first is when the potential host territory 
is located on the immediate periphery of the sending state’s adversary, for a 
proximate threat is more likely to prompt the enemy to forcefully oppose the 
negotiations. The second is when the sending state’s ability to deter or compel an 
                                               
29 See Kenneth A. Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper, 1962), pp. 
229-230, 245-247; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1981), pp. 40-44; Walt, Origins of Alliances, pp. 23-24. 
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adversary is undermined by an overextension of its military capabilities. Specifically, 
taking on simultaneous military commitments in multiple disputes increases the risk 
of spreading the sending state’s forces too thin.31 Thus, when the sending state is 
already engaged in a war, it will be more likely to pursue basing negotiations secretly 
for fear of triggering a response by the enemy against the host or some other territory 
where it may not be prepared to resist. In both situations, the host-state leader also is 
likely to prefer secret negotiations to avoid prematurely provoking military retaliation 
against her homeland from the sending state’s enemy. This suggests the third 
hypothesis. 
     H3: Sending- and host-state leaders are less likely to go public when 
(a) the potential host territory shares a border with an adversary of the 
sending state or  
(b) the sending state is involved in an interstate war. 
 
As a weaker state seeking to enhance its security by hosting a foreign military, 
however, the receiving state will be more inclined to pursue a basing relationship 
publicly when it faces an immediate external threat. In this case, the host-state leader 
has incentives to use a public basing relationship to signal strength to her adversary, 
for any perceived increase in the host state’s capabilities that is attendant to engaging 
in military cooperation with the sending state may serve to deter the host state’s 
enemy or compel it to seek an early negotiated settlement if fighting occurs. In light 
of the host state’s need for immediate support, the sending-state leader will be more 
likely to accept public negotiations in this situation, anticipating enhanced bargaining 
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leverage and thus more favorable agreement terms. This is especially likely when the 
host state is already engaged in active conflict, for the fear of prematurely provoking 
its adversary is no longer operative. This suggests the fourth hypothesis. 
     H4: Sending- and host-state leaders are more likely to go public when the host  
state is involved in an interstate war. 
 
Alternatively, a state may seek to ensure its security or autonomy by pursuing 
a policy of neutrality whereby it agrees to remain impartial in ongoing conflicts, 
specifically preventing other states from using its territory for military purposes in 
return for their agreeing not to violate its territorial integrity.32 Yet neutral states often 
are approached for base rights, accounting for 63 (or 28.9%) of the 218 rounds of 
U.S. negotiations during 1939 – 1971. Moreover, the United States itself as the 
sending state was committed to a neutralist policy for 48 (or 22%) of the rounds. The 
arguments above imply that leaders will be more likely to pursue basing negotiations 
secretly when either is publicly committed to neutrality for three reasons. First, from 
the sending state’s perspective as a great power, publicly pursuing base rights on 
neutral territory may set an unfavorable precedent that motivates adversaries to seek 
their own footholds in neutral states. Second, when the sending state itself is neutral, 
it may pursue basing negotiations secretly as a strategy for discreetly building up its 
forward presence and preserving the advantages of surprise in anticipation of future 
conflict. Third, from the host’s perspective as a weaker state, “neutrality can be a 
                                               
32 See Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns 
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matter of existence.”33 Thus, for a small neutral state, publicly granting base rights to 
a great power may be dangerous, as it invites opposition from the sending state’s 
adversaries.34 This suggests the fifth hypothesis. 
     H5: Sending- and host-state leaders are less likely to go public when either state is  
publicly committed to a policy of neutrality in an ongoing conflict. 
 
 
Public Acknowledgement, Bargaining, and the Prospects of Security Cooperation 
In this subsection, I extend the argument above in two ways to show how states’ 
power positions and leaders’ management of national security information affect their 
bargaining behavior and the prospects of cooperation. First, I argue that power 
position shapes the distribution of constraints in cooperative security relationships by 
affecting the balance of vulnerability between the negotiating parties to abandonment 
and entanglement. Second, I argue that public acknowledgement can enhance the 
more vulnerable or constrained partner’s bargaining position by invoking the 
attention of third-party states, whose opposition to the pending relationship generates 
scrutiny costs that affect the negotiating parties’ willingness to make concessions and 
the overall likelihood of reaching an agreement. 
POWER ASYMMETRIES AND THE BALANCE OF VULNERABILITY. As suggested 
above, cooperative security relationships vary broadly across two dimensions: the 
benefits each partner seeks to realize (i.e., security or autonomy) and the assets each 
partner brings to the negotiating table (i.e., issue-specific or aggregate). These two 
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dimensions tend to co-vary, since each partner can offer and receive different benefits 
in light of the complementary assets each brings to the relationship.35 For this reason, 
cooperative security relationships often exhibit an asymmetry across both dimensions, 
with one side seeking autonomy and bringing primarily aggregate resources to the 
negotiating table and the other seeking security and offering issue-specific assets in 
return. Basing relationships exhibit this dual asymmetry, with the host state offering 
issue-specific concessions (i.e., access to strategic territory) that increase the sending 
state’s freedom of action by extending its ability to project power abroad. In return, 
the host state receives the security benefits implicit in hosting a great power’s military 
forces. 
Such asymmetries shape the distribution of constraints in cooperative security 
relationships by affecting the balance of vulnerability between the negotiating parties 
to abandonment and entanglement. Abandonment refers broadly to the fear that one’s 
partner may fail to deliver its end of the bargain.36 Entanglement, on the other hand, 
refers to the concern that one may be compelled to pursue costly policies (or may 
experience negative externalities) on account of the relationship.37 Because they are 
                                               
35 See, for instance, Morrow, “Alliances and Asymmetry.” 
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more dependent on the cooperative relationship, states seeking security and 
possessing inflexible specific assets are generally more vulnerable to both 
abandonment and entanglement – and thus more constrained – than states seeking 
autonomy and possessing more flexible aggregate assets.  
Basing relationships demonstrate this point. Given that the host state’s 
territory is simultaneously the fixed asset it seeks to secure through the relationship 
and the one it offers as its side of the bargain, the host is more exposed to the risk of 
abandonment and entanglement than the sending state, whose objectives and assets 
afford greater flexibility. Host states often view foreign bases as a way of cementing a 
great power’s defense commitment, while at the same time recognizing that the 
sending state possesses the ability to withdraw or redeploy its forces elsewhere if its 
strategic interests change.38 Similarly, though hosting a foreign military may 
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generally increase the probability of successful extended deterrence,39 it also can 
place the host state “on the target list of another power.”40 While the sending state 
itself is certainly susceptible to abandonment and entanglement – as reflected in the 
locational redundancy of the United States’ basing system and its preference for 
retaining unrestricted use rights – the nature of the sending state’s objectives and 
assets helps to minimize these risks and affords it a greater ability to adjust should 
either arise. This imbalance of vulnerability, then, places a higher level of constraints 
on the host state. 
In his seminal work Alliance Politics, Glenn Snyder suggests generally that 
one strategy for dealing with abandonment fears is to draw attention to them through 
the use of “diplomatic communications and public statements,” while one way of 
dealing with entanglement concerns is “through the exercise of bargaining power.”41 
In the next subsection, I argue that for host states, on account of their higher level of 
constraints, these strategies are one and the same. 
PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL SCRUTINY. Underlying the 
host state’s negotiating behavior, given its vulnerable position, is the desire to avoid 
serving as “mere real estate” for the pursuit of the sending state’s strategic objectives 
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at the expense of its own interests.42 To address this grievance, host states seek 
concessions across two broad agreement design features. The first is control, which 
concerns each actor’s ability to influence how decisions are made within the context 
of the relationship, thus determining each actor’s ability “to block undesirable 
outcomes.”43 Specifically, the use rights governing a basing relationship capture the 
choice between agreements that grant the host state prior consultation over the 
sending state’s use of its troops and military assets stationed within the host’s borders 
and agreements that grant the sending state unilateral decision-making power to 
deploy its military forces based in the host state outside the latter’s borders.44 The 
various out-of-area disputes between the United States and West European hosts are 
prominent examples of bargaining over use rights, where the latter sought to restrict 
the use of U.S. bases for missions in other regions.45 The second design feature 
concerns the precision with which a basing agreement specifies the behavior it 
requires, authorizes, or proscribes.46 In particular, host states can seek to limit the 
types of installations, assets, and personnel stationed within their borders and to fully 
                                               
42 George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1962), p. 144. 
 
43 Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, “The Rational Design of International 
Institutions,” International Organization, Vol. 55, No. 4 (October 2001), pp. 772, 792. 
 
44 Alexander Cooley, Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2008), pp. 41-42. 
 
45 See Geir Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe Since 1945 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), pp. 142-167. 
 
46 Kenneth W. Abbott, Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan 





specify the extent of the sending state’s defense commitment. Examples here include 
France’s refusal to allow nuclear weapons to be stationed at U.S. bases47 and 
Australia’s efforts to link base rights on Manus Island to the creation of a broad U.S. 
security arrangement in the Pacific.48 
Public acknowledgement is one strategy that host states can use to press these 
demands during negotiations. As Robert Keohane notes, for a weaker “state that 
wants political, military or economic support,…it is imperative that visibility be 
maintained by insisting that [its stronger partner] is overlooking some of its important 
interests.”49 The visibility attendant to public acknowledgement can invite or 
intensify international opposition to the pending relationship, generating an additional 
constraint in the form of scrutiny costs – from monitoring by third-party states – 
which the weaker partner can use as leverage during the negotiations.50 The logic here 
is that while “sending the signal bears no direct costs (a situation often called ‘cheap 
talk’)” for the host state, public acknowledgement can lead “to actions by other actors 
that impose costs.”51 Such actions include diplomatic protests, hostile propaganda 
                                               
47 See Patrick Facon, “U.S. Forces in France, 1945-1958,” in Simon W. Duke and Wolfgang Krieger, 
eds., U.S. Military Forces in Europe: The Early Years, 1945-1970 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1993), pp. 243-247. 
 
48 See Roger Bell, “Australian-American Discord: Negotiations for Post-War Bases and Security 
Arrangements in the Pacific, 1944-1946,” Australian Outlook, Vol. 27, No. 1 (April 1973), pp. 12-33. 
 
49 Keohane, “Big Influence of Small Allies,” p. 168. 
 
50 On scrutiny costs, see Alexander Thompson, “Coercion Through IOs: The Security Council and the 
Logic of Information Transmission,” International Organization, Vol. 60, No. 1 (Winter 2006), pp. 10-
11. 
 
51 James D. Morrow, “Alliances: Why Write Them Down?” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 3 
(2000), p. 69. For a cheap talk reputational theory of diplomacy during international disputes, see Anne 
E. Sartori, Deterrence By Diplomacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). 
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statements, and other forms of official objections or resistance that carry a threat of 
strained relations by third-party states opposed to the new precedents and 
provocations resulting from the pending basing relationship.52 This resistance creates 
an additional bargaining constraint for two reasons. First, following public 
acknowledgement, host-state leaders are obliged to respond to this opposition, which 
serves to clarify and, in the process, solidify their bargaining demands. When basing 
negotiations are secret, on the other hand, third-party resistance can simply be ignored 
or denied and thus has no constraining effects. Second, it increases the value of 
noncooperation for the host state relative to cooperation on unfavorable terms. By 
inviting resistance and the prospect of strained relations from third-party states, 
particularly adversaries, public acknowledgement by the weaker host does not merely 
communicate a vulnerability it already had but actually enhances that vulnerability in 
the process. Thus, the message from the host to the sending state is: “In case we were 
not sufficiently exposed to impress you, now we are.”53 This is an informative signal 
because it conveys simultaneously (1) the host state’s willingness to suffer the costs 
of third-party reactions if the terms of cooperation meet its needs and (2) the 
imperative of walking away if the terms do not sufficiently compensate for the 
                                               
52 See Joseph C. McKenna, Diplomatic Protest in Foreign Policy: Analysis and Case Studies 
(Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1962); Robert F. Trager, “Diplomatic Calculus in Anarchy: How 
Communication Works,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 104, No. 2 (May 2010), pp. 347-
368; Todd H. Hall, “We Will Not Swallow This Bitter Fruit: Theorizing a Diplomacy of Anger,” 
Security Studies, Vol. 20, No. 4 (October – December 2011), pp. 521-555. 
 
53 The phrasing of this part of my argument draws heavily and closely from Thomas Schelling’s 
discussion of relinquishing the initiative and the process of commitment by coupling capabilities to 




increased vulnerabilities it might otherwise experience.54 By effectively maneuvering 
into a bargaining position where the choice is between noncooperation and 
cooperation on its terms, the host state has arranged the status quo in its favor and left 
to the sending state the decision to concede. 
These scrutiny costs from public acknowledgement by the weaker, more 
constrained state put pressure on the stronger, less vulnerable partner to make 
concessions to ensure cooperation for two reasons. First, with regard to precedent 
setting, the sending state must balance its preference for securing the most favorable 
terms possible, as suggested above, with the need to reassure other potential 
cooperative partners that they will not be exploited. Thus, when one host state goes 
public to draw attention to unequal gains and liabilities in a pending basing 
relationship, the sending state can choose to exercise “strategic restraint” by making 
concessions as a means of ensuring cooperation and alleviating other partners’ fears 
of domination.55 As Donald Moak notes, “United States bases have regularly been the 
object of allied striving for ‘independence within interdependence.’ When such 
efforts are focused on its bases, the United States has usually accepted some 
limitation of base rights rather than risk an open conflict with the…host.”56 Second, 
by invoking the attention – and thus exacerbating the opposition – of a rival power, 
                                               
54 This latter point is similar to Judith Kelley’s concept of strategic noncooperation in asymmetrical 
bargaining situations. See Judith Kelley, “Strategic Non-cooperation as Soft Balancing: Why Iraq was 
not Just about Iraq,” International Politics, Vol. 42, No. 2 (2005), pp. 153-173. 
 
55 For a theory of strategic restraint and order formation in the aftermath of major wars, see G. John 
Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major 
Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
 




public acknowledgement by the host state can serve to emphasize “the severity of the 
threat posed by the common adversary,” thereby blurring the distinction between the 
host state’s concerns and the sending state’s self-interest.57 
For similar reasons, though, the scrutiny costs from public acknowledgement 
can motivate the weaker, more constrained state to adopt an uncompromising position 
that goes beyond its partner’s ability to make concessions. As argued above, once a 
host-state leader has acknowledged the negotiations, she is then obliged to respond to 
the opposition generated by the visibility. The opportunity to clarify one’s bargaining 
position can lead, in turn, to a hardening of that position. “The result,” as Dean Pruitt 
notes, often “is ‘speeches to the gallery’ – endless repetition of official positions and 
past grievances – which sound good when relayed to [outside audiences] but do not 
advance the negotiations.” Alternatively, a benefit of secret negotiations is that they 
are “usually disavowable if an outsider finds out about them. The leaders can argue 
that reports about these talks are faulty, that these reports concern other innocent 
events, or that the people engaged in these talks were not authorized to do so.”58 The 
negative feedback from public acknowledgement can undercut the host state’s 
original objective of securing cooperation on favorable terms by establishing a hard-
line bargaining stance that provokes stalemate.59  
                                               
57 Avery Goldstein, “Discounting the Free Ride: Alliances and Security in the Postwar World,” 
International Organization, Vol. 49, No. 1 (Winter 1995), pp. 48-49, 55. 
 
58 Pruitt, “Back-channel Communication,” pp. 41, 43. 
 
59 See Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton 




Ultimately, then, while public acknowledgment of cooperative security 
negotiations by the weaker, more vulnerable partner produces a short-term bargaining 
advantage for that side, it has a long-term effect of reducing the overall likelihood 
that the two sides will reach an agreement. This argument suggests the last two 
hypotheses.60 
H6: Public acknowledgement of negotiations by the host state 
(a) increases the likelihood that the sending-state leader will make 
concessions but  
(b) decreases the likelihood that the host-state leader will make concessions. 
 
H7: Public acknowledgement of negotiations by the host state decreases the  
likelihood of the two parties reaching an agreement. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I develop a realist-inspired theoretical framework for thinking about 
(1) leaders’ control of information during military basing negotiations and (2) the 
impact of information disclosure on their bargaining behavior and the prospects of 
cooperation. This theory focuses on third-party states as the primary targets of 
information management and emphasizes the effects of international power position 
and strategic context, holding constant any influence that purely dyadic and domestic 
political factors may exert on leaders’ use of secrecy and public acknowledgement in 
pursuit of security cooperation. I derive seven hypotheses from this framework. The 
first five examine the conditions under which leaders are more or less likely to go 
public or private during negotiations. These hypotheses are evaluated empirically in 
                                               
60 The broader theoretical argument developed in the first half of this chapter also suggests several 
hypotheses beyond the effects of public acknowledgment that link variation in international power 
position and strategic context to leaders’ bargaining behavior and the prospects of cooperation. These 
supplementary expectations are briefly discussed in Appendix C. 
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the next chapter. The remaining two hypotheses focus on the effects of public 
acknowledgement on leaders’ willingness to make concessions and reach an 





















CHAPTER 4:  
POWER, SECRECY, AND THE PURSUIT OF SECURITY COOPERATION: 








In this chapter, I present the empirical analyses of sending- and host-state leaders’ 
decisions to go public or private during basing negotiations. I first discuss the unit of 
analysis, variable operationalizations, and statistical model used in the quantitative 
tests of H1 – H5. I then report the results of the statistical analysis. I also provide 
several illustrative historical examples for each of the main findings. 
 
Negotiation Rounds as the Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis is the negotiation round rather than the standard dyad-year 
observation for two reasons. First, more than one round of talks can take place in a 
single year, and any given round of talks can spill over from one year to the next. By 
examining the actual episodes of interest rather than yearly observations, this research 
design is better suited to capture patterns of activity and substantive decisions that do 
not necessarily unfold on an annual basis.1 Second, each leader faces the choice of 
going public or private during each negotiation round. Thus, two outcomes are coded 
for every round: one for the sending-state leader and one for the host-state leader. 
                                               
1 See John R. Freeman, “Systemic Sampling, Temporal Aggregation, and the Study of Political 




Compared to a dyad-year analysis that aggregates both leaders’ choices into a single 
observation, this research design is better suited to capture the effects of different 
variables on each leader’s decision.2 
 
The Dependent Variable and Statistical Model 
GOING PUBLIC: The dependent variable for both the sending and host states is 
dichotomous, coded 1, respectively, if officials from that state publicly acknowledge 
a round of negotiations prior to its commencement or while it is taking place. Thus, 
the code of 0 captures going private. The data were gathered through archival 
research – principally in the General Records of the Department of State (RG 59) and 
the Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State (RG 84) at the 
National Archives – and through supplementary research using official published 
document collections, the ProQuest Historical Newspapers database, and secondary 
historical sources. 
While both leaders separately decide whether to pursue public or private 
strategies in a given round of talks, their individual choices are interrelated. Given 
dichotomous dependent variables, a bivariate probit model is an appropriate statistical 
technique for capturing the interrelated decisions of two separate actors. This model 
estimates a separate equation for the likelihood that the sending- and host-state 
leaders will individually choose to go public in a round of negotiations. The model 
                                               
2 Paul K. Huth and Todd L. Allee, The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth 




also accounts for the interrelatedness of their choices by incorporating the correlation 
of the errors between the two equations, which is expressed as the parameter rho (ρ). 
A statistically significant and positive rho indicates that the unmeasured factors that 
affect the sending state’s equation also affect the host state’s equation in a similar 
way. A significant and negative rho, on the other hand, indicates that the common 
unmeasured factors affect the two equations in an opposite manner.3 Thus, I estimate 
a bivariate probit model to examine the sending- and host-state leaders’ decisions to 
go public during each round of negotiations. 
Since a leader’s decision to go public in any given round may be related to her 
decision to enter into that round in the first place, I also test for possible selection bias 
by estimating a Heckman or censored probit model. I found no evidence of selection 
effects biasing the analyses, however, and the results remained consistent.4 
Consequently, I report only the bivariate probit results below. 
 
The Independent Variables 
The independent and control variables are measured on a month-specific basis to 
more accurately capture their effects on leaders’ decisions to go public or private. 
Thus, when either leader goes public, the data for the independent and control 
                                               
3 William H. Greene, Econometric Analysis (3rd Ed., Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1997), pp. 
906-911; Christopher Zorn, “U.S. Government Litigation Strategies in the Federal Appellate Courts,” 
Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 55, No. 1 (March 2002), pp. 156-157; Huth and Allee, Democratic 
Peace, pp. 189-191. 
 
4 Specifically, the selection model’s estimated rho (ρ) parameter, which indicates the correlation of the 
disturbances across the two equations, did not approach standard levels of statistical significance. The 




variables are drawn from the month when this decision is made. Alternatively, if 
neither leader goes public, the data for the variables are drawn from the last month of 
that round of talks. 
 GREAT POWER: This indicator is dichotomous, coded 1 if the host state was 
classified as a major power by Vesna Danilovic.5 The United States was a major 
power during the entire coding period. 
SUBJUGATION: This indicator is dichotomous, coded 1 if the host state was 
forcibly subjugated by the sending state in the recent past – that is, defeated in war by 
the United States within the past five years, formerly occupied militarily by the 
United States, or formerly a U.S. colony. The data were gathered from relevant 
secondary historical sources and the Correlates of War (COW) Wars dataset.6 
ADVERSARY BORDER: This indicator is dichotomous, coded 1 if the host 
territory shares a land or sea border with a third state that is engaged in a militarized 
dispute with – or is a strategic rival of – the sending state at the time of the 
negotiations. Data on land and sea borders come from the COW Direct Contiguity 
and Colonial/Dependency Contiguity datasets.7 The primary sources of data on 
                                               
5 Vesna Danilovic, When the Stakes Are High: Deterrence and Conflict among Major Powers (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), pp. 26-46, 225-230. 
 
6 Meredith Sarkees and Frank Wayman, Resort to War: A Data Guide to Inter-State, Extra-State, 
Intra-State, and Non-State Wars, 1816-2007 (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2010). 
 
7 Douglas M. Stinnett, Jaroslav Tir, Philip Schafer, Paul F. Diehl, and Charles Gochman, “The 
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disputes and rivals are the COW Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset8 and Michael 
Colaresi, et al.’s dataset on strategic rivalries.9 
WARTIME: A separate variable is coded for the sending and host states. This 
indicator is dichotomous, coded 1 if the state is engaged in an interstate war at the 
time of the negotiations. Data come from the COW Wars dataset. 
NEUTRALITY: This indicator is dichotomous, coded 1 if the sending or host 
state was publicly committed to a policy of neutrality, non-belligerency, or non-
alignment in an ongoing conflict. The data were gathered from relevant secondary 
historical sources. 
 
The Control Variables 
COALITION SIZE: This variable is included as a control for domestic regime type, 
which previous scholarship suggests affects leaders’ use of secrecy. Using Bruce 
Bueno de Mesquita, et al.’s five-point winning coalition scale, ranging from 0 (the 
smallest coalition size) to 1 (the largest coalition size), this indicator is dichotomous, 
coded 1 if the host-state leader’s coalition size equals .75 or 1, thus capturing large-
coalition leaders. The code of 0, in turn, captures small-coalition leaders – that is, all 
                                               
8 Daniel M. Jones, Stuart A. Bremer, and J. David Singer, “Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1992: 
Rationale, Coding Rules and Empirical Patterns,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 15, 
No. 2 (Summer 1996), pp.163-213. 
 
9 Michael P. Colaresi, Karen Rasler, and William R. Thompson, Strategic Rivalries in World Politics: 




leaders with coalition sizes equal to 0, .25, and .5.10 This variable is coded only for 
the host state, as the United States had a large coalition during the entire coding 
period. I chose this operationalization of regime type for two theoretical reasons. 
First, selectorate theory’s argument regarding coalition size and the provision of 
public versus private goods is particularly relevant to explaining leaders’ bargaining 
behavior during basing negotiations.11 Second, recent scholarship also links variation 
in coalition size to leaders’ incentive and ability to engage in secret foreign policy 
behavior.12 
 EXECUTIVE CONSTRAINTS: This indicator measures the degree of 
institutionalized constraints on the power of the executive to determine policy. It is 
included as a control variable for the elements of democracy outside of the winning 
coalition: namely, legislative constraints.13 Previous scholarship suggests legislative 
branches that possess significant powers of oversight can decrease the executive’s 
incentive and ability to withhold information about foreign policy behavior.14 This 
                                               
10 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, The Logic 
of Political Survival (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003). 
 
11 Alexander Cooley, Base Politics: Democratic Change and the U.S. Military Overseas (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2008). 
 
12 Jonathan N. Brown and Anthony S. Marcum, “Avoiding Audience Costs: Domestic Political 
Accountability and Concessions in Crisis Diplomacy,” Security Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April – June 
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13 James D. Morrow, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith, “Retesting 
Selectorate Theory: Separating the Effects of W from Other Elements of Democracy,” American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 102, No. 3 (August 2008), pp. 393-400. 
 
14 See, for instance, Thomas M. Franck and Edward Weisband, eds, Secrecy and Foreign Policy (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1974), pp. 42-162; John D. Lees, “Legislatures and Oversight: A 
Review Article on a Neglected Area of Research,” Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 2 (May 
1977), pp. 193-208; Philip H. Melanson, Secrecy Wars: National Security, Privacy, and the Public’s 
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indicator is dichotomous, coded 1 if the EXCONST variable in the Polity IV dataset 
is equal to 7, which captures executive parity or subordination to a relevant 
accountability group such as a legislature.15 This variable is coded only for the host 
state, as the United States had a value of 7 for EXCONST during the entire coding 
period. 
ELECTION: This variable is included as a control for cycles of political 
vulnerability in democratic states, as previous scholarship suggests that leaders are 
significantly less likely to go public just prior to elections than immediately after 
them.16 A separate variable is coded for the sending and host states. This indicator is 
coded as the number of months since the last relevant national election – rather than 
the number of months until the next election – to account for endogenous election 
timing in parliamentary systems.17 Information on the dates of all national elections 
comes from the Archigos dataset.18  
PRESS COVERAGE: This variable is included as a control for the effects of the 
media on leaders’ incentives and ability to engage in secret foreign policy 
                                                                                                                                      
Right to Know (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2001); Riccardo Pelizzon and Rick Stapenhurst, 
“Democracy and Oversight,” in Riccardo Pelizzon, Rick Stapenhurst, and David Olson, eds., 
Parliamentary Oversight for Government Accountability (Washington, DC: World Bank Institute, 
2006), pp. 6-22. 
 
15 Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers, Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and 
Transitions, 1800-2007 (University of Maryland, College Park, 2007). 
 
16 Bahar Leventoğlu and Ahmer Tarar, “Prenegotiation Public Commitment in Domestic and 
International Bargaining,” American Political Science Review, Vol., 99, No. 3 (August 2005), p. 422. 
 
17 Huth and Allee, Democratic Peace, p. 96. 
 
18 Henk E. Goemans, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza, “Introducing Archigos: A 




behaviors.19 This indicator is dichotomous, coded 1 if the national press in either the 
sending or host state printed news stories reporting prospective U.S. military basing 
in the potential host territory within at least three months prior to the negotiation 
round. Data for the United States were coded from press coverage in The New York 
Times, The Washington Post, and The Chicago Tribune, based primarily on research 
using the ProQuest Historical Newspapers database. Data for the potential host 
territory were coded from press coverage in national newspapers in each potential 
host state as comprehensively tracked by the U.S. Department of State in RG 59 and 
RG 84 at the National Archives. 
TECHNICAL ROUND: This indicator is dichotomous, coded 1 if the negotiation 
round is devoted primarily to technical military details about the force structure 
deployed in the host state. Given that the disclosure of such information to an enemy 
could undermine established war plans or sacrifice the immediate tactical advantages 
of surprise, negotiation rounds devoted primarily to technical military details are 
more likely to be shrouded in secrecy. The data were gathered from archival sources. 
PREVIOUS PUBLIC ROUND: This indicator is dichotomous, coded 1 if the 
previous negotiation round was public, as a control for past history.20 
                                               
19 For a thorough review of the literature on the media and leaders’ management of foreign policy 
information, see Matthew A. Baum and Philip B.K. Potter, “The Relationships Between Mass Media, 
Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis,” Annual Review of Political 
Science, Vol. 11 (2008), pp. 39-65. 
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ROUND: This indicator counts the number of previous rounds, as a control for 
the non-independence of observations.21 
 
The Results 
The results of the bivariate probit analysis are presented in Table 2 and provide strong 
support for the hypotheses and the overall theoretical argument. Moreover, there is 
considerable support for the use of a bivariate probit model. The parameter rho (ρ) is 
positive and significant, indicating that the sending- and host-state leaders’ decisions 
are highly correlated and that the unmeasured factors affecting the sending state’s 
equation also affect the host state’s equation in a similar way.22 To aid interpretation 
of substantive effects, Table 3 reports the impact of changes in select significant 
variables on predicted probabilities for going public.23 Table 4 provides a summary of 
the expected and observed relationships. 
                                               
21 To further address concerns related to the nonindependence of observations, clustered robust 
standard errors are used in the analyses. 
 
22 The extremely high ρ coefficient in this model simply reflects the fact that both decisions, while 
made separately, often are jointly coordinated, as suggested by the case of Greece discussed in chapter 
3. Despite this high correlation, the bivariate probit is a more useful and informative model than a 
probit with a dyadic dependent variable because the former can capture the different effects that 
independent variables might have across each leader’s decision. The ability to separate the two 
wartime variables, for instance, demonstrates the utility of the bivariate probit, as these indictors 
generate more nuanced relationships that otherwise would be missed with an aggregate dyadic 
variable. 
 
23 The predicted probabilities represent the marginal probability of the sending or host state going 
public, regardless of whether the other state also goes public. The baseline probability was calculated 
by setting all variables at their mean or mode. The first difference was calculated by subtracting the 
baseline predicted probability from the predicted probability following a discrete change in the 
variable of interest from its low value to its high value, holding all other variables constant. The 
percentage change in probability was calculated by dividing the discrete change in the predicted 




 The first hypothesis received strong support. As predicted, both sending- and 
host-state leaders are significantly less likely to go public during basing negotiations 
when both states are great powers. In particular, the United States is 48.1% less likely  
 
Table 2: Bivariate Probit Results for Going Public in a Round of Negotiations 
 Sending State Decision 
To Go Public 
Host State Decision 
To Go Public 
INTERNATIONAL VARIABLES   
  Great Power  -.676*  -.932** 
 (.392) (.392) 
  Subjugate      2.50***     2.29*** 
 (.673) (.664) 
  Adversary Border     -1.17***   -.965** 
 (.398) (.401) 
  Wartime (U.S.)     -.930***  -.684** 
 (.296) (.338) 
  Wartime (Host)     .881***   .660* 
 (.322) (.376) 
  Neutrality      -1.06***      -1.21*** 
 (.315) (.380) 
DOMESTIC & CONTROL 
VARIABLES 
  
  Large Coalition Size      -2.61***       -2.54*** 
 (.608) (.668) 
  Executive Constraints    .900***    1.19*** 
 (.344) (.436) 
  Election (U.S.) .003 -.007 
 (.008) (.010) 
  Election (Host) .007 .008 
 (.009) (.009) 
  Press Coverage      1.57***      1.64*** 
 (.350) (.328) 
  Technical Round  -.762* -.175 
 (.424) (.510) 
  Previous Public Round       .644**       .902*** 
 (.326) (.325) 
  Round .076 .136 
 (.093) (.093) 
  Constant -.704 -.738 
 (.495) (.476) 
N = 218. Log pseudolikelihood = -90.87. 
ρ = .985. Wald test of ρ: p = .000.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering. 




and the host state is 74.1% less likely to go public under these circumstances. In 
August 1939, for instance, when the United States approached France for naval base 
rights on Fakarava Island in the South Pacific, the following rationale was given for 
conducting the negotiations secretly. 
The [lease] of one of the islands of the Tuamotu Archipelago and the 
establishment of a naval base there might be interpreted by Japan as part of an 
encircling movement by the only great power which is at present in a position 
to wage effective warfare against Japan. This strategic threat to Japan might 
be expected to render American-Japanese relations more difficult and more 
unfriendly than they are at present and to increase the likelihood of eventual 
war between the two countries. It could be further anticipated that…in the 
event of indecision on the part of Japan as to whether she should join with 
Germany and Italy in a war against Great Britain and France, knowledge that 
the United States was intending to establish a naval base in the Tuamotu 
Islands might influence Japan into active participation in the war: Japan might 
conclude that it would be preferable to come to a showdown militarily with 
Great Britain and France prior to development of the contemplated naval base 
as such a base would weaken Japan’s position in the Pacific in the event of 
war with Great Britain and France.24 
 
Precisely for these reasons, the negotiations quickly broke down following the 
German invasion of Poland and France’s entry into World War II in September 1939. 
Alternatively, British officials often expressed the concern that publicly granting base 
rights to the United States would be perceived internationally as “bad bargains” for 
the United Kingdom and unbecoming of a great power.25 Consistent with these 
                                               
24 Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hamilton) to the Under Secretary 
of State (Welles), 28 June 1939, in Foreign Relations of the United States: 1939, Vol. 2: The British 
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rationales for secrecy, when news broke in September 1940 that the United Kingdom 
had granted extensive base rights to the United States in eight British possessions in 
the North Atlantic and the Caribbean, officials in Germany, Italy, and Japan 
interpreted this agreement as a sign of both the British Empire’s eminent demise and 
the rise of an American-led bloc, thus motivating the formation of the Tripartite Pact 
two weeks later.26 
 The second hypothesis also received strong support. As predicted, both 
sending- and host-state leaders are significantly more likely to go public when the 
host state recently was defeated in war by the sending state, formerly occupied by the 
sending state, or formerly a colony of the sending state. In particular, the United 
States is 94.9% more likely to go public when it has forcibly subjugated the host in 
the recent past. The host state, in turn, is 179.7% more likely to go public. Thus, when 
the sending state’s superior capabilities carry an explicit threat of force, it can attempt 
to utilize this leverage to wrest more favorable terms of agreement that may set 
favorable precedents for future negotiations. For instance, the United States publicly 
secured highly unequal agreements with the Philippines in 1946 – 1947 (a recently 
former colony) and Japan in 1951 – 1952 (a recently defeated and formerly occupied 
enemy) by effectively making favorable base rights a necessary condition for granting
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Cooperation (London: Europa, 1981), pp. 131-132; Fitzroy André Baptiste, War, Cooperation, and 
Conflict: The European Possessions in the Caribbean, 1939-1945 (New York: Greenwood Press, 




Table 3: Impact of Changes in Variables on Predicted Probabilities for Going Public 
 Sending State Host State 
INTERNATIONAL VARIABLES   
  Great Power   
     No (0) .511 .340 
     Yes (1) .265 .088 
     First Difference -.246 -.252 
     % Change -48.1% -74.1% 
  Subjugate   
     No (0) .511 .340 
     Yes (1) .996 .951 
     First Difference .485 .611 
     % Change 94.9% 179.7% 
  Adversary Border   
     No (0) .511 .340 
     Yes (1) .048 .122 
     First Difference -.463 -.218 
     % Change -90.6% -64.1% 
  Wartime (U.S.)   
     No (0) .511 .340 
     Yes (1) .118 .131 
     First Difference .231 -.209 
     % Change  -45.2% -61.2% 
  Wartime (Host)   
     No (1) .511 .340 
     Yes (1) .812 .595 
     First Difference .301 .255 
     % Change 58.9% 75% 
  Neutrality   
     No (0) .511 .340 
     Yes (1) .111 .057 
     First Difference -.400 -.283 
     % Change -78.3% -83.2% 
DOMESTIC VARIABLES   
  Large Coalition Size   
     No (0) .511 .340 
     Yes (1) .001 .003 
     First Difference -.510 -.337 
     % Change -99.8% -99.1% 
  Executive Constraints   
     Low (0) .511 .340 
     High (1) .855 .748 
     First Difference .344 .408 
     % Change 67.3% 120% 
  Press Coverage   
     No (0) .511 .340 
     Yes (1) .952 .884 
     First Difference .441 .544 




both states independence.27 It subsequently attempted to use these agreements as a 
baseline during early negotiations with South Korea and Taiwan.28 
The third hypothesis received strong support. As suggested in H3(a), both 
sending- and host-state leaders are significantly less likely to go public during basing 
negotiations when the host territory shares a border with an adversary of the sending 
state. In particular, the United States is 90.6% less likely to go public and the host 
state is 64.1% less likely under these circumstances. U.S. negotiations with Turkey in 
1953 – 1954 constitute an example of this, given that the latter shared a land border 
with the Soviet Union. Specifically, the negotiators agreed that the “secrecy [of] 
military rights [talks was] of great importance because of known Soviet sensitivity 
[to] actual US military operations [in] peripheral countries” and therefore necessary 
to “avoid [a] USSR reaction causing [them] to counterbalance US operations by 
adjusting their own defense planning and estimates which tend [to] diminish the gains 
attendant [to] additional US bases.”29 Similarly, in 1951 – 1952, American and 
Norwegian officials pursued highly secretive basing negotiations partially for fear of 
provoking a Russian retaliatory move against northern Norway, which bordered the 
                                               
27 On the Philippines, see William E. Berry, U.S. Bases in the Philippines: The Evolution of the Special 
Relationship (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 13-68. On Japan, see Eiji Takemae, The Allied 
Occupation of Japan (New York: Continuum, 2003), pp. 503-506. 
 
28 On South Korea, see NARA, RG 59, CDF 1950-54, 711.56395B, Box 3200; CDF 1955-59, 
711.56395B, Box 2919. On Taiwan, see NARA, RG 59, CDF 1955-59, 711.56393, Box 2917. 
 
29 Telegram 1405 from Washington to Ankara, 31 May 1953, NARA, RG 84 (350/56/13/4), Entry 




Soviet Union, or against Norway’s Svalbard Archipelago, which was located just 
across the Barents Sea from the U.S.S.R.30  
Moreover, as suggested in H3(b), both the sending- and host-state leaders are 
significantly less likely to go public when the sending state is engaged in an interstate 
war at the time of the negotiations. In particular, the United States is 45.2% less likely 
to go public and the host state is 61.2% less likely under this circumstance. For 
example, despite general support for a basing relationship in both countries, the 
United States and Ecuador maintained a high level of secrecy during negotiations for 
the Galapagos Islands in December 1941 – June 1942, for fear of triggering a 
Japanese attack against Ecuadoran territory.31 
The fourth hypothesis also received strong support. As predicted, both 
sending- and host-state leaders are significantly more likely to go public when the 
host state is fighting an interstate war at the time of the negotiations. Specifically, the 
United States is 58.9% more likely to go public and the host state is 75% more likely 
under this circumstance. In early January 1942, for instance, as Japanese planes 
extended their operating radius to within 800 miles of Australia, recently conducting 
two bombing raids against Australian airdromes at Rabaul in the Bismark 
Archipelago, it was announced that Australian and American officials were 
                                               
30 See Robert K. German, “Norway and the Bear: Soviet Coercive Diplomacy and Norwegian Security 
Policy,” International Security, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Fall 1982), pp. 55-82; Tom Hetland, “The Soviet View 
of the Nordic Countries and NATO, 1948-1952,” Scandinavian Journal of History, Vol. 11, No. 2 
(March – June 1986), pp. 149-181; Rolf Tamnes, The United States and the Cold War in the High 
North (Aldershot, UK: Dartmouth, 1991), pp. 63-89. 
 
31 Caribbean Defense Command, Procurement, Occupation, and Use of Air Bases in the Galapagos 




conducting negotiations for naval base rights, with Prime Minister John Curtin 
emphasizing the “great encouragement” that Australians should feel as a result.32 
Similarly, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill remarked at a meeting of the 
War Cabinet in August 1940 that one public benefit of the Destroyers-Bases Deal was 
the “immense” effect it would have on Germany, as the arrangement more closely 
associated the United States with the British war effort.33 
 Finally, the fifth hypothesis received strong support. As posited, both sending- 
and host-state leaders are significantly less likely to go public during basing 
negotiations when either leader is openly committed to a neutral policy in an ongoing 
conflict. In particular, the United States is 78.3% less likely to go public and the host 
state is 83.2% less likely under these circumstances. For instance, given Portugal’s 
neutral status during World War II, the United States’ negotiations for air base rights 
on Santa Maria Island in the Azores during 1943 – 1945 were shrouded in secrecy for 
two reasons. First, Portuguese officials sought to avoid provoking German retaliation. 
In fact, President Antonio de Oliveira Salazar continually emphasized throughout the 
negotiations that “the German Minister had been after him repeatedly with all sorts of 
questions about the possibility of the facilities in the Azores being used by the 
Americans; and that German curiosity in this respect had been so keen that…the 
question may represent the keystone of German policy with regard to Portugal.” Thus 
                                               
32 “U.S. Warships to Use Bases in Australasia,” Washington Post, 5 January 1942, p. 1; G. Hermon 
Gill, Australia in the War of 1939-1945: The Navy, Vol. II: Royal Australian Navy, 1942-1945 
(Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1968), p. 105; Roger Bell, Unequal Allies: Australian-American 
Relations and the Pacific War (Carlton, Australia: Melbourne University Press, 1977), pp. 28-29. 
 




Table 4: Summary of Expected and Observed Relationships for Going Public 
 Sending State Decision 
To Go Public 
Host State Decision 
To Go Public 
 Expected Observed Expected Observed 
INTERNATIONAL VARIABLES     
  Great Power – – – – 
  Subjugate + + + + 
  Adversary Border – – – – 
  Wartime (U.S.) – – – – 
  Wartime (Host) + + + + 
  Neutrality – – – – 
DOMESTIC & CONTROL 
VARIABLES 
    
  Large Coalition Size – – – – 
  Election Year (U.S.) – Ins. – Ins. 
  Election Year (Host) – Ins. – Ins. 
  Press Coverage + + + + 
  Executive Constraints + + + + 
  Technical Round – – – Ins. 
  Previous Public Round + + + + 
NOTE: A positive sign (+) indicates a coefficient value greater than zero. A negative sign (–) indicates 
a coefficient value less than zero. The abbreviation “Ins.” indicates an insignificant coefficient. 
 
he would agree to cooperate only “as long as some formula were observed which 
would permit him…to deny officially to the Germans that he had granted any special 
facilities to the United States in the islands.” Second, American officials feared that if 
“Portugal granted [bases in the Azores] to us as a power not allied with Portugal…the 
Germans might cite this as a precedent for obtaining similar concessions from Spain 
in the Balearics.”34 
Several of the control variables for domestic political factors also generated 
significant results. First, basing negotiations between two large-coalition leaders are 
significantly less likely to be public than negotiations between a sending-state leader 
                                               
34 Telegram 2858, 25 November 1943, and Telegram 2911, 2 December 1943, from Lisbon to 
Washington, in Foreign Relations of the United States: 1943, Vol. II: Europe (Washington, D.C.: 




with a large coalition and a host-state leader with a small coalition. In particular, the 
United States is 99.8% less likely and the host state is 99.1% less likely to go public 
when both have large domestic coalitions. This finding is consistent with recent 
scholarship that suggests leaders are more likely to engage in secret negotiations 
when public attention generates similar levels of domestic audience costs for both 
parties.35 It also is supportive of recent work on large-coalition leaders’ enhanced 
incentive and ability to secretly pursue controversial foreign policies.36 Second, 
sending- and host-state leaders are significantly more likely to go public when both 
leaders face high levels of institutionalized constraints on their ability to determine 
policy and when there is press speculation about the negotiations in either state. 
Specifically, the United States is 67.3% more likely to go public when the host-state 
leader also faces a high level of executive constraints and 86.3% more likely 
following press speculation. Similarly, host-state leaders are 120% more likely to go 
public in the face of high executive constraints and 160% more likely following press 
speculation. These findings are consistent with conventional wisdom that institutional 
constraints such as legislative oversight and a free press generally enhance the 
transparency of leaders’ foreign policy behavior. There is no evidence, however, that 
cycles of domestic political vulnerability shape leaders’ decisions to draw attention to 
international negotiations. Specifically, leaders are neither more nor less likely to go 
                                               
35 Leventoğlu and Tarar, “Prenegotiation Public Commitment”; Shuhei Kurizaki, “Efficient Secrecy: 
Public versus Private Threats in Crisis Diplomacy,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 101, No. 
3 (August 2007), pp. 543-558; Ahmer Tarar and Bahar Leventoğlu, “Public Commitment in Crisis 
Bargaining,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 3 (September 2009), pp. 817-839. 
 




public when basing negotiations take place in close proximity to national elections. 
Overall, then, these additional findings indicate that domestic political institutions 
broadly affect both sending- and host-state leaders’ management of national security 
information during basing negotiations. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter poses a basic question: Under what conditions are leaders more or less 
likely to go public or private during military basing negotiations? To answer this 
question, I evaluate the first five hypotheses presented in chapter 3 with rigorous 
statistical analyses that produce strong support for my theoretical argument. 
Additional support comes from several historical examples that illustrate the causal 
processes underlying each of the main findings. 
 This dissertation draws on basic insights from realist theory to emphasize the 
effects of international power position and strategic context on leaders’ management 
of national security information. The empirical results presented in this chapter show 
that great powers are more likely to employ official secrecy than other types of states 
and clearly indicate that leaders generally seek to withhold information about the 
occurrence of basing negotiations when its disclosure to international audiences may 
reflect poorly on their state’s prestige or when it might unnecessarily provoke 
adversaries to oppose the talks or take preventive measures. Alternatively, leaders 
seek to invoke the attention of international audiences when doing so may set 
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favorable precedents for future negotiations with other potential cooperative partners 
or signal strength to present enemies. 
  In the next chapter, I continue this project’s empirical analyses by examining 
the effects of public acknowledgement on leaders’ bargaining behavior during basing 
negotiations and its impact on the probability of achieving formal cooperation.
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CHAPTER 5:  
PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT, BARGAINING, AND THE PROSPECTS OF 
SECURITY COOPERATION: ANALYZING LEADERS’ DECISIONS TO MAKE 








In this chapter, I present the empirical analyses of sending- and host-state leaders’ 
decisions to make concessions and to reach an agreement during basing negotiations, 
with a particular focus on the effects of host-state leaders’ decisions to publicly 
acknowledge the pending relationship. I first discuss the variable operationalizations 
and statistical models used in the quantitative tests of H6 and H7. As in the previous 
chapter, the negotiation round is the unit of analysis for these tests. I then report the 
results of the statistical analyses. To illustrate in greater depth the causal logic 
underlying these quantitative findings, I also present a qualitative analysis that 
compares Danish and Norwegian basing negotiations with the United States during 
1951 – 1953. 
 
The Dependent Variables and Statistical Models 
CONCESSIONS: To test H6, the dependent variable for both the sending and host states 
is dichotomous, coded 1, respectively, if officials from that state make concessions 
during a round of negotiations. A leader makes a concession when she accepts a 
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proposal from the other side or explicitly forfeits one of her own proposals.1 
Concessions in basing negotiations can cover an array of issues, such as use rights, 
criminal jurisdiction procedures, base location, military assets, troop levels, and 
various political and economic quid pro quo.2 Despite the diversity of demands that 
leaders may have across these and other issues, I code dichotomous variables that 
capture each side’s basic decision to offer or withhold concessions rather than ordinal 
variables that attempt to assess the magnitude of concessions. As Kathleen 
Cunningham notes:  
Treating different types of concessions as if they were a continuum of “less” 
to “more” is problematic….The value of the concessions depends on what the 
[actors] want. Moreover, specific demands can have multiple 
implications….Indeed, many concessions are multifaceted – addressing a 
number of policy areas – which makes categorizing them difficult and 
potentially misleading.3 
 
The data on concessions were gathered through archival research – principally in RG 
59 and RG 84 at the National Archives – supplemented with published document 
collections and relevant secondary historical sources. Given dichotomous dependent 
variables that capture leaders’ separate but interrelated decisions to make concessions 
in a given round of talks, I estimate a bivariate probit model to test H6. 
                                               
1 Jonathan N. Brown and Anthony S. Marcum, “Avoiding Audience Costs: Domestic Political 
Accountability and Concessions in Crisis Diplomacy,” Security Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2 (April – June 
2011), p. 156. 
 
2 See, for instance, Robert. E. Harkavy, Bases Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 320-372; Alexander Cooley, Base Politics: Democratic Change 
and the U.S. Military Overseas (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), pp. 34-50. 
 
3 Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, “Divide and Conquer or Divide and Concede: How Do States 
Respond to Internally Divided Separatists,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 105, No. 2 (May 




AGREEMENT: For H7, the dependent variable is dichotomous, coded 1 if the 
negotiation round ends with the sending and host states signing an agreement. As this 
indicator is both binary and dyadic, I estimate a logit model. 
Since the decision to make concessions or reach a final agreement in any 
given round may be related to the decision to enter into that round in the first place, I 
also test for possible selection bias by estimating a series of Heckman or censored 
probit models. Again, though, I found no evidence of selection effects biasing either 
of the analyses, and the results remained consistent.4 Consequently, I report only the 
bivariate probit and the logit results below. 
 
The Independent Variable 
PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BY HOST: This variable is dichotomous, coded 1 if host-
state officials publicly acknowledged a previous round of negotiations.5 This 
indicator is lagged in this way to help minimize endogeneity problems, thus 
essentially capturing the equivalent of a prenegotiation public commitment.6 The data 
                                               
4 Specifically, each selection model’s estimated rho (ρ) parameter, which indicates the correlation of 
the disturbances across the two equations, did not approach standard levels of statistical significance. 
The full details and results of the selection analyses are presented in Appendix B. 
 
5 Again, it is important to recognize that this coding scheme introduces a small amount of bias in favor 
of 0, as this value is assigned to instances of first negotiation rounds – that is, observations for which 
there were no prior rounds to acknowledge. As the only alternatives would involve either dropping the 
first negotiation round for each case from the dataset or allowing significant endogeneity in the model, 
the present coding scheme is tolerated as the least worst option. 
 
6 See Bahar Leventoğlu and Ahmer Tarar, “Prenegotiation Public Commitment in Domestic and 
International Bargaining,” American Political Science Review, Vol., 99, No. 3 (August 2005), pp. 419-
433; Julie Browne and Eric S. Dickson, “‘We Don’t Talk to Terrorists’: On the Rhetoric and Practice 




were gathered through original archival research and supplementary research using 
official published document collections, the ProQuest Historical Newspapers 
database, and secondary historical sources. 
 The quantitative analyses also incorporate most of the independent and control 
variables for international strategic and domestic political factors featured in the 
previous chapter. The coding rules for these variables are largely the same, with a few 
minor changes that are briefly discussed in Appendix C. 
 
The Results 
The results of the bivariate probit and the logit analyses are presented in Tables 5 and 
7, respectively, providing strong support for the hypotheses. To aid interpretation of 
substantive effects, Tables 6 and 8 report the impact of changes in select significant 
variables on predicted probabilities for making concessions and reaching an 
agreement, respectively.7 For the sake of clarity and focus, the discussion below is 
limited to the principal independent variable, as only these results bear directly on the 
hypotheses. A discussion of supplementary findings for the other independent and 
control variables can be found in Appendix C. 
 
                                               
7 The predicted probabilities represent the marginal probability of the sending or host state making 
concessions (or of both reaching an agreement), regardless of whether the other state also makes 
concessions. The baseline probability was calculated by setting all variables at their mean or mode. 
The first difference was calculated by subtracting the baseline predicted probability from the predicted 
probability following a discrete change in the variable of interest from its low value to its high value, 
holding all other variables constant. The percentage change in probability was calculated by dividing 







Table 5: Bivariate Probit Results for Concessions in a Round of Negotiations 
 Sending State Decision 
To Make Concessions 
Host State Decision 
To Make Concessions 
PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT   
  Host State      .544**     -.671** 
 (.263) (.293) 
INTERNATIONAL VARIABLES   
  Great Power    .564*       -1.06*** 
 (.327)  (.255) 
  Subjugate -.540     1.00* 
 (.546)  (.579) 
  Adversary Border (U.S.)     .653** .274 
 (.320)  (.386) 
  Adversary Border (Host) .128     .493** 
 (.227) (.225) 
  Wartime (U.S.) -.043  .183 
 (.201) (.289) 
  Wartime (Host) .168  .389 
 (.324) (.274) 
  Prior Access       -.884***    -.699** 
 (.248) (.283) 
  Ally    -.567** -.174 
 (.260) (.323) 
  Previous Stalemate -.123      -.705*** 
 (.231) (.220) 
  Round     .157* .102 
 (.084) (.088) 
DOMESTIC CONTROL VARIABLES   
  Large Coalition Size  .515   .042 
 (.377) (.352) 
  Executive Constraints .077 .169 
 (.301) (.294) 
  Election (U.S.) .008 -.002 
 (.007) (.006) 
  Election (Host) -.010  .008 
 (.006)  (.006) 
  Press Coverage .301     -.525* 
 (.281)  (.292) 
  Constant -.272      .998** 
 (.365)  (.393) 
N = 218. Log pseudolikelihood = -204.01. 
ρ = .825. Wald test of ρ: p = .000.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering. 





As indicated in Table 5, the sixth hypothesis received strong support.8 As 
predicted in H6(a), the sending state is significantly more likely to make concessions 
during negotiations after the host state has publicly acknowledged the pending 
relationship. Specifically, as shown in Table 6, the United States is 37.7% more likely 
to make concessions. Alternatively, as suggested in H6(b), the host state is 
significantly less likely to make concessions after it has publicly acknowledged the 
negotiations. In particular, it is 18.3% less likely to adopt a flexible bargaining stance. 
These results are broadly consistent with my argument, first, that public 
acknowledgement is a strategy that host states can use to press their demands during 
negotiations and, second, that the visibility attendant to acknowledgement puts 
pressure on the stronger sending state to compromise but motivates the weaker host 
state to adopt a hard-line bargaining stance. 
I now turn to the logit analysis of the likelihood that negotiations end with the 
sending and host states signing an agreement. As indicated in Table 7, the seventh 
hypothesis received significant support. As predicted, sending- and host-state leaders 
are significantly less likely to reach an agreement after the host state has publicly 
acknowledged the pending relationship. Specifically, as shown in Table 8, the 
negotiations are 53.1% less likely to end in an agreement under these circumstances. 
Again, this result is consistent with my argument that public acknowledgement, while 
                                               
8 Moreover, there is considerable support for the use of a bivariate probit model to test H6. The 
parameter rho (ρ) is positive and significant, indicating that the sending- and host-state leaders’ 
decisions are highly correlated and that the unmeasured factors affecting the sending state’s equation 
also affect the host state’s equation in a similar way. 
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producing a short-term bargaining advantage for the weaker partner, has a long-term 
effect of reducing the overall likelihood that the two sides will achieve cooperation. 
 
Table 6: Impact of Changes in Variables on Predicted Probabilities for Concessions 
 Sending State Host State 
PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT   
  Host State   
     No (0) .512 .891 
     Yes (1) .705 .728 
     First Difference .193 -.163 
     % Change 37.7% -18.3% 
INTERNATIONAL VARIABLES   
  Great Power   
     No (0) .512 .891 
     Yes (1) .745 .557 
     First Difference .233 -.334 
     % Change 45.5% -37.5% 
  Subjugate   
     No (0) -- .891 
     Yes (1) -- .989 
     First Difference -- .098 
     % Change -- 11% 
  Adversary Border (U.S.)   
     No (0) .512 -- 
     Yes (1) .775 -- 
     First Difference .263 -- 
     % Change 51.4% -- 
  Adversary Border (Host)   
     No (0) -- .891 
     Yes (1) -- .959 
     First Difference -- .068 
     % Change -- 7.6% 
  Prior Access   
     No (0) .512 .891 
     Yes (1) .197 .685 
     First Difference -.315 -.206 
     % Change -61.5% -23.1% 
  Ally   
     No (0) .512 -- 
     Yes (1) .283 -- 
     First Difference -.229 -- 
     % Change -44.7% -- 
DOMESTIC VARIABLES   
  Press Coverage   
     No (0) -- .891 
     Yes (1) -- .739 
     First Difference -- -.152 




Table 7: Logit Results for Reaching an Agreement in a Round of Negotiations 
 States’ Decision to Reach an Agreement 
PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  
  Host State   -.868** 
 (.435) 
INTERNATIONAL VARIABLES  
  Great Power       -1.45*** 
 (.443) 
  Subjugate      1.25** 
 (.596) 
  Adversary Border .211 
 (.355) 
  Wartime       1.72*** 
 (.412) 
  Prior Access .424 
 (.414) 
  Ally      1.08*** 
 (.380) 
  Previous Stalemate       1.01*** 
 (.370) 
  Round    .302* 
 (.160) 
DOMESTIC CONTROL VARIABLES  
  Large Coalition Size     1.04** 
 (.492) 
  Executive Constraints -.331 
 (.586) 
  Election -.464 
 (.406) 
  Press Coverage .116 
 (.448) 
  Constant      -3.95*** 
 (.678) 
N = 218. Log pseudolikelihood = -100.63 
Wald Chi-square (13) = 112.29 
Prob > Chi-square = .000. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering. 
***p < .01, **p < .05, *p < .1 
 
The qualitative analysis presented in the next section illustrates how the causal 
mechanisms posited to underlie these statistical findings actually explain the 
divergent bargaining processes and outcomes in two cases where the predictions of 
my theory are correct. 
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Table 8: Impact of Changes in Variables on Predicted Probabilities for Agreement 
 States’ Decision to Reach an Agreement 
PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT  
  Host State  
     No (0) .175 
     Yes (1) .082 
     First Difference -.093 
     % Change -53.1% 
INTERNATIONAL VARIABLES  
  Great Power  
     No (0) .175 
     Yes (1) .047 
     First Difference -.128 
     % Change -73.1% 
  Subjugate  
     No (0) .175 
     Yes (1) .427 
     First Difference .252 
     % Change 144% 
  Wartime  
     No (0) .036 
     Yes (1) .175 
     First Difference .139 
     % Change 386.1% 
  Ally  
     No (0) .175 
     Yes (1) .385 
     First Difference .210 
     % Change 120% 
DOMESTIC VARIABLES  
  Large Winning Coalition  
     No (0) .175 
     Yes (1) .376 
     First Difference .201 
     % Change 114.9% 
 
“Something Is Rotten In the State of Denmark”9: A Comparison of Danish and 
Norwegian Basing Negotiations with the United States, 1951 – 1953 
 
I chose to examine Danish and Norwegian basing negotiations with the United States 
during 1951 – 1953 because these cases come very close to approximating the strict 
conditions for a controlled comparison – that is, “the study of two or more instances 
                                               
9 William Shakespeare, “Hamlet, Prince of Denmark,” in William George Clark and William Aldis 




of a well-specified phenomenon that resemble each other in every respect but one.”10 
Denmark and Norway share similar domestic political dynamics and international 
strategic pressures. Moreover, their respective basing negotiations with the United 
States were alike in nearly all respects except for the principal explanatory and 
outcome variables. As such, this analysis can be thought of as employing a “most-
similar” case study design.11 Specifically, Danish authorities publicly acknowledged 
their negotiations while Norwegian officials did not. Despite the United States’ 
greater willingness to make concessions to the former compared to the latter, Danish 
officials developed a hard-line bargaining stance that provoked stalemate while 
Norwegian authorities pursued a more flexible negotiating strategy that resulted in an 
agreement. Furthermore, these cases clearly illustrate the different effects of, on the 
one hand, the international scrutiny costs that are attendant to public 
acknowledgement and, on the other, the deniability that is buttressed by secrecy. The 
first subsection briefly discusses the general strategic context in Scandinavia during 
the late 1940s and early 1950s. The second and third subsections explore the United 




                                               
10 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), p. 151. 
 
11 John Gerring, “Case Selection for Case-Study Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques,” 
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Physically weak, geographically exposed, and strategically important, Denmark and 
Norway together constitute a vital but vulnerable chokepoint in the great-power 
politics of northern Europe. During the early years of the Cold War, the small state of 
Denmark was particularly vulnerable on its southern border, given the lack of ground 
coverage in Schleswig-Holstein and the presence of Soviet forces stationed near 
Lübek, and to its east with the home base of the Soviet Baltic Fleet in nearby 
Kaliningrad.12 Norway was even more difficult to defend, with a total land area of 
149,273 square miles, including more than 13,000 miles of coastline. It also shared a 
120-mile border with northern Russia that was a short distance from Murmansk, the 
home base of the Soviet Northern Fleet, which the Norwegian Defense Ministry 
“deemed capable of mounting a three-dimensional attack on northern Norway.”13 
This general sense of vulnerability was reinforced in early 1950 when Danish and 
Norwegian officials learned confidentially that the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff’s (JCS) 
coordinated war plan for Europe, codenamed Offtackle, drew the outer defense line at 
                                               
12 Carsten Holbraad, “Denmark: Half-Hearted Partner,” in Nils Ørvik, ed., Semialignment and Western 
Security (London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 15-16; Nikolaj Petersen, “Denmark and NATO, 1949-
1987,” Forsvarsstudier, Vol. 2 (1987), pp. 25-26; Hans Garde, “Denmark,” in Bruce W. Watson and 
Susan M. Watson, eds., The Soviet Naval Threat to Europe: Military and Political Dimensions 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), p. 204. 
 
13 Robert K. German, “Norway and the Bear: Soviet Coercive Diplomacy and Norwegian Security 
Policy,” International Security, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Fall 1982), p. 56; Nils Ørvik, “Norway: Deterrence 
Versus Nonprovocation,” in Ørvik, ed., Semialignment and Western Security, p. 189; Olav Riste and 




the Rhine, as American military planners estimated that Soviet forces could easily 
knock off both Scandinavian countries in less than three days.14 
Scandinavia formed an essential strategic zone for the Soviet Union. The two 
most important lines of approach to the Atlantic Ocean for Soviet naval forces were 
from Arctic harbors around northern Norway and from Baltic outposts through the 
Danish straits.15 In addition to being essential access points for the Barents and Baltic 
Seas, the Scandinavian countries lay “astride the great circle route between North 
America and the strategic heart of Western Russia” and were “midway on the air 
route between London and Moscow.”16 As Tom Hetland notes, “Soviet strategy in 
Scandinavia was therefore of necessity one of ‘area denial,’ that is to say to prevent 
the western powers from securing a strategic foothold in the Nordic region.”17 To this 
effect, during January – March 1949 the Soviet Union launched a barrage of 
diplomatic protests and propaganda against Norway, alleging that the Western powers 
sought to establish military bases on Norwegian territory and seeking assurances 
against this eventuality. The Norwegian government formally replied that it “will not 
join in any agreement with other states involving obligations to open bases for 
military forces of foreign powers on Norwegian territory as long as Norway is not 
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attacked or exposed to threats of attack.”18 On its own accord, the Danish government 
followed suit in May 1949 when Foreign Minister Gustav Rasmussen issued a 
statement that he could “promise with certainty that there would be no foreign bases 
in Denmark.”19 
The United States, at any rate, was not interested in Scandinavian bases during 
the mid to late 1940s and had not approached either state about the matter. With 
regard to Denmark, U.S. officials were concerned that any request for base rights 
could set an unfavorable precedent that “would open the door for the Soviet Union to 
do the same.” On the other hand, “the development of allied bases in Norway,” 
according to the JCS, “would tend to precipitate a Soviet armed invasion of 
Norway.”20 This position changed with the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. 
Anxiety among U.S. officials that this conflict constituted a prelude to a Soviet 
military thrust westward motivated decisions to formulate specific military operating 
rights within the North Atlantic Treaty Area, to grant the Strategic Air Command 
(SAC) control over new overseas air bases, and to deploy additional U.S. troops to 
Europe.21 
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Public Acknowledgement, International Scrutiny Costs, and U.S.-Denmark Basing 
Negotiations 
 
Upon learning informally in October 1951 of a forthcoming request for air base rights 
by the United States, officials in the Danish Foreign and Defense Ministries 
commissioned studies to determine whether Denmark should accept or decline the 
approach. These analyses decisively favored the proposal for strategic reasons: 
namely, Denmark’s exposed position, proximity to Soviet occupied territories in 
Central and Eastern Europe, vulnerability to an unannounced Soviet attack, and the 
otherwise low probability of allied assistance during the critical early stages of a 
conflict, given current allied war plans. One Foreign Ministry analysis concluded 
specifically that “the presence of foreign forces on Danish soil will probably be the 
best guarantee that the country will not be written off.” These studies recommended, 
however, that all basing negotiations and arrangements be kept secret to avoid 
provoking Soviet preventive measures, arguing that the highest risk of conflict would 
come during the interval between the Russians gaining knowledge of the Danish 
acceptance and the actual arrival of U.S. forces.22 
In light of these analyses, Danish Foreign Minister Ole Kraft informed U.S. 
Ambassador Eugenie Anderson, in a private meeting on 11 January 1952, of his 
belief that “there will not be any serious opposition to the establishment of NATO air 
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bases in Denmark.”23 Consequently, when he met with U.S. Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson the following month, Kraft expressed Denmark’s interest in the proposal, 
emphasizing only the importance of not disclosing the negotiations to the Soviets 
until the deployment could be presented as a fait accompli.24 American officials 
shared this preference for maintaining secrecy in order to avoid “giving Soviet 
propaganda [an] advantage.”25 Otherwise, as Acheson wrote to Anderson on 20 
March, the United States’ ability to “obtain proposed positions” might be impaired.26 
It gradually became evident, during preparations for the negotiations, that 
American officials did not similarly share their Danish counterparts’ understanding of 
the purpose for the bases. As Poul Villaume notes:  
Right from the start, Denmark and the United States were talking about 
different things. The Danish decision-makers were deeply worried about the 
country’s exposed strategic position and the apparently low priority which the 
alliance gave to its defense, and regarded American air units in Denmark as a 
much-needed reinforcement of the country’s air defenses. In contrast,…the 
State Department and the Pentagon…thought in larger strategic and more 
offensive terms….American military planners saw Scandinavian air space as 
an important route for strategic bombers…on their way to and from targets in 
the Soviet Union. Such strategic bombers needed to be escorted by fighter 
planes and Washington…regarded the stationing of escorting aircraft, or 
fighter-bombers in support of the strategic air offensive, at forward bases in 
Jutland in peacetime as a natural and tempting prospect.”27 
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Danish officials thus perceived early on that the United States likely assessed the 
value of the bases primarily in terms of enhancing its capacity to project power rather 
than to defend Danish territory. American officials nevertheless were taken by 
surprise when, five months prior to the start of negotiations, the Danish government 
launched a publicity campaign that disclosed the upcoming talks and explicitly cast 
the stationing of foreign forces as a concrete guarantee of Danish security. 
In the spring of 1952, Foreign Minister Kraft met privately with 
representatives of Danish newspapers to inform them of a government campaign to 
publicize the country’s decision to consider hosting allied military detachments at 
several new air bases.28 This campaign commenced on 6 May when Kraft informed 
the Rigsdag, the Danish Parliament, that he sought to establish air bases for use by 
NATO forces “as an important contribution to Denmark’s ability to defend herself.” 
This announcement was followed on 15 May with a speech by Finance Minister 
Thorkil Kristensen, who argued that “the lack of allied air forces in Denmark 
constitutes a serious gap in this country’s defense structure.”29 Two days later, Kraft 
delivered a speech to the Foreign Press Association’s annual dinner, claiming that 
“Denmark’s membership in NATO provides effective guarantees that in case of war 
she will received outside assistance,…and it is clear that the preparation of base 
facilities is a first requirement to assure that the assistance will come in time.” In 
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making this argument, he explicitly dismissed as “entirely erroneous” the idea that 
Denmark “cannot be defended and will only be an advance base for the defense of the 
United States.”30 Kraft expressed similar points in additional speeches throughout 
June. These were followed on 3 July by a radio address from Defense Minister Harald 
Peterson, who argued that “the objective of the air base program is to make 
it…possible to strengthen the air defense of a specially exposed country by stationing 
there airmen from other countries.”31 
In response to this publicity campaign, the Soviet Ambassador in Copenhagen 
created a working group to formulate a propaganda policy aimed at preventing or 
impeding Danish acceptance of U.S. bases.32 This led to the publication on 23 July of 
an article in Pravda entitled “Suspicious Maneuvers.” This article proclaimed: 
Ole Bjorn Kraft, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Thorkil Kristesen, Minister 
of Finance, have frequently spoke of…the fact that the USA is preparing to 
station its armed forces on the territory of Denmark in the near future….The 
presence of foreign forces on Danish territory in peacetime cannot be 
explained by any kind of defense considerations. The aggressive, 
provocational [sic] nature of such measures is obvious….The Danish 
government cannot but see that the granting of bases to foreign armed forces 
and the stationing of foreign armed forces on Danish territory would be a 
gross violation of the assurances made by it…not to participate in measures 
directed against the Soviet Union….It cannot but realize the serious 
responsibility it has undertaken by violating these assurances….Denmark is 
daily falling more and more under the control of the USA, and the threat of 
American occupation is increasingly hanging over it….The Soviet people, of 
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course, cannot but pay attention to the unfriendly measures of the Danish 
government with regard to the Soviet Union.33 
 
Two days later, the Danish Ambassador in Washington, Henrik Kauffmann, called on 
State Department officials, handing them a note from his government expressing 
concern about the article. The note stated specifically that “any untimely 
representations from the Soviet Government…might cause serious difficulties for a 
positive resolution to the problems in…a potential stationing of American forces in 
Denmark.”34 On 1 August, Kraft noted in a private letter to Jorgen Jorgensen, leader 
of the Social Liberal Party, that he regarded the article as representing only the first 
Soviet warning to Denmark.35 
The Danish government proposed that the negotiations unfold in two stages, 
with technical matters addressed in the first stage and political matters discussed in 
the second.36 After various meetings to set the schedule for the technical talks, 
Ambassador Anderson reported to the State Department in late August that, contrary 
to Kraft’s initial accommodating perspective in January, Danish officials have started 
to show some reluctance on the airfield issue in view of the Pravda article.37 Shortly 
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thereafter, in closed meetings with key Danish ministers on 8 and 10 September, 
Kraft argued that Denmark could not appear to give into Soviet pressure, lest the 
Russians get the impression that it was possible to scare Denmark, and emphasized 
that Denmark should accept the stationing proposal as a means to accomplish its long 
sought goal of a concrete allied defense guarantee. He further remarked, however, 
that Denmark was now in a position to make some demands of the U.S. in the 
upcoming talks: (1) all aircraft stationed in Denmark must be tactical and therefore 
meant only to defend Danish territory, thus addressing the accusation of offensive 
measures; and (2) Danish nationals must be employed to construct the airfields and 
Denmark must retain jurisdiction over foreign forces, thus addressing the allegation 
of an impending American occupation.38 During the initial round of technical talks in 
late September, only the second issue was raised, particularly concerning the use of 
Danish engineers and contractors, but U.S. officials indicated their willingness to 
meet this demand.39 
At the suggestion of the Soviet Ambassador in Copenhagen, Russian officials 
decided to increase pressure on Denmark with an official communication, which was 
handed to the Danish Ambassador in Moscow on 2 October by the Soviet Foreign 
Minister. The note declared:  
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As it will appear from statements made by members of the Danish 
government in July and August of this year,…Denmark will be made into a 
base for foreign armies. The Danish Government has begun negotiations 
concerning this problem with the American Government. These negotiations 
were started in spite of the Danish Government’s former declaration that 
Denmark would not in peacetime place bases at the disposal of forces of any 
foreign power. The Soviet Government draws the attention of the Danish 
Government to the fact that the stationing in Denmark of foreign armed 
forces…cannot be justified by stating that it is a matter of defense….The 
Soviet Government finds it necessary to draw the attention of the Danish 
Government to the fact that its intention of placing military bases at the 
disposal of foreign armed forces…must be regarded as a threat against the 
safety of the Soviet Union and the other Baltic countries. The Soviet 
Government declares that the responsibility for the consequences of such a 
policy will rest upon the Danish Government.40 
 
Danish authorities replied simply that they would never allow “Danish territory to be 
used to initiate an attack on any other state.”41 
American officials reported that their Danish counterparts seemed “almost 
elated” by the Soviet note.42 However, while Danish Foreign Ministry officials 
indicated reassuringly that the note did not affect Denmark’s overall willingness to 
hold talks, they did express confidentially that it created difficulties and likely would 
hamper their ability to pursue the basing relationship entirely according to plan.43 
This newly constrained bargaining position was further emphasized by Kraft, who 
informed Anderson that Danish officials also were now facing pressure from the 
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governments of Sweden and Finland to reject the bases, lest these two countries be 
negatively affected by Soviet countermeasures.44 
As the start of the second round of negotiations approached in December 
1952, Danish officials calculated that they now were in a position, given the recent 
external opposition, to push the Americans on the defensive character of the bases by 
demanding Danish command over allied detachments stationed in Jutland and prior 
consent rights over the use or removal of those forces for activities outside of 
Demark.45 These additional demands were outgrowths of Danish officials’ concerns 
about entanglement and abandonment. As Carsten Holbraad notes, “if the aircraft 
were to be under U.S. command, there appeared to be a risk that Denmark might 
become involved in a course of action that could be deemed aggressive by the Soviet 
Union.”46 Moreover, absent prior consultation rights, Danish officials feared that U.S. 
forces might be withdrawn for use in “local wars” between, for instance, Bulgaria and 
Turkey or East and West Germany, thereby leaving Jutland unprotected and 
vulnerable to attack.47 Thus, when the second round of talks commenced on 8 
December, Danish officials outlined four principal demands: (1) Danish prior 
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consultation, (2) Danish command, (3) tactical aircraft, and (4) Danish primary 
jurisdiction.48  
Over the course of the second negotiation round, U.S. officials indicated their 
willingness to concede the third and fourth points and to compromise on the second 
condition by “working out a satisfactory command relationship.”49 They rejected the 
first point, however, emphasizing foremost the need for operational flexibility. As 
General Alfred Gruenther, Chief of Staff of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers 
in Europe (SHAPE), explained to Kraft on 19 December, “Flexibility is an important 
attribute of air power and the commander wants to be assured he can use it where 
needed. This is also a great advantage to Denmark because it provides for 
employment of additional air power over Denmark and other areas in case of 
emergency. It would be a serious error to tie air power to a territorial basis.”50 U.S. 
negotiators also were concerned, though, that publicly “committing the aircraft to 
Denmark alone would create a dangerous precedent” that other host states could then 
cite in an effort to receive similar commitments.51 While Danish officials “appeared 
gratified” by the United States’ willingness to make concessions on points two 
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through four, they maintained “that of these points one was an imperative sine qua 
non.” Consequently, by mid-January 1953, Anderson reported to Washington that “I 
am exceedingly pessimistic as to the chances for any change….[P]roceeding further 
at this time is probably doomed to failure.” Secretary of State Acheson insisted, 
however, that the negotiations continue “in view [of the] importance…of [the] project 
going forward this year.”52 
Less than two weeks later, the Soviet Foreign Minister handed an aide-
memoire to the Danish charge d’affaires in Moscow, reiterating Soviet opposition to 
the basing negotiations. This communication further warned that “By entering the 
North Atlantic bloc Denmark became a part of an aggressive military 
group…preparing a world war. By accepting foreign troops in peacetime Denmark 
becomes a direct participant in the war now under preparation.” The Polish 
government followed suit shortly thereafter by criticizing Denmark for preparing to 
accept American “war bases” and thereby becoming a “springboard” for Western 
aggression.53  
As was the case in October 1952 with the first Soviet note, this external 
opposition “served a useful purpose in raising allied awareness of the significance of 
                                               
52 Telegram 626 from Copenhagen to Washington, 30 December 1952, NARA, RG 84, 350/56/13/4, 
Entry 2454-A, 430.3 – Bases: NATO Countries, Box 30; Telegram 656 from Copenhagen to 
Washington, 14 January 1953, and Telegram 762 from Washington to Copenhagen, 16 January 1953, 
NARA, RG 59, CDF 1950-54, 759.5/1-1453 and 759.5/1-1553, Box 3780. 
 
53 Örjan Berner, Soviet Policies Toward the Nordic Countries (Lanham, MD: University Press of 




the threat against Denmark.”54 However, while American officials reaffirmed their 
willingness to meet most of Denmark’s demands, they would not budge on the issue 
of prior consultation. A few days after the Soviet aide-memoire, Kraft, who was 
“inclined to accept a stationing agreement on U.S. terms,” held a closed meeting with 
key ministers to seek a possible relaxation of Danish demands. This effort was of no 
avail, though, as the growing “political disadvantages in peacetime and the increased 
risk of Soviet bombing in time of war” now made it impossible for Denmark to 
accept American forces without veto power over their use outside Jutland.55 The 
negotiations stalemated as a result, when “Danish representatives indicated there was 
no possibility at this time of further fruitful discussions.”56 Talks were never 
resumed.57 
Historians of Danish security policy widely agree, as Hans Mouritzen notes, 
that the “flight stationing was rejected due to external constraints, primarily the direct 
‘Soviet connection.’”58 By publicly disclosing the basing negotiations, Danish 
authorities provided useful grist for Soviet propaganda and diplomatic protests. Able 
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to then “capitalize on issues that were already part of public debate in Denmark…, 
Moscow succeeded in setting the agenda for Danish political debates on security 
issues.”59 While this external pressure served to strengthen Denmark’s bargaining 
position vis-à-vis the United States, it effectively foreclosed any chance of reaching 
an agreement by forcing Danish authorities to adopt an uncompromising position that 
went beyond the United States’ ability to make concessions. In the end, then, as 
Jonathan Agger and Trine Michesen observe, “although the Danish government 
displayed considerable resolve in the face of Soviet pressure, it nevertheless pursued 
a policy line that was close to the Kremlin’s demands. These apparent Danish 
concessions [to Moscow] led to a strengthening of the Kremlin’s conviction that 
Copenhagen was susceptible to influence.”60 Thus, the negative feedback from 
Denmark’s acknowledgement of the pending basing relationship undercut its original 
objective of achieving cooperation on terms that improved its security relative to the 
Soviet Union by establishing a hard-line bargaining stance that provoked stalemate 
with the United States. 
 
Secrecy, Deniability, and U.S.-Norway Basing Negotiations 
On 7 August 1951, American Ambassador Charles Bay approached Norwegian 
Foreign Minister Halvard Lange with a proposal to open SAC basing negotiations. 
Four days later, Lange accepted this offer and suggested that the talks could start by 
                                               






the end of the month.61 According to the Foreign Minister, what Norway sought in a 
basing relationship was “the maximum of protection with the minimum of 
provocation.”62  From Norway’s perspective, then, “emphasis is not so much on what 
can be done but rather on how it can be done. The Norwegian Government wishes to 
avoid any action which would focus…attention on U.S. operations in Norway.” Any 
resulting arrangements consequently must appear to “be consistent with the 
[country’s] base policy.”63 Specifically, Lange indicated that “if queried…as to 
whether he has made agreement with the U.S. [on base rights], he wants to be in a 
position to reply that neither he nor [the] Norwegian Government has done so.”64 The 
Norwegian government thus “wishes [to] keep the negotiations and conclusion of any 
agreement secret and would appreciate [the United States’] cooperation in seeing that 
there are no leaks or disclosure of any information on this subject.”65 
U.S. officials shared this view. As Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote to 
Ambassador Bay: 
We believe it is essential that SAC base development be kept secret…and be 
done under guise [of the] present base policy….It is our belief that the 
disclosure of an agreement with Norway…providing for military operating 
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requirements and facilities would be interpreted…internationally as a revision 
of the Norwegian base policy. Such an impression, if created, would probably 
result in international pressure of the type which would 
increase…unnecessary risks jeopardizing the securing of the rights and 
facilities we need.66 
 
More specifically, according to Deputy Under Secretary of State H. Freeman 
Matthews, openly acknowledging plans for the peacetime stationing of U.S. forces in 
Norway will serve only to “afford the Soviet Government a clear opportunity to 
embarrass and to bring pressures of various kinds on the Norwegian 
Government…and give the Soviets a peg which they do not now possess on which to 
base their general propaganda which may result in adverse effects in Norway…with 
the probable result that we would end up with definitely less than might be 
possible.”67 Thus, Bay reported to Washington on 18 August that “I discussed 
publicity with Lange and we agreed it would be better not to publicize [the] 
forthcoming discussions.”68 
The first round of talks commenced shortly thereafter on 27 August. Secrecy 
and deniability aside, the Norwegian representatives raised two principal concerns. 
The first pertained to enhancing the security of Norway. As expressed by Defense 
Minister Jens Christian Hauge, the “arrangements…must not deal only with matters 
of U.S. interest.” Instead, they also must take into consideration “local Norwegian 
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defense.”69 In particular, Norwegian officials sought to include a clause in the 
agreement explicitly linking the development of the facilities to the defense of 
Norway.70 U.S. negotiators opposed the inclusion of this clause on grounds that it 
would commit the United States to a special bilateral security guarantee for Norway 
that was outside of and in addition to the general defense assurances attendant to 
membership in NATO.71 The second issue concerned the Norwegian government’s 
desire to place a ceiling on the number of foreign troops to be stationed in Norway. 
As Hauge explained at a meeting on 16 October, “New U.S. personnel must be 
strictly limited….[T]hese limitations sprang partly from Norwegian anxiety regarding 
[the] world political situation and desire to avoid creating an impression on the 
Soviets that war was inevitable. Norway would even be willing to sacrifice some 
immediate military security to avoid such a provocation.”72 
Later that evening, as if on cue, the Soviet Foreign Minister delivered a 
diplomatic note to the Norwegian Ambassador in Moscow, accusing the Norwegian 
government of agreeing to build “air bases on Norwegian territory, including areas in 
North Norway abutting on the Soviet Union,…for use by the armed forces of the 
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aggressive North Atlantic bloc…under American command.” The note asserted that 
this decision was in violation of the Norwegian government’s 1949 base declaration 
and therefore “incompatible with the normal bilateral relationship between the Soviet 
Union and Norway as neighboring states.”73As Tom Hetland notes: 
We do not know how well-informed the Russians were about internal 
discussions within NATO and Norway, but it is not inconceivable that they 
were aware that the Norwegian policy toward foreign bases was under a 
certain degree of pressure at this time…If the Russians entertained suspicions 
along these lines, it can only have reinforced the urgency of obtaining new 
assurances.74 
 
In fact, there was some concern among Norwegian officials that the Soviets actually 
knew about the negotiations.75 Nevertheless, the Norwegian government’s reply 
simply denied any change in the base policy and reaffirmed the purely defensive 
character of NATO. Moreover, the Norwegian authorities flatly ignored a second 
Soviet note that followed shortly thereafter, casting Norway’s response as “untrue” 
and reiterating the general accusation that NATO’s aggressive intentions were evident 
“in the setting up of American military bases…close to the Soviet Russian border.”76 
On 23 October, one week after the Soviet communication, Ambassador Bay 
reported to Washington that “I have consciously avoided interrogating [Foreign 
Minister Lange] formally concerning the Russian note for fear of magnifying the 
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note’s importance in relation to the base discussions and of stimulating his thinking 
toward linking the note with our current negotiations.”77 However, two days later, in 
the first negotiation meeting following the episode, the Norwegian representatives 
gave “no indication that the Russian note has adversely affected the negotiations.”78 
Instead, they simply reiterated their prior two demands concerning local defense and 
a personnel ceiling. Little progress was made on the first issue until 3 November, 
when Defense Minister Hauge “indicated he would be willing to drop this question 
for [the] present as being outside [the] scope of these negotiations.”79 With regard to 
the second issue, U.S. representatives proposed on 10 December that all American 
personnel could be brought into Norway under the “cloak” of the existing Military 
Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), thereby disguising them as military advisers, 
but then stationed at the air bases.80 This first round of talks closed ten days later, 
leaving the question of a personnel ceiling unresolved. However, the round ended 
with the signing of a memorandum of conversation that expressed both governments’ 
satisfaction with the present trajectory of the negotiations and approved the 
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introduction of limited technical personnel, attached to MAAG, to begin developing 
the airfields.81 
In the interim between the first and second negotiation rounds, the New York 
Herald Tribune published an article on 18 May 1952 speculating on the possible 
future stationing of U.S. forces in Norway and a change in that country’s bases 
policy.82 Initially, U.S. officials feared that this leak would constitute an “adverse 
development which might prejudice reaching agreement with Norway.”83 American 
and Norwegian authorities did not officially acknowledge the story, however, and it 
ultimately received little attention. In fact, the Norwegian Foreign Office 
confidentially asked the editors of local newspapers to refrain from commenting on 
the article.84 Furthermore, in a meeting with General Gruenther on 31 May, the new 
Norwegian Defense Minister Nils Langhelle indicated that “when queried regarding a 
change in policy, he, Lange and other Government officials will continue to take the 
line that there has been no change in Norway’s base policy.”85  
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Amazingly, the Soviets also failed to utilize the story for propaganda 
purposes. As Ambassador Bay speculated, “the Norwegian reply to the Russian note 
on bases of last October…contained the clear indication that if the Russians wished 
the Norwegian base policy to remain unchanged they should leave the Norwegians 
alone. Conceivably the Russians are paying some attention to that thought.” Either 
way, he continued, “it would not have surprised me at all if the [Norwegian] 
Government had informed us that in view of [this] business it would have to 
reconsider the whole position. But this has not happened.”86 
The second round of talks therefore commenced on 24 July. The first matter 
that U.S. negotiators sought to resolve concerned the fixed troop ceiling, which the 
Norwegians agreed to drop at the initial meeting.87 After making this concession, 
though, Norwegian officials raised two new concerns. Perhaps due to their failure in 
the first round of talks to secure a clause in the agreement explicitly linking the 
development of U.S. facilities to the defense of Norway, the Norwegians sought “to 
play down the bilateral aspect in favor of the NATO aspect of the arrangement, and 
[to] avoid any mention of SAC as such. This was done specifically to put the 
government in a safer position in case of [further] leakage which might force it to 
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disclose [the] document.”88 U.S. officials rejected this demand on grounds that, 
absent specific reference to the United States and SAC, any resulting agreement 
would be insufficient to authorize and ensure American tenure at the bases.89 Though 
the Norwegians initially refused to budge on this condition, they ultimately were 
“forced to accept the bilateral approach.”90 
The second issue pertained to Norwegian prior consent rights over the use of 
American forces stationed in Norway for activities outside of the country. According 
to the Norwegian negotiators: 
The gist of it was that use for hostile purposes of a Norwegian base by a 
second country against a third country could be expected automatically to 
involve Norway in hostilities against the third country. This being so, Norway 
felt justified in reserving the right to make the initial determination as to when 
its bases could be used in that manner…In substance, Norway did not want to 
put itself in a position where another country, however friendly and reliable, 
could force it into hostilities against a third country.91 
 
Again, U.S. officials opposed this condition, arguing that “It has long been our theory 
that such consent of the host government is an inherent factor in any base 
agreement.”92 Moreover, they stressed that “It is particularly important from a 
military viewpoint that use…of these bases by the U.S. Air Force be possible with 
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minimum delay, conceivably a matter of hours.”93 While these arguments were 
“received critically,” the Norwegians ultimately backed away from this demand.94 
As a result, the negotiations ended successfully with the signing first of an 
Aide Memoire by Foreign Minister Lange and Ambassador Bay on 17 October 1952 
and then of a military-level agreement the following day by the Chief of the 
Norwegian Air Force, Lieutenant General Finn Lambrechts, and the Chief of Staff of 
the U.S. Air Force, General Hoyt Vandenberg.95 These documents granted the United 
States rights to utilize Norwegian airfields and allowed for the presence of U.S. 
military personnel in peacetime. In light of the general “feeling that Soviet reaction 
would be based to a considerable extent on what they saw happening in Norway and 
not on the contents of an agreement,” Secretary Acheson reiterated to Ambassador 
Bay that “one had to make a critical selection of people who were to be located in 
Norway under the SAC agreement; the operation needed maximum cover and a 
thorough briefing of the personnel in advance.”96 Funds for building and maintaining 
the airfields also were “camouflaged” by funneling the money through preexisting 
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legislation on defense construction projects.97 Thus, when Pravda ran several articles 
in November 1952 alleging U.S. military bases on Norwegian territory, Lange was 
able to categorically deny the claims, simply reiterating the position that “the 
Norwegian government has not changed its mind not to permit allied bases in 
Norway.”98 In the end, the SAC basing arrangements remained secret for thirty-one 
years, until the Norwegian government finally acknowledged their existence in 
1983.99 
While it is clear, as Nils Ørvik notes, that Norway’s 1949 “ban on allied 
bases…was caused by various forms of Soviet intimidation and pressure tactics,”100 
Norwegian authorities nevertheless were able to reach a basing agreement with the 
United States three years later, despite renewed Soviet threats of retaliation and 
strained relations, by simply pursuing the negotiations secretly. By not 
acknowledging the pending relationship, the Norwegians deprived the Soviets of an 
important “peg” on which to substantiate propaganda and diplomatic protests. 
Though this approach may have weakened Norway’s bargaining position vis-à-vis the 
United States, it enabled the Norwegians to accept a level of military cooperation 
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considered important by their Defense Ministry but otherwise impossible to attain, 
thus loosening the binds of what Rolf Tamnes once referred to as “probably the 
knottiest problem in the American relationship.”101 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter empirically tests the effects of public acknowledgement on leaders’ 
bargaining behavior during negotiations and its impact on their willingness to reach 
an agreement. The statistical results, coupled with illustrative comparative case 
studies, support my argument’s three principal claims. First, public acknowledgement 
is a strategy that host states can use to press their demands during negotiations. 
Second, the visibility attendant to acknowledgement generates international scrutiny 
costs that put pressure on the stronger sending state to compromise but motivate the 
weaker host state to adopt a hard-line bargaining stance. Third, while public 
acknowledgement may produce a short-term bargaining advantage for the weaker 
partner, it has a long-term effect of reducing the overall likelihood that the two sides 
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In this chapter, I first present an overview of this dissertation’s theoretical argument 
and empirical findings. I then examine the project’s relevance to the study of overseas 
basing and leaders’ management of national security information in the twenty-first 
century. I close with a discussion of several directions for future research. 
 
Overview of the Argument and Findings 
This dissertation poses two basic questions: (1) Under what conditions are leaders 
more or less likely to publicly acknowledge cooperative security negotiations or to 
pursue talks secretly? (2) What impact does this decision have on leaders’ subsequent 
bargaining behavior during negotiations and the overall prospects of achieving 
cooperation? To answer these questions, I develop a realist-inspired theoretical 
framework that advances two main arguments about leaders’ management of 
information during negotiations for overseas military basing rights. First, 
international audiences – namely, third-party states – rather than domestic audiences 
often constitute the principal targets of official secrecy and public acknowledgement. 
Second, leaders’ control of information is shaped primarily by the international 
strategic context and the scope of their states’ national security interests rather than 
domestic political institutions. 
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 My central claim and finding is that states’ power positions in the 
international system fundamentally influence not only the way that leaders control 
information during cooperative security negotiations but also the impact that 
information management has on leaders’ subsequent bargaining behavior and the 
outcome of talks. The empirical results presented in chapter 4 show that great powers 
are more likely to employ official secrecy than other types of states and that leaders 
generally seek to withhold information about the occurrence of basing negotiations 
when its disclosure to international audiences may reflect poorly on their state’s 
prestige or when it might unnecessarily provoke adversaries to oppose the talks or 
take preventive measures. Alternatively, leaders commonly seek to invoke the 
attention of international audiences when doing so may set favorable precedents for 
future negotiations with other potential cooperative partners or signal strength to 
present enemies. By emphasizing third-party states as targets of official secrecy and 
acknowledgement, this dissertation thus makes novel contributions to scholarship on 
audience costs, bargaining, and security cooperation by extending the analysis of 
information management beyond purely dyadic and domestic political incentives and 
impediments. 
 The empirical results in chapter 5 show that public acknowledgement is a 
strategy that weaker states can use to press their demands during negotiations by 
putting pressure on their stronger partner to make concessions.  At the same time, 
while public acknowledgement may produce a short-term bargaining advantage for 
the weaker side, it can motivate that state to adopt a hard-line bargaining stance. This, 
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in turn, often has the long-term effect of reducing the overall likelihood that the two 
sides will achieve cooperation. Specifically, the quantitative and qualitative analyses 
indicate that, on account of attendant international scrutiny costs, public 
acknowledgement of basing negotiations by the host state increases the likelihood 
that the United States will make concessions but decreases the likelihood both that the 
host state will make concessions and that the negotiations will end in an agreement. 
By emphasizing international power position rather than domestic political 
institutions, this dissertation thus generates different expectations about which states’ 
bargaining positions benefit from public acknowledgement than existing scholarship 
on audience costs. By highlighting the constraining effects of international scrutiny 
costs that arise from acknowledgment by the weaker partner, this dissertation also 
challenges previous realist theories that suggest the bargaining advantage during 
security cooperation rests with the less vulnerable and less constrained state. 
 
Contemporary Relevance of the Project 
 
As this project’s empirical evidence ends in 1971, some readers might question its 
contemporary relevance in light of revolutions in military and information 
technologies that suggest a decreased need for overseas military bases and cast doubt 






Overseas Military Basing 
 
There is no denying that technological changes that improve the performance 
characteristics of ships and planes (as well as missiles) certainly lessen the need for 
elaborate overseas basing networks comprised of numerous naval shore facilities and 
aerial staging points to project power over long distances.1 That being said, though, 
advances in military technology have far from eliminated the utility of overseas 
bases. Even in the twenty-first century, as Michael O’Hanlon notes, “without bases 
from which to operate,…combat units are of little inherent use unless a battle comes 
straight to them and they can fight on their home fields….It would typically take a 
couple of weeks even to deploy a few thousand troops to a distant region…and a few 
months to deploy a large combat force to most parts of the world,” much less the 
equipment, supplies, and support units needed for a sustained campaign. “Some of 
this can be constructed as needed, but that is a slow process.”2 Thus, in a very basic 
and meaningful way, an existing network of overseas bases with peacetime troop 
deployments continues to contribute to great powers’ abilities to deter and fight wars 
by allowing for extensive military preparations prior to the outbreak of crises and on-
call capabilities for efficient responses during the critical early stages of conflicts. For 
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these reasons alone, to echo the conclusion of a 2007 SIPRI Policy Paper, “Foreign 
military basing will remain an indispensable element of the force deployment plans of 
several of the world’s major powers and alliances for a long time to come.”3 
Moreover, power projection remains susceptible to three key vulnerabilities – 
at least one of which is made worse by advances in military technology – that suggest 
a continued (if not increased) need for diversification and redundancy of base 
locations. The first vulnerability concerns logistical bottlenecks and operational 
limitations. Large modern airfields, for instance, can reasonably accommodate 
deployments of no more than 1,000 tons of equipment and supplies each day and 
operations involving a fighter wing of aircraft (i.e., 72 planes). Such throughput and 
operational limitations are more severe at smaller, less developed airfields. 
Consequently, absent a sufficiently large number of modern airbases within at least 
500 miles of combat theaters, bottlenecks can develop that significantly clog large 
deployments and diminish operational effectiveness.4 The second vulnerability is in 
relation to enemy attacks. Fewer bases means longer supply lines, which are more 
easily disrupted, and renders any given location a prime target for area denial 
strategies by adversaries involving  the use of advanced precision weapons (i.e., 
ballistic and cruise missiles), ground assaults, and terrorist attacks. Effectively 
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countering this vulnerability requires, at a minimum, dispersing forces across a 
greater number of locations and developing hardened facilities capable of surviving 
such attacks. Both objectives are more easily accomplished ahead of time and at 
dedicated defense areas.5 The final vulnerability is due to the threat of access denial 
by cooperative partners. Specifically, potential host states can refuse to grant base 
rights and current hosts can deny the use of existing bases in a given crisis or war.6 
Again, this suggests the importance of acquiring access privileges across a wide range 
of foreign territories and maintaining sufficient backup locations to accommodate 
fluctuations in host-state politics. 
Each of these vulnerabilities is heightened in the current strategic 
environment. Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the geopolitical 
emphasis of U.S. national security strategy shifted toward the so-called “arc of 
instability” that stretches from parts of the Caribbean and the triborder region of 
South America through most of Africa, the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Middle East, 
and into Central, South, and Southeast Asia. This region is populated by quasi, 
failing/failed, and rogue states that “threaten us by their weakness, not their 
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strength.”7 The unstable governance structures that characterize such states help to 
proliferate an array of non-state and transnational threats that include global 
terrorism, organized international crime, drug and human trafficking, piracy, and 
humanitarian crises. Given this area’s underdeveloped infrastructure, volatile politics, 
and panoply of new threats, a great power’s efforts to secure access in or around this 
region will be especially vulnerable to bottlenecks, area denial strategies, and anti-
access pressures. At the same time, though, since it lies astride the major sea lanes of 
communication, containing many of the globe’s vital chokepoints, and is home to 
much of the world’s energy resources, “acquiring or maintaining bases and base 
access on this region’s periphery from which to project forces rapidly may be of even 
greater importance in the future than it is today.”8 
Reflecting these considerations, the United States announced in 2004 that it 
intended to restructure its overseas basing network. The resulting Global Defense 
Posture Review (GDPR) called for the creation of bases in new regions (i.e., Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia) and the downsizing or realignment of bases in older areas 
of activity (i.e., Western Europe and East Asia). It emphasized the need to combat 
new asymmetric threats and prioritized force mobility, strategic flexibility, and 
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unrestricted use rights.9 In this regard, the GDPR represents an adjustment in U.S. 
strategic policy of the type and scale that one would expect naturally to follow a 
major change in the external threat environment.10 In other respects, such as its 
conceptualization of overseas basing, the GDPR is less transformative. 
To make sense of this strategic adjustment, the United States introduced three 
new categories of overseas military facilities: main operating bases (MOBs), forward 
operating sites (FOSs), and cooperative security locations (CSLs). MOBs represent 
strategically enduring assets with robust infrastructure and permanently stationed 
combat forces. Characterized by extensive command, control, and support structures 
as well as force protection measures, MOBs are meant to serve as regional hubs for 
throughput and as anchors for U.S. engagement and commitments. FOSs constitute 
scalable “warm bases” with light infrastructure and a small permanently stationed 
U.S. support presence. These “lily pads” are meant to be rapidly expandable staging 
and jump-off points capable of accommodating large troop deployments as well as 
logistical and strategic lift in times of crisis. Finally, CSLs are host-state facilities 
with limited in-place infrastructure and little or no permanently stationed U.S. 
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personnel. These “virtual bases” are meant to provide contingency access and to be 
rapidly scalable to FOSs should the need arise.11 
Though these categories certainly help to clarify important aspects of the 
GDPR’s on-the-ground implementation, these distinctions do not represent a 
transformation in the nature of foreign basing relationships. In the early 1940s, for 
instance, the U.S. Army and Navy employed a comparable spectrum of base types: 
lions, cubs, and acorns. A lion base was equipped to support major fleet and air 
operations and to provide force protection. It consisted of robust infrastructure, 
including as many as eight runways of up to 5,000 feet, and accommodated 
approximately 10,000 combat, repair, and construction personnel. A cub base 
ordinarily hosted a small group of light forces but was capable of supporting the 
transition process from force deployment into a theater to force employment in 
combat operations. An acorn, in turn, was designed for rapid construction and 
operation as needed.12 Similarly, in 1949, Hans Weigart classified naval and air bases 
into three groups: 
Permanent operational bases which are fortified and garrisoned with sufficient 
strength to hold against a major attack; limited operational bases, which will 
be used chiefly for aerial reconnaissance; and emergency bases, which need 
not be garrisoned in normal times, but which we should be entitled to occupy 
should an emergency arise.13 
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Analogous to the concept of FOSs, in the early 1950s the U.S. Air Force considered 
establishing a series of “bargain bases” in Central, West, and East Africa that were to 
be maintained at austerity levels by limited U.S. personnel but serviceable in 
emergencies.14 Finally, comparable to CSLs, during the late 1960s and early 1970s 
the U.S. Air Force introduced the concept of collocated operating bases (COBs) for 
Western Europe. These were host-state facilities capable of bedding down U.S. 
tactical aircraft deployed at the outbreak of hostilities to augment in-place U.S. forces 
already stationed at MOBs in the region.15 Thus, from an historical perspective, as 
these examples illustrate, there is nothing especially novel or revolutionary about the 
GDPR’s reconceptualization of overseas facilities. 
In sum, foreign military basing remains as relevant today as it was during the 
period of 1939 – 1971. Advances in military technology certainly have decreased the 
sheer number of shore facilities and aerial staging points needed for power projection, 
though sustained overseas operations remain vulnerable to logistical bottlenecks, area 
denial strategies by adversaries, and anti-access pressures from hosts. In chapter 2, I 
made use of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s distinction between “rights desired which can 
be exercised when necessary, and the actual establishment, garrisoning, and 
maintenance of bases,” which “depend on a number of factors, such as current 
strategic concept, the international situation, new weapons of war, and material and 
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manpower resources.”16 This dissertation project focuses on the former, the nature of 
and need for which have changed little over the past 70 years. To the extent that the 
United States’ current basing strategy is designed to leave a lighter footprint in host 
states, however, this will serve only to facilitate the pursuit of secret basing 
relationships. At the same time, a strategy that deploys fewer permanent troops and 
emphasizes unrestricted use rights may lead cooperative partners to question the 
security benefits of hosting U.S. bases, thus possibly motivating their use of public 
acknowledgment as a bargaining tactic to address abandonment and entanglement 
concerns during negotiations. In all these respects, this dissertation’s arguments and 
findings are not only quite relevant to the study of basing relationships after 1971 but 
also especially timely for understanding U.S. overseas military strategy in the twenty-
first century.  
 
Secrecy and the Management of National Security Information 
 
The information age began in the mid to late 1970s and then picked up considerable 
speed in the 1980s and 1990s, with no end in sight.17 As my dataset terminates in 
1971, this dissertation’s empirical analyses effectively precede the information age. 
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(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 1174-1175. 
 
17 See, for instance, Theodore J. Lowi, “The Information Revolution, Politics, and the Prospects for an 
Open Society,” in Itzhak Galnoor, ed., Government Secrecy in Democracies (New York: New York 
University Press, 1977), pp. 40-61; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Power and 
Interdependence in the Information Age,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 5 (September – October 1998), 
pp. 81-94; Beth A. Simmons, “International Studies in the Global Information Age,” International 




Does this make the results and insights from these analyses irrelevant to 
contemporary times? Answering this larger question requires posing two more 
specific ones. 
First, has the revolution in information and communications technology 
decreased leaders’ incentives to withhold national security information from 
international audiences? In chapter 3, I discussed three general motives for employing 
official secrecy during cooperative security negotiations: to avoid bargaining 
inefficiencies from unnecessary opposition and constraints; to minimize unfavorable 
precedents from concessions; and to preserve military effectiveness by maintaining 
the benefits of surprise and curtailing unnecessary provocations. There is no reason to 
think that these incentives are diminished in the information age. If anything, as 
suggested below, technological advances that broadly render state behavior more 
observable likely spur leaders’ impulse to withhold official information about and 
acknowledgement of sensitive activities, for an effective use of secrecy still carries 
the advantage of deniability. Moreover, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, “the 
potential for secrecy has become much greater…as the scope of ‘national security’ 
has expanded exponentially.”18 
Second, has the information revolution decreased leaders’ abilities to withhold 
national security information? There are at least two parts to answering this question. 
The first concerns the procedural aspects of the state’s production, classification, and 
                                               
18 Jacob N. Shapiro and David A. Siegel, “Is this Paper Dangerous? Balancing Secrecy and Openness 




then subsequent declassification and release of government records. By decreasing 
the costs of information production, advances in communication technologies have 
dramatically increased the volume and diversity of government records and thus the 
work loads of officials tasked with reviewing those records for declassification and 
release.19 Of course, this implies that the state actually has procedures mandating the 
release of official records, which is not always a safe assumption. For instance, a 
2006 survey of freedom of information protections in ninety-two democracies found 
that only 57% had any codified procedures requiring the executive to release national 
security records, with an average mandated lag-time of release of thirty-five years.20 
Either way, records concerning military cooperation – particularly overseas basing – 
always have been subject to the highest levels of classification and slowest rates of 
release. This has not changed in the information age.  
Setting aside the legal and procedural aspects of classifying and releasing 
official records, has the state’s ability to conceal its foreign policy behavior more 
generally been affected by the revolution in information and communication 
technologies? Absolutely. Advances in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
satellites and sensors, for instance, clearly enhance the abilities of technologically 
                                               
19 Alastair Roberts, Blacked Out: Government Secrecy in the Information Age (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), pp. 199-227. 
 
20 The median and modal mandated lag-times were thirty years. The data on freedom of information 
protections come from David Banisar, Freedom of Information Around the World 2006: A Global 
Survey of Access to Government Information Laws (London: Privacy International, 2006). The sample 
of democracies comes from the Polity IV dataset. A state was included if its combined Polity score in 
2006 was greater than or equal to six. See Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers, Polity IV Project: 





proficient third-party states to identify and locate objects of military interest – such as 
the construction and garrisoning of new defense installations – in other countries. At 
the same time, though, such technologies are less capable of detecting secret 
negotiations and planning for pending and future military relationships, which 
constitute the primary focus of this study. Of course, today’s global broadcasting 
networks, twenty-four-hour news coverage, and “cybercitizens” armed with video-
equipped smart phones help to shed light on these less easily observed activities.21 
Secretive foreign policy behavior also is vulnerable to leaks – that is, premature, 
unauthorized partial disclosures of insider information.22  
The release in November – December 2010 of hundreds of thousands of 
classified U.S. government documents by the whistle-blower website WikiLeaks is a 
prominent example of these contemporary forces working together. This leak was 
unprecedented in its mode and scale. Following the 9/11 attacks, there was a push to 
share intelligence information more widely among federal agencies to make the U.S. 
government more capable of detecting terrorist plots. This enabled Bradley Manning, 
a low-level analyst with access to the Defense Department’s classified Siprnet 
system, to quickly download a large number of State and Defense Department 
                                               
21 For a thorough review of the literature on the media and leaders’ management of foreign policy 
information, see Matthew A. Baum and Philip B.K. Potter, “The Relationships Between Mass Media, 
Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis,” Annual Review of Political 
Science, Vol. 11 (2008), pp. 39-65. On the impact of new media technologies, see Karin Geiselhart, 
“Toward Global Governance: Interactive Technologies and Global Accountability,” Public 
Communication Review, Vol. 1, No. 1 (2010), pp. 37-46. 
 
22 On leaks, see Stephen Hess, The Government/Press Connection: Press Officers and Their Offices 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1984), pp. 75-94; Elie Abel, Leaking: Who Does It? Who 




documents and then easily share those with WikiLeaks. As Scott Shane of The New 
York Times notes, however, “if technology enabled those disclosures, technology can 
also make computers more leakproof. Chastened bureaucrats already have made fixes 
to prevent the hemorrhage of more documents.” These include blocking USB ports, 
disabling the recording capacity of CD and DVD drives, and installing software that 
disables read-write drives and detects unusual downloads of data on classified 
computers.23 Moreover, as Beth Simmons observes, “WikiLeaks may encourage 
governments everywhere to escalate their internal security ratings. What was once 
‘secret’ in the future will more likely be elevated to ‘top secret’ and become harder 
than ever to declassify. This could hardly have been what the techno-libertarians had 
intended.”24 
While this dissertation’s empirical scope predates the information age and 
thus does not directly capture the effects of these advances in communication 
technology, the quantitative tests in chapters 5 and 6 do take some of these factors 
into consideration by controlling for press speculation and leaks. These statistical 
analyses demonstrate in a generalizable way that such unwanted attention 
significantly increases both sending- and host-state leaders’ subsequent likelihood of 
going public, as conventional wisdom might suggest, and decreases host-state 
leaders’ willingness to make concessions. Moreover, though leaders often are able to 
                                               
23 Scott Shane, “Can the Government Keep A Secret?” in Alexander Star, ed., Open Secrets: 
WikiLeaks, War, and American Diplomacy (New York: Grove Press, 2011), pp. 337-342. 
 




effectively manage unintended breakdowns in secrecy by lying,25 there is anecdotal 
evidence that press speculation and leaks also can decrease the probability that 
negotiations will end successfully in a formal agreement.  
For instance, on 6 June 1940, the Chargé d’affaires at the American Legation 
in Montevideo, Uruguay, approached Foreign Minister Alberto Guani to discuss the 
construction and use of air and naval bases. Guani agreed to hold talks but, 
anticipating Argentine opposition, insisted that “any actual agreement to use the bases 
by the United States might be the subject of a secret agreement.”26 Preliminary 
discussions were held secretly during late June. However, on 24 August, The New 
York Times published a story, which subsequently was republished in the Uruguayan 
opposition newspaper El Diario, reporting that “secret emissaries from Washington” 
had met with Uruguayan officials to discuss the establishment of bases.27 The 
American Legation responded with a public statement that “this report is entirely 
without foundation,” which was followed by a statement from Guani that “the 
Foreign Office denies these reports categorically and states it has never discussed any 
                                               
25 On the politics of lying, see Gordon Tullock, Toward a Mathematics of Politics (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1967), pp. 133-43; David Wise, The Politics of Lying: Government 
Deception, Secrecy, and Power (New York: Random House, 1973); Robert E. Goodin, Manipulatory 
Politics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 37-64; Miroslav Nincic, Democracy and 
Foreign Policy: The Fallacy of Political Realism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), pp. 
124-52; Lionel Cliffe, Maureen Ramsay, and Dave Bartlett, The Politics of Lying: Implications for 
Democracy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000); John J. Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie: The Truth 
about Lying in International Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
 
26 Montevideo Despatches No. 999, 7 June 1940, and No. 1003, 10 June 1940, NARA, RG 59, Central 
Decimal File (CDF) 1940-1944, Confidential File (250/34/16/3-4), 810.20 Defense/864 and 871, Box 
C19. 
 
27 John W. White, “Uruguayan Offers of Bases Rejected,” New York Times, 24 August 1940, p. 6; 
Montevideo Despatch No. 545, 14 September 1940, NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-1944, Confidential File 




propositions of this nature.”28 Additional secret discussions were held in late October. 
However, on 10 November, The New York Times published a second story reporting, 
incorrectly, that Uruguay had agreed to host bases.29 The next day, Guani issued 
another statement that “consideration has not been given nor is it being given to 
permitting the establishment of such foreign bases on our territory.”30 This was 
followed by a press conference from Sumner Welles, Acting U.S. Secretary of State, 
who announced that “the United States Government has never sought directly or 
indirectly to obtain the lease or cession of air and naval bases in Uruguay.”31 In the 
end, though both governments were able to effectively dodge this unwanted attention 
before it became an international political liability, they chose not to resume the 
negotiations. 
In sum, there is no reason to think that leaders’ incentives to withhold national 
security information from international audiences have weakened in the information 
age. If anything, the global war on terrorism promises to increase states’ use of 
secrecy in the twenty-first century. There is no denying that advances in information 
and communication technologies since 1971 have broadly diminished states’ abilities 
                                               
28 Montevideo Telegram No. 191, 28 August 1940, and Despatch No. 509, 30 August 1940, NARA, 
RG 59, CDF 1940-1944, 810.20 Defense/176 and 201, Boxes 3375-3376; “Uruguayan Plan Denied: 
Foreign Minister and U.S. Legation Say No Bases Are Sought,” New York Times, 30 August 1940, p. 
9. 
 
29 John W. White, “Uruguayans Agree to Allow US Bases,” New York Times, 10 November 1940, p. 1. 
 
30 “Communiqué of the Uruguayan Minister of Foreign Affairs (Guani),” 11 November 1940, in S. 
Shepard Jones and Denys P. Myers, eds., Documents on American Foreign Relations, Vol. III: July 
1940-June 1941 (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1941), p. 136. 
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to fully conceal their foreign policy activities. By controlling for press speculation 
and leaks, however, this dissertation’s empirical analyses systematically capture the 
effects of contemporaneous information diffusion. The fact that such diffusion has 
increased in subsequent years does not therefore limit the generalizability and 
relevance of this project’s findings. 
 
Directions for Future Research 
There are at least three directions for future research. The first is to explore the scope 
of the argument beyond U.S. foreign military basing. In theory, the argument should 
be generalizable to other sending states and their respective host partners. Testing this 
empirically will require systematic data gathering on the negotiation efforts of other 
major powers that have pursued overseas basing networks: namely, the United 
Kingdom, France, Russia, Germany, Italy, and Japan. Similarly, it should be possible 
to apply or expand the argument to explain leaders’ management of information in 
other types of cooperative security relationships, such as alliances, coalition warfare, 
and the provision of foreign military assistance. 
 A second obvious avenue for future research is to extend the empirical 
analysis to cover the time periods before 1939 and after 1971. The present study also 
is limited to U.S. negotiations and agreements for base rights on foreign territory 
where it did not already legally possess such privileges. Thus, additional data could 
be gathered on all talks and agreements related to the renegotiation or termination of 
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existing privileges to examine leaders’ management of information during these later 
stages of cooperation. 
 Finally, whereas this dissertation focuses on third-party states as targets of 
official secrecy, leaders’ control of national security information may be directed at 
other international audiences, such as terrorist organizations. As David Ochmanek 
notes, “Protecting U.S. forces and assets worldwide from terrorist attacks is always a 
high priority, but concern for the safety of U.S. forces increases when those forces are 
deployed in a region close to the home base of one or more terrorist groups.”32 
Similar to the logic of H3(a), this suggests that sending- and host-state leaders may be 
more likely to pursue military cooperation secretly if the receiving state also plays 
host to an international terrorist organization. This argument sheds some light on the 
contemporary examples briefly discussed in the introduction chapter: namely, that the 
United States’ secret cooperation with Yemen and public cooperation with Djibouti 
can be explained partially by the fact that the former serves as the hub for al-Qaeda in 
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) while the latter is not a terrorist haven.33 A third 
avenue for future research, then, is to examine leaders’ use of official secrecy when 
sending and host states’ adversaries are non-state actors. 
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In appendix A, I present a summary description of the 90 cases of potential basing 
relationships initiated by the United States between January 1939 and December 
1971. Of these 90 proposals to open basing negotiations, 82 were accepted by the 
potential host state, leading to a total of 218 rounds of bilateral talks and 59 
agreements. The summary profile for each case includes the following information: 
1. The month and year when the United States first proposed to open basing 
negotiations for a particular host territory/state. 
2. The month and year when the potential host state either accepted or 
declined the proposal.  
3. If negotiations took place, the starting and end dates for each round of talks. 
4. If an agreement was reached, the title and date of the agreement. 
The full citation information for the sources consulted is provided at the end of each 
case summary. The cases are grouped together by geographic region and then 
presented in chronological order. 
 
North, Central, and South America and the Caribbean 
Brazil (1939 – 1942) 
American officials approached Brazil in May 1939 to discuss military cooperation, 




Brazilian officials accepted the proposal that same month. Four rounds of talks 
ensued: round 1 (May – July 1939), round 2 (May – October 1940), round 3 (January 
– November 1941), and round 4 (March – May 1942). These negotiations culminated 
in the Political-Military Agreement between the United States of Brazil and the 
United States of America, signed 28 May 1942.1 
 
Bermuda, St. Lucia, and Trinidad/United Kingdom (1939)  
President Franklin Roosevelt proposed the establishment of U.S. bases in Bermuda, 
St. Lucia, and Trinidad to King George VI and British Ambassador Ronald Lindsay 
in June 1939. The proposal was accepted that same month. Two rounds of talks 
ensued: round 1 (June – July 1939) and round 2 (September – November 1939). The 
negotiations culminated in Agreements for the Lease of Air and Naval Facilities on 
Bermuda, St. Lucia, and Trinidad, finalized on 28 November 1939.2 
                                               
1 NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, 810.20 Defense/2093, Box 3386; NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, 
832.24/2-741, Box C115; NARA, RG 84 (350/50/14/7), Entry 2133 (Brazil; U.S. Embassy, Rio De 
Janeiro; Strictly Confidential General Records, 1940-1946), Strictly Confidential File 820, Box 7; 
NARA, RG 218 (190/2/24/4), Brazil-United States Defense Commission, SF 1941-1954, BDC 910 
International Agreements (Political Military Agreement), Box 3; FRUS, 1940, V, pp. 40-52; FRUS, 
1941, VI, pp. 490-514; FRUS, 1947, VIII, pp. 410-412; Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, United 
States Army in World War II, The Western Hemisphere: The Framework of Hemisphere Defense 
(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1960), pp. 9-13, 
267-268, 272-319; Bynum E. Weathers, Acquisition of Air Bases in Latin America: June 1939 – June 
1943, AFHRA Historical Study No. 63 (1960), pp. 162-164; Theresa Louise Kraus, The Establishment 
of United States Army Air Corps Bases in Brazil, 1938-1945 (Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland, 
1986); Theresa L. Kraus, “Planning the Defense of the South Atlantic, 1939-1941: Securing Brazil.” In 
Timothy J. Runyan and Jan M. Copes, eds., To Die Gallantly: The Battle of the Atlantic (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1994), pp. 60-61. 
 
2 F. A. Baptiste, “The British Grant of Air and Naval Facilities to the United States in Trinidad, St. 
Lucia, and Bermuda in 1939 (June – December),” Caribbean Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2 (July 1976), pp. 
5-43; Joseph P. Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, 1939-1941: The Partnership that Saved the West (New 
York: Norton, 1976), pp. 63-64; James R. Leutze, Bargaining for Supremacy: Anglo-American Naval 




British Caribbean and North Atlantic Territories/United Kingdom (1940 – 1941) 
President Roosevelt proposed the establishment of U.S. bases in British Caribbean 
and North Atlantic Territories to Prime Minister Churchill in August 1940. The 
proposal was accepted that same month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (August 
– September 1940) and round 2 (January – March 1941). The negotiations culminated 
in Agreement for the Leasing of Naval and Air Bases, signed 27 March 1941.3 
 
Mexico (1939 – 1943) 
President Franklin Roosevelt sent a letter to Mexican President Lázaro Cárdenas, 
forwarded from Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles to Mexican Ambassador 
Francisco Nájera in August 1939, requesting bases in Mexico. Nájera met with 
Welles in June 1940 to convey Cárdenas’ willingness to discuss the base issue. Five 
rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (July 1940), round 2 (November 1940), round 3 
(March – July 1941), round 4 (December 1941 – April 1942), and round 5 (June 1942 
– January 1943). No agreement was reached.4 
                                                                                                                                      
Reynolds, “FDR’s Foreign Policy and the British Royal Visit to the U.S.A., 1939,” The Historian, Vol. 
45, No. 4 (August 1983), p. 468. 
 
3 NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-1939, 811.34500/3 ¾, Box 5017; NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, 
811.34544, Boxes 3786-3790; FRUS, 1940, III, pp. 49-77; FRUS, 1941, III, pp. 53-85; EAS 181 and 
235; William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940 (New York: 
Harper, 1952), pp. 743-776; Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, pp. 51-62; 
Weathers, Acquisition of Air Bases in Latin America, pp. 237-276; Philip Goodhart, Fifty Ships that 
Saved the World: The Foundation of the Anglo-American Alliance (London: Heinemann, 1965); David 
Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance 1937-1941: A Study in Competitive 
Cooperation (London: Europa, 1981), pp. 121-168. 
 
4 NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, 811.24512/11B, Box 4986; NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, 810.20 
Defense/3465, Box C21; NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, 811.24512, Box 3765; NARA, RG 59, CDF 
1940-44, 811.34512, Boxes 3782 and C80; NARA, RG 218 (190/2/24/5-7), Joint Mexican-United 





Galapagos Islands/Ecuador (1939 – 1947) 
American officials approached Ecuador in October 1939 to discuss the defense of the 
Galapagos Islands and the establishment of military bases on the islands. Ecuadoran 
officials accepted the proposal that same month. Nine rounds of talks ensued: round 1 
(November 1939), round 2 (December 1941 – February 1942), round 3 (July 1942), 
round 4 (September – November 1942), round 5 (October 1943 – May 1944), round 6 
(July – August 1944), round 7 (October 1944 – January 1945), round 8 (May 1945 – 
April 1946), and round 9 (June 1946 – March 1947). No agreement was reached.5 
 
Panama (1939 – 1942) 
The American Ambassador to Panama approached the Panamanian Foreign Minister 
in November 1939 to informally indicate US interest in obtaining base rights outside 
of the Panama Canal Zone. The Panamanian Foreign Minister accepted the proposal 
that same month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (July – August 1940) and 
                                                                                                                                      
145; Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, pp. 333-350; Weathers, Acquisition 
of Air Bases in Latin America, pp. 175-179; María Emilia Paz, Strategy, Security, and Spies: Mexico 
and the U.S. as Allies in World War II (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1997), pp. 51-60, 67-71, 110-122, 210-218. 
 
5 NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, 811.24522, Boxes C76 and 3765; NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, 
811.34522, Box 3783; NARA, RG 59, CDF 1945-49, 811.24522, Boxes 4651-4652; FRUS, 1941, 
VIII, pp. 258-301; FRUS, 1942, VI, pp. 371-379; FRUS, 1944, VII, pp. 1052-1079; FRUS, 1945, IX, 
pp. 1007-1036; FRUS, 1946, XI, pp. 836-864; FRUS, 1947, VIII, pp. 676-690; CDC, Procurement, 
Occupation, and Use of Air Bases in the Galapagos Islands and at Salinas, Ecuador, CMH HMF 8-2.8 
BL 1945; Weathers, Acquisition of Air Bases in Latin America, pp. 94-101; Ronin Pineo, Ecuador and 





round 2 (October 1940 – March 1942). The negotiations culminated in the Defense 
Sites Agreement, signed 18 May 1942.6 
 
Venezuela (1940 – 1942) 
American officials approached Venezuela in May 1940 with a proposal to open staff 
conversations on military cooperation, including the issue of stationing US forces at 
air and naval bases in the country. Venezuelan officials accepted the proposal in June 
1940. Three rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (August 1940), round 2 (January 1942), 
and round 3 (June – July 1942). No agreement was reached.7 
 
Uruguay (1940) 
American officials approached Uruguay in May 1940 with a proposal to open staff 
conversations on military cooperation, including the issue of stationing US forces at 
air and naval bases in the country. Uruguayan officials accepted the proposal in June 
                                               
6 NARA, RG 59, CDF 1930-39, 711F.1914/128 and /129, Box 4109; NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, 
711F.1914, Boxes 2263-2266; FRUS, 1940, V, pp. 1072-1089; FRUS, 1941, VII, pp. 414-468; FRUS, 
1942, VI, pp. 577-619; EAS 359; Almon R. Wright, “Defense Sites Negotiations Between the United 
States and Panama, 1936-1948,” Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 27, No. 685 (11 August 1952), pp. 
212-219; Weathers, Acquisition of Air Bases in Latin America, pp. 13-84. 
 
7 NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, 810.20 Defense/1-1742 and /2-1342, Box C24; CDC, Military 
Collaboration: CDC-Venezuela During World War II. CMH HMF 8-2.8 BJ 1946, pp. 10-11, 18-20, 
22-31, 47-48, 51-52; CDC, Antilles Department Historical Studies, Volume 2: War Plans and Defense 
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333-339; FRUS, 1940, V, pp. 175-197; Conn and Fairchild, The Framework of Hemisphere Defense, 
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1940. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (June 1940) and round 2 (October 1940). 
No agreement was reached.8 
 
Peru (1940 – 1942) 
American officials approached Peru in May 1940 with a proposal to open staff 
conversations on military cooperation, including the issue of stationing US forces at 
air and naval bases in the country. Peruvian officials accepted the proposal in June 
1940. Three rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (September 1940), round 2 (December 
1941 – January 1942), and round 3 (April – July 1942). The negotiations culminated 
in the Talara Air Base Agreement, initialed on 24 April 1942 and officially signed on 
8 July 1942.9 
 
Colombia (1940 – 1942) 
American officials approached Colombia in May 1940 with a proposal to open staff 
conversations on military cooperation, including the issue of stationing US forces at 
air and naval bases in the country. Colombian officials accepted the proposal in June 
1940. Four rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (September 1940), round 2 (May – July 
                                               
8 NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, 810.20 Defense/864, /871, /19 ¼, /19 ¾, and /7-1940, Boxes C16, 
C19, and C21; FRUS, 1940, V, pp. 162-174; Stetson Conn, Rose C. Engleman, and Byron Fairchild, 
United States Army in World War II, The Western Hemisphere: Guarding the United States and Its 
Outposts (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1964), 
pp. 175-181. 
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1941), round 3 (December 1941 – May 1942), and round 4 (July – September 1942). 
The negotiations culminated in an Agreement for a Naval Seaplane Base at Cartagena 
by exchange of notes on 23/30 September 1942.10 
 
Ecuador (1940 – 1942) 
American officials approached Ecuador in May 1940 with a proposal to open staff 
conversations on military cooperation, including the issue of stationing US forces at 
air and naval bases on the Ecuadoran mainland. Ecuadoran officials accepted the 
proposal in June 1940. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (September – October 
1940) and round 2 (December 1941 – January 1942). The negotiations culminated in 
an Agreement for a Defense Base at Salinas, signed 24 January 1942.11 
 
Chile (1940) 
American officials approached Chile in May 1940 with a proposal to open staff 
conversations on military cooperation, including the issue of stationing US forces at 
air and naval bases in the country. Chilean officials accepted the proposal in June 
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American officials approached Argentina in May 1940 with a proposal to open staff 
conversations on military cooperation, including the issue of stationing US forces at 
air and naval bases in the country. Argentine officials declined the proposal in 
October 1940. No negotiations were held and no agreement was reached.13 
 
Cuba (1940 – 1942) 
In May 1940, Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles met with the Cuban 
Ambassador in Washington and broached the topic of holding talks on expanded 
military and naval cooperation between the United States and Cuba, including the 
issue of base access outside of Guantanamo Bay. The Cuban Ambassador accepted 
the proposal that same month. Four rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (August – 
September 1940), round 2 (December 1941 – January 1942), round 3 (April – June 
1942), and round 4 (August – September 1942). The negotiations culminated in an 
                                               
12 FRUS, 1940, V, pp. 52-57; “Chile’s Defense Head Against Ceding Bases,” The New York Times, 9 
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pp. 175-181. 
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Agreement between the United States and Cuba for Military and Naval Cooperation, 
signed 7 September 1942.14 
 
Dominican Republic (1940 – 1941) 
American officials approached the Dominican Republic in May 1940 with a proposal 
to open staff conversations on military cooperation, including the issue of stationing 
US forces at air and naval bases in the country. Dominican officials accepted the 
proposal that same month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (August 1940) and 
round 2 (December 1941). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement for a U.S. 
Army Air Base at Cuidad Trujillo, signed on 16 December 1941.15 
 
Haiti (1940 – 1941) 
American officials approached Haiti in May 1940 with a proposal to open staff 
conversations on military cooperation, including the issue of stationing US forces at 
air and naval bases in the country. Haitian officials accepted the proposal that same 
month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (August 1940) and round 2 (December 
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1941). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement for a U.S. Army Air Base at 
Brown Field by exchange of notes on 15/16 December 1941.16 
 
Nicaragua (1940 – 1942) 
American officials approached Nicaragua in June 1940 with a proposal to open staff 
conversations on military cooperation, including the issue of stationing US forces at 
air and naval bases in the country. Nicaraguan officials accepted the proposal that 
same month. Four rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (August 1940), round 2 (December 
1941 – January 1942), round 3 (April – June 1942), and round 4 (August – November 
1942). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement for a Naval Base at Corinto by 
exchange of notes on 14 October and 25 November 1942.17 
 
Honduras (1940 – 1942) 
American officials approached Honduras in June 1940 with a proposal to open staff 
conversations on military cooperation, including the issue of stationing US forces at 
air and naval bases in the country. Honduran officials accepted the proposal that same 
month. Three rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (September 1940), round 2 (June – July 
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1942), and round 3 (September 1942). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement 
for a Naval Base at Puerto Castillo by exchange of notes on 8/19 September 1942.18 
 
Guatemala (1940 – 1942) 
American officials approached Guatemala in June 1940 with a proposal to open staff 
conversations on military cooperation, including the issue of stationing US forces at 
air and naval bases in the country. Guatemalan officials accepted the proposal that 
same month. Three rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (September 1940), round 2 
(December 1941 – February 1942), and round 3 (April – November 1942). The 
negotiations culminated in an Air Base Agreement, signed 16 November 1942.19 
 
El Salvador (1940) 
American officials approached El Salvador in June 1940 with a proposal to open staff 
conversations on military cooperation, including the issue of stationing US forces at 
air and naval bases in the country. Salvadoran officials accepted the proposal that 
same month. One round of negotiations ensued in September 1940. No agreement 
was reached.20 
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Costa Rica (1940 – 1942) 
American officials approached Costa Rica in June 1940 with a proposal to open staff 
conversations on military cooperation, including the issue of stationing US forces at 
air and naval bases in the country. Costa Rican officials accepted the proposal that 
same month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (August 1940) and round 2 
(December 1941 – January 1942). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement for a 
U.S. Army Air Base at San Jose by exchange of notes on 15 December 1941 and 9 
January 1942.21 
 
Bolivia (1940 – 1942) 
American officials approached Bolivia in August 1940 with a proposal to open staff 
conversations on military cooperation, including the issue of stationing US forces at 
air and naval bases in the country. Bolivian officials accepted the proposal that same 
month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (September – October 1940) and round 2 
(January – April 1942). No agreement was reached.22 
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American officials approached Paraguay in August 1940 with a proposal to open staff 
conversations on military cooperation, including the issue of stationing US forces at 
air and naval bases in the country. Paraguayan officials accepted the proposal that 
same month. One round of talks ensued during August – September 1940. No 
agreement was reached.23 
 
Canada (1940 – 1944) 
President Franklin Roosevelt approached Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King 
in August 1940 with a proposal to establish US bases and to station US troops in 
Canada. Prime Minister King accepted the proposal that same month. Four rounds of 
talks ensued: round 1 (August 1940), round 2 (September – November 1941), round 3 
(July 1942 – February 1943), and round 4 (October 1943 – February 1944). The 
negotiations culminated in an Agreement concerning Military Facilities, initialed 26 
November 1941 with an Understanding concerning the Status of US Forces Stationed 
in Canada by exchange of notes on 27 December 1943 and 8 February 1944.24 
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American officials approached the Netherlands government in September 1941 for 
access to bases in Surinam. Dutch officials accepted the proposal that same month. 
One round of talks ensued during September – November 1941. The negotiations 
culminated in a Defense Agreement for Surinam, signed on 19 November 1941.25 
 
Dutch Antilles/Netherlands (1941 – 1942) 
American officials approached the Netherlands government in December 
1941concerning the use of military facilities in the Dutch Antilles. Dutch officials 
accepted the proposal that same month. One round of talks ensued during December 
1941 – January 1942. The negotiations culminated in a Defense Agreement for 
Curacao by exchange of notes 15 December 1941/20 January 1942.26 
 
Ascension Island/United Kingdom (1942 – 1946) 
American officials approached the United Kingdom in January 1942 to open 
discussions regarding the construction and use of an air base on Ascension Island. 
British officials accepted this proposal that same month. Three rounds of talks 
ensued: round 1 (January – February 1942), round 2 (March – December 1942), and 
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round 3 (March – May 1946). No agreement was reached. As a point of clarification, 
the exchange of correspondence on 27 January and 7 February 1942, which is 
commonly referred to as the Ascension Island Air Base Agreement, was in actuality a 
preliminary “agreement in principle” that approved the construction and use of the air 
base while negotiations were being held to determine the specific terms of use in a 
formal agreement. These negotiations commenced in April 1942 but ended in 
stalemate in December 1942. The United States sought to reopen these negotiations in 
November 1945, which the United Kingdom agreed to in February 1946. 
Negotiations resumed in March 1946, but British officials ultimately turned down the 
U.S. request for base rights in May 1946. Thus, no formal agreement covering 
Ascension Island was reached.27 
 
French Guiana/France (1943) 
American officials requested rights for an air base at Gallion in French Guiana in 
March 1943. French authorities accepted the proposal that same month. Two rounds 
of talks ensued: round 1 (March 1943) and round 2 (May 1943). The negotiations 
culminated in an Agreement for an Air Base at Gallion, signed 18 May 1943.28 
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Newfoundland/Canada (1946 – 1952) 
In October 1946, President Harry Truman approached Canadian Prime Minister 
Mackenzie King to indicate the United States’ willingness to open discussions on the 
status of its leased bases in Newfoundland following the eventual transfer of 
sovereignty over that territory from the United Kingdom to Canada. Prime Minister 
King accepted the proposal that same month. Three rounds of talks ensued: round 1 
(November – December 1948), round 2 (February 1949 – March 1950), and round 3 
(February – March 1952). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement on Leased 
Bases in Newfoundland by exchange of notes on 19 March 1952.29 
 
Federation of the West Indies (1959 – 1961) 
In December 1959, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Federation of the 
West Indies agreed to enter into trilateral talks to reach a bilateral agreement on the 
status of U.S. bases in the Federation of the West Indies following independence. 
Five rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (December 1959 – June 1960), round 2 
(September 1960 – October), round 3 (November 1960), round 4 (November – 
December 1960), and round 5 (January – February 1961). The negotiations 
culminated in an Agreement between the Government of the United States of 
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America and the Government of the Federation of the West Indies Concerning United 
States Defense Areas in the Federation of the West Indies, signed 10 February 1961.30 
 
Guyana (1959 – 1966) 
American officials raised the issue of post-independence base rights at Atkinson Field 
with Guyana (British Guiana) in December 1959. Guyanese officials delayed 
responding to this approach until September 1965, at which point they agreed to hold 
discussions. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (September – November 1965) and 
round 2 (April – May 1966). The negotiations culminated in a Defense Agreement for 
United States Use of Atkinson Field, signed 26 May 1966.31 
 
Surinam/Netherlands (1960 – 1962) 
In April 1960, the American officials approached the Netherlands to request base 
access and stationing rights at Zanderij Field in Surinam. Dutch officials accepted this 
proposal that same month. Four rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (April 1960), round 2 
(March – April 1961), round 3 (September 1961), and round 4 (January – April 
1962). The negotiations culminated in a Defense Agreement for Use of Zanderij Field 
by the United States by exchange of notes 24 April 1962.32 
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United Kingdom (1941 – 1942) 
In January 1941, the United States and the United Kingdom decided to hold staff 
conversations on the strategic principles of joint military operations, including the 
establishment and stationing of troops at U.S. air and naval bases in the British Isles. 
Three rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (January – March 1941), round 2 (May – July 
1941), and round 3 (November 1941 – July 1942). The negotiations culminated in a 
series of informal agreements governing the establishment and use of military bases 
and the status of US forces stationed in the United Kingdom, reached by 27 July 
1942. As a point of clarification, all of the post-war base arrangements, staring with 
the Spaatz-Tedder Agreement of June – July 1946, are treated here as agreements for 
the continuation of the American military presence in the United Kingdom rather than 
as the initial agreements of a new case of U.S. basing, given that elements of the 
Eighth Air Force and the U.S. Navy were still stationed in the United Kingdom at the 
time these new arrangements were being negotiated.33 
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American officials approached Danish authorities in February 1941 concerning bases 
in Greenland. Danish officials accepted this proposal that same month. One round of 
talks ensued in April 1941. The negotiations culminated in an Agreement for the 
Defense of Greenland, signed 9 April 1941.34 
 
Iceland (1941 – 1942) 
In June 1941, American officials approached Iceland via the British Minister in 
Reykjavik concerning the question of stationing U.S. forces in the country. Icelandic 
officials accepted the proposal that same month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 
(June – July 1941) and round 2 (February – May 1942). The negotiations culminated 
in an Agreement for the Defense of Iceland by exchange of notes on 1 July 1941, 
with a Supplementary Agreement concerning the Construction and Use of an 
Airdrome at Keflavik by exchanges of notes on 2, 5, and 18 May 1942.35 
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Ukraine/Soviet Union (1943 – 1944) 
In October 1943, American officials approached the Soviet Union for air base rights 
in the Ukraine. Soviet officials accepted this proposal in December 1943. One round 
of talks ensued during February – March 1944. The negotiations culminated in an 
Agreement for the Establishment and Use of Air Bases at Poltava, Mirgorod, and 
Piryatin, reached on 22 March 1944.36 
 
Azores/Portugal (1943 – 1945) 
American officials approached Portugal in November 1943 with a proposal to open 
negotiations for the construction and use of an air base on Santa Maria Island in the 
Azores. Portuguese officials accepted the proposal that same month. Four rounds of 
talks ensued: round 1 (November 1943 – May 1944), round 2 (July 1944), round 3 
(September – November 1944), and round 4 (January – July 1945). The negotiations 
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culminated in an Agreement for Air Base on Santa Maria Island by exchange of notes 
on 28 November 1944, with complementary accords signed on 23 July 1945.37 
 
Yugoslavia (1944 – 1945) 
In December 1944, the United States and the United Kingdom jointly approached 
Yugoslavia via the Combined Chiefs of Staff to open negotiations for rights to 
establish an air base and to station American and British troops at Zadar. Yugoslav 
officials accepted the proposal that same month. One round of talks ensued during 
December 1944 – January 1945. The negotiations culminated in an Agreement 
concerning the Establishment of Air Bases in Yugoslavia, signed 18 January 1945.38 
 
Iceland (1950 -1951) 
In September 1950, American officials approached Iceland via the NATO Military 
Standing Group concerning the question of stationing U.S. forces at bases in the 
country. Icelandic officials accepted the proposal in January 1951. One round of talks 
ensued during February – May 1951. The negotiations culminated in the Defense 
Agreement Pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty between the United States and the 
                                               
37 NARA, RG 59, CDF 1940-44, 811.34553B, Boxes 3783, 3803, and C83; NARA, RG 59, CDF 
1945-49, 811.34553B, Box 4684; FRUS, 1943, II, pp. 527-581; FRUS, 1944, IV, pp. 1-83; TIAS 2338; 
Norman Herz, Operation Alacrity: The Azores and the War in the Atlantic (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 2004). 
 
38 NARA, RG 218 (190/1/16/1), GF 1942-45, JCS 356 1-20-45, Box 221; Fitzroy Maclean, Eastern 





Republic of Iceland, signed 5 May 1951, with an Annex on the Status of United 
States Personnel and Property, signed 8 May 1951.39 
 
Federal Republic of Germany (1950 – 1952) 
Following President Truman’s decision in September 1950 to increase the strength of 
U.S. forces stationed in Europe and to thus change the footing of U.S. forces in the 
Federal Republic of Germany from occupation to containment, it was decided in 
December 1950 that talks would be held at Bonn with representatives of the Federal 
Republic of Germany on the German contribution to Western defense and a new 
contractual relationship to replace the Occupation Statute. Three rounds of talks 
ensued: round 1 (January – June 1951), round 2 (September – November 1951), and 
round 3 (February – May 1952). The negotiations culminated in the Bonn 
Conventions on Relations between the Three Powers and the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the Rights and Obligations of Foreign Forces and Their Members in the 
Federal Republic of Germany, signed 26 May 1952.40 
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France (1951 – 1952) 
American officials proposed negotiations in March 1951 to France regarding air base 
rights in Metropolitan France. French officials accepted the proposal that same 
month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (April – October 1951) and round 2 
(January – October 1952). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement between the 
United States of America and the Republic of France Regarding Certain Air Bases 
and Facilities in Metropolitan France Placed at the Disposal of the United States Air 
Force, signed 4 October 1952.41 
 
Norway (1951 – 1952) 
American officials approached Norway in April 1951 with a proposal to open 
negotiations for base rights. Norwegian officials accepted the proposal that same 
month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (August – December 1951) and round 2 
(July – October 1952). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement between the 
Government of the United States of American and the Government of the Kingdom 
of Norway Pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed 17 October 1952, with a 
Supplementary Military Arrangement for the Utilization of Certain Norwegian 
Facilities, signed 18 October 1952.42 
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Spain (1951 – 1953) 
American officials approached Spain in June 1951 with a proposal to open 
negotiations for base rights. Spanish officials accepted the proposal that same month. 
Four rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (July – October 1951), round 2 (January – 
March 1952), round 3 (May 1952 – April 1953), and round 4 (June – September 
1953). The negotiations culminated in the Defense Agreement between the United 
States and Spain Concerning the Use of Military Facilities in Spain, signed 26 
September 1953.43 
 
Denmark (1951 – 1953) 
American officials approached Denmark in January 1952 with a proposal to open 
discussions concerning the stationing of U.S. troops and military aircraft at airfields 
in Jutland. Danish officials accepted the proposal that same month. Two rounds of 
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talks ensued: round 1 (September 1952) and round 2 (December 1952 – January 
1953). No agreement was reached.44 
 
Italy (1952 – 1954) 
American officials approached Italy in December 1952 with a proposal to open 
bilateral base rights negotiations. Italian officials accepted the proposal that same 
month. Four rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (January – July 1953), round 2 (October 
– December 1953), round 3 (March – June 1954), and round 4 (August – October 
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American officials proposed base negotiations to Greece in April 1953. Greek 
officials accepted the proposal that same month. One round of talks ensued during 
August – October 1953. The negotiations culminated in an Agreement between the 
United States and Greece Concerning Military Facilities, signed 12 October 1953.46 
 
Netherlands (1954) 
American officials proposed base negotiations to the Netherlands in February 1954. 
Dutch officials accepted the proposal that same month. Three rounds of talks ensued: 
round 1 (February – March 1954), round 2 (April 1954), and round 3 (May – August 
1954). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement for the Stationing of United 
States Armed Forces in the Netherlands, signed 13 August 1954, with a Technical 
Annex Concerning the Use of Soesterberg Air Base, signed 16 November 1954.47 
 
Africa 
Liberia (1941 – 1942) 
American officials approached Liberia in June 1941 with a proposal to open 
negotiations for air base rights. Liberian officials accepted the proposal that same 
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month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (June – July 1941) and round 2 
(November 1941 – March 1942). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement 
between the Governments of the United States of America and Liberia Concerning 
the Use of Defense Areas, signed 31 March 1942.48 
 
French Equatorial Africa/France (1942) 
American officials requested rights for an air base at Pointe-Noire in French 
Equatorial Africa in February 1942. French authorities accepted the proposal that 
same month. Three rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (February – April 1942), round 2 
(May – June 1942), and round 3 (August – September 1942). The negotiations 
culminated in an Agreement for an Air Base at Pointe-Noire, signed 16 September 
1942.49 
 
French West Africa (1942) 
In December 1942, American officials approached French authorities regarding 
access to and administration of military bases in French West Africa. French officials 
agreed to enter into negotiations that same month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 
1 (December 1942) and round 2 (January – February 1944). The negotiations 
culminated in an Understanding with the Government General of French West Africa 
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relating to the Construction, Improvement, Command, and Use by the United States 
Army of Airdrome Facilities, signed 24 February 1944.50 
 
Belgian Congo/Belgium (1948) 
In March 1948, American officials approached Belgium to express interest in 
obtaining air base rights in the Belgian Congo. Belgian officials declined the proposal 
that same month. No negotiations were held and no agreement was reached.51 
 
Ethiopia (1948 – 1953) 
American officials approached Ethiopia in November 1948 to indicate their desire for 
formal base rights in Eritrea once that territory came under Ethiopian sovereignty. 
Ethiopian officials accepted the proposal that same month. Three rounds of talks 
ensued: round 1 (March 1952), round 2 (August – December 1952), and round 3 
(March – May 1953). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement between the 
Government of the United States of America and the Imperial Ethiopian Government 
Concerning the Utilization of Defense Installations Within the Empire of Ethiopia, 
signed 22 May 1953.52 
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Near East, Middle East, and North Africa 
Oman (1942) 
In July 1942, American officials approached Oman via British representatives in that 
country regarding air base rights for the U.S. Army Air Forces at Salalah, Masirah, 
and Ras-al-Hadd. The Sultan of Oman accepted this proposal in August 1942. One 
round of talks ensued during August – November 1942. The negotiations culminated 
in an Agreement Concerning Use by the United States of Air Bases in Muscat and 
Oman, reached on 4 November 1942.53 
 
Iran (1942 – 1945) 
In October 1942, American officials approached Iran to discuss the stationing of U.S. 
forces and the operation of military facilities in that country. Iranian officials 
accepted the proposal in November 1942. Three rounds of talks ensued: round 1 
(November 1942 – January 1953), round 2 (April – December 1943), and round 3 
(September 1944 – March 1945). No agreement was reached.54 
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French North Africa/France (1942) 
In November 1942, American officials approached French authorities regarding 
access to and administration of military bases in French North Africa. French officials 
accepted the proposal that same month. One round of talks ensued in November 
1942. The negotiations culminated in the Clark-Darlan Agreement, signed 22 
November 1942.55 
 
Saudi Arabia (1944) 
In July 1944, American officials approached Saudi Arabia with a proposal to start 
negotiations for the construction and use of an air base at Dhahran by the U.S. Army. 
Saudi officials declined the proposal that same month. No negotiations were held and 
no agreement was reached.56 
 
Saudi Arabia (1945) 
In May 1945, American officials again approached Saudi Arabia with a proposal to 
start negotiations for the construction and use of an air base at Dhahran by the U.S. 
Army. Saudi officials accepted the proposal that same month. One round of talks 
ensued during May – August 1945. The negotiations culminated in an Agreement for 
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a United States Military Airbase at Dhahran by exchange of notes on 5-6 August 
1945.57 
 
Libya (1950 – 1954) 
In June 1950, American officials expressed their desire for base rights at Wheelus 
Field to Emir Mohammed Idris el-Senussi. The Emir accepted the proposal that same 
month. Six rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (August – December 1951), round 2 
(August – October 1952), round 3 (December 1952 – January 1953), round 4 (April – 
May 1953), round 5 (August – October 1953), and round 6 (January – September 
1954). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement and Memorandum of 
Understanding between the United States and Libya Concerning the Use of Defense 
Facilities in Agreed Areas in Libya, signed 9 September 1954.58 
 
Turkey (1952 – 1954) 
In September 1952, the American Secretary for Air met with the Turkish Prime 
Minister to indicate that the United States would like to discuss the use of Turkish air 
bases. The Turkish Prime Minister accepted this proposal that same month. Two 
rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (February – August 1953) and round 2 (October 1953 
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– June 1954). The negotiations culminated in a Military Facilities Agreement and a 
Status of Forces Agreement, signed 23 June 1954.59 
 
Morocco (1956 – 1959) 
In June 1956, American officials proposed to Morocco the holding of tripartite 
negotiations between American, French, and Moroccan authorities to determine U.S. 
base rights in the newly independent Morocco. Moroccan officials responded in 
November 1956 that they would agree to hold only bilateral negotiations with the 
U.S. Five rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (May – July 1957), round 2 (September – 
November 1957), round 3 (January – May 1958), round 4 (July – September 1958), 
and round 5 (April – December 1959). No agreement was reached.60 
 
Bahrain (1971) 
American officials approach Bahrain in April 1971 regarding base rights negotiations. 
Bahraini officials accepted the proposal that same month. One round of talks ensued 
during July – December 1971. The negotiations culminated in a Military Facilities 
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Agreement and an Agreement for the Deployment in Bahrain of the United States 
Middle East Force by exchange of notes 23 December 1971.61 
 
Central Asia, the Far East, and the Pacific 
Fakarava Island/France (1939) 
American officials approached France in August 1939 for base rights on Fakarava 
Island in French Polynesia. French officials accepted the proposal that same month. 
One round of talks ensued during August – November 1939. No agreement was 
reached.62 
 
Fiji/United Kingdom (1941 – 1942) 
American officials approached the United Kingdom in October 1941 with a proposal 
to open discussions for the establishment of air bases in the Fiji Islands. British 
officials accepted the proposal that same month. Two rounds of negotiations ensued: 
round 1 (October – November 1941) and round 2 (July – August 1942). The 
negotiations culminated in an Agreement between the United Kingdom and the 
United States Regarding the Defense of Fiji, reached on 15 August 1942.63 
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Dutch East Indies/Netherlands (1941) 
American officials approached the Netherlands government in October 1941 to 
request air base rights in the Dutch East Indies. Dutch authorities accepted the 
proposal that same month. One round of talks ensued during October – November 
1941. No agreement was reached.64 
 
Phoenix Islands/United Kingdom (1941 – 1947) 
American officials approached the United Kingdom in October 1941 with a proposal 
to open discussions for the establishment of air bases in the Phoenix Islands (in 
particular, Canton and Enderbury Islands). British officials accepted the proposal that 
same month. Three rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (October – November 1941), 
round 2 (March – May 1946), and round 3 (December 1946 – April 1947). No 
agreement was reached.65 
 
Australia (1941 – 1942) 
In October 1941, American officials approached Australia with a request for base 
rights in that country, particularly at Darwin and Rockhampton. Australian officials 
accepted the proposal that same month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (October 
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– November 1941) and round 2 (January – May 1942). The negotiations culminated 
in an Agreement for the Planning, Operation and Provision of Personnel for Naval 
Bases, reached 29 May 1942.66 
 
Line Islands/United Kingdom (1941 – 1947) 
American officials approached the United Kingdom in October 1941 with a proposal 
to open discussions for the establishment of air bases in the Line Islands (in 
particular, Christmas Island). British officials accepted that same month. Three 
rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (October – November 1941), round 2 (March – May 
1946), and round 3 (December 1946 – April 1947). No agreement was reached.67 
 
Western Samoa/New Zealand (1941 – 1942) 
In October 1941, American officials approached New Zealand with a proposal to 
begin negotiations for air base rights on the island of Western Samoa. New Zealand 
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officials accepted the proposal that same month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 
(October – November 1941) and round 2 (March 1942).68 
 
Solomon Island/United Kingdom (1941 – 1946) 
American officials approached the United Kingdom in October 1941 with a proposal 
to open discussions for the establishment of air bases in the Solomon Islands (in 
particular, Guadalcanal-Tulagi). British officials accepted the proposal that same 
month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (October – November 1941) and round 2 
(March – May 1946). No agreement was reached.69 
 
New Caledonia/France (1941 – 1942) 
American officials proposed negotiations to France in November 1941 for base rights 
on the Island of New Caledonia in French Melanesia. French authorities accepted the 
proposal that same month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (December 1941) and 
round 2 (March 1942). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement for the Use of a 
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Naval Base on the Island of New Caledonia by the United States of America, signed 7 
March 1942.70 
 
Bora Bora/France (1941 – 1942) 
American officials proposed negotiations to France in December 1941 for base rights 
on the Island of Bora Bora in French Polynesia. French authorities accepted the 
proposal that same month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (December 1941 – 
January 1942) and round 2 (February 1942). The negotiations culminated in an 
Agreement for the Use, Administration, and Operation of a Naval Base on the Island 
of Bora Bora by the United States of America, signed 23 February 1942.71 
 
New Hebrides/United Kingdom (1941 – 1946) 
American officials approached the United Kingdom in November 1941 with a 
proposal to open discussions for the establishment of air and naval bases in the New 
Hebrides. British officials accepted the proposal that same month. Five rounds of 
talks ensued: round 1 (December 1941), round 2 (March 1942), round 3 (March 
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1943), round 4 (April – May 1944), and round 5 (March – May 1946). No agreement 
was reached.72 
 
Tongatabu/United Kingdom (1942) 
American officials approached the United Kingdom in February 1942 regarding the 
establishment of a naval base on the Island of Tongatabu. British officials accepted 
the proposal in March 1942. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (May – June 1942) 
and round 2 (July – August 1942). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement 
between the United Kingdom and the United States Regarding the Defense of Tonga, 
signed 15 August 1942.73 
 
Eastern Siberia/Soviet Union (1943) 
In July 1942, American officials approached the Soviet Union with a proposal to open 
discussions on air base rights in eastern Siberia. Soviet officials declined the proposal 
in January 1943. No negotiations occurred and no agreement was reached.74 
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Eastern Siberia/Soviet Union (1944 – 1945) 
In November 1943, American officials approached the Soviet Union for a second 
time with a proposal to open discussion on air base rights in eastern Siberia. Soviet 
officials accepted the proposal in February 1944. Three rounds of talks ensued: round 
1 (June – July 1944), round 2 (September – October 1944), and round 3 (February – 
April 1945). No agreement was reached.75 
 
Philippines (1945 – 1947) 
In April 1945, U.S. Secretary of State Stettinius raised the issue of reaching an 
agreement on military and naval bases with Philippine President Osmena, who 
accepted the proposal that same month. Three rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (May 
1945), round 2 (May – September 1946), and round 3 (October 1946 – March 1947). 
The negotiations culminated in an Agreement between the United States of America 
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Kurile Islands/Soviet Union (1945) 
American officials approached the Soviet Union in August 1945 with a proposal to 
open negotiations for air base rights in the Kuril Islands. Soviet officials declined the 
proposal that same month. No negotiations occurred and no agreement was reached.77 
 
Ellice Islands/United Kingdom (1945 – 1946) 
American officials approached the United Kingdom in November 1945 with a 
proposal to open discussions for rights to air and naval bases in the Ellice Islands (in 
particular, Funafuti). British officials accepted the proposal in February 1946. Two 
rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (March – May 1946) and round 2 (December 1946). 
No agreement was reached.78 
 
Gilbert Islands/United Kingdom (1945 – 1946) 
American officials approached the United Kingdom in November 1945 with a 
proposal to open discussions for rights to air and naval bases in the Gilbert Islands (in 
particular, Tarawa). British officials accepted the proposal in February 1946. Two 
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rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (March – May 1946) and round 2 (December 1946). 
No agreement was reached.79 
 
Admiralty Islands/Australia (1946 – 1947) 
In March 1946, American officials approached Australia with a proposal to open 
negotiations on base rights at Manus in the Admiralty Islands. In April 1946, 
Australia officials indicated their willingness to discuss U.S. base rights at Manus on 
the condition that such talks also encompassed the development of a regional defense 
arrangement. Four rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (April 1946), round 2 (June 1946), 
round 3 (October 1946 – February 1947), and round 4 (June 1947). No agreement 
was reached.80 
 
Sri Lanka (1949) 
In January 1949, American officials approached Sri Lanka with a proposal to open 
discussions on access to and stationing of U.S. military personnel at naval and air 
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communication facilities in that country. Sri Lankan officials declined the proposal in 
September 1949. No negotiations occurred and no agreement was reached.81 
 
Japan (1951 – 1952) 
In February 1951, the United States released a public proposal to station American 
forces in Japan and to open negotiations for base rights following the restoration of 
Japanese sovereignty, which the Japanese government accepted that same month. 
Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (February – September 1951) and round 2 
(November 1951 – February 1952). The negotiations culminated in the Security 
Treaty between the United States of American and Japan, signed 8 September 1951, 
with an Administrative Agreement Under Article III, signed 28 February 1952.82 
 
Republic of Korea (1953 – 1966) 
In August 1953, U.S. Secretary of State Dulles indicated to South Korean President 
Rhee that the United States intended to negotiate a formal agreement governing the 
status of American forces and the use of military facilities in the Republic of Korea. 
President Rhee accepted the proposal that same month. Seven rounds of talks ensued: 
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round 1 (August 1953), round 2 (June 1959 – September 1960), round 3 (January – 
March 1961), round 4 (April 1961), round 5 (March – September 1962), round 6 
(October 1962 – February 1966), and round 7 (April – July 1966). The negotiations 
culminated in an Agreement Under Article IV of the Mutual Defense Treaty Between 
the United States of America and the Republic of Korea Regarding Facilities and 
Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in the Republic of Korea, signed 
9 July 1966.83 
 
Thailand (1954 – 1970) 
In May 1954, the American Ambassador to Thailand approached the Prime Minister 
of Thailand with a proposal to open negotiations for an agreement governing the 
establishment of air bases and the stationing of U.S. military personnel in that 
country. The Thai Prime Minister accepted the proposal that same month. Two 
rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (November 1966 – November 1967) and round 2 
(February – July 1968). No agreement was reached.84 
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Republic of China (1955 – 1965) 
American officials approached the Republic of China in February 1955 with a 
proposal to open discussions on an overall base rights agreement. Chinese officials 
accepted the proposal that same month. Five rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (August 
1955 – June 1956), round 2 (October 1956 – April 1957), round 3 (August 1958 – 
November 1959), round 4 (April – May 1960), and round 5 (January 1963 – July 
1965). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement Concerning the Status of United 
States Armed Forces in the Republic of China, signed 31 August 1965.85 
 
Pakistan (1955) 
In December 1955, the American Ambassador to Pakistan approached Iskander Mirza 
with an informal proposal to open discussions for base rights in Pakistan. The 
proposal was declined that same month. No negotiations occurred and no agreement 
was reached.86 
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Pakistan (1957 – 1955) 
In December 1957, American officials approached Pakistan with a proposal to open 
negotiations for the establishment and stationing of U.S. military personnel at a naval 
communication facility at Peshawar. Pakistani officials accepted the proposal that 
same month. Two rounds of talks ensued: round 1 (April – July 1958) and round 2 
(March – July 1959). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement for the 
Establishment of a Naval Communications Unit by exchange of notes on 18 July 
1959.87 
 
British Indian Ocean Territories/United Kingdom (1960 – 1966) 
American officials first broached the idea with the United Kingdom of establishing a 
base on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean in October 1960. British 
officials accepted the proposal that same month. Five rounds of talks ensued: round 1 
(September 1962), round 2 (February – May 1964), round 3 (May – June 1965), 
round 4 (September 1965), and round 5 (June – December 1966). The negotiations 
culminated in an Agreement Concerning the Availability of Certain Indian Ocean 
Islands for Defense Purposes, signed 30 December 1966.88 
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Australia (1960 – 1963) 
In September 1960, American officials approached Australia with a proposal to open 
negotiations for rights to establish a naval communications station in that country. 
Australian officials accepted the proposal that same month. Two rounds of talks 
ensued: round 1 (September 1960 – January 1961) and round 2 (February 1962 – May 
1963). The negotiations culminated in an Agreement between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia 
Relating to the Establishment of a United States Naval Communication Station in 
Australia and an Agreement Concerning the Status of United States Forces in 
Australia, signed 9 May 1963.89 
 
Onn Kyunt Island/Bangladesh (1971) 
In March 1971, American Envoy to Pakistan Joseph Farland met with Mujib Rahman 
and requested rights to establish a naval base on Onn Kyunt Island in the Bay of 
Bengal after Bangladesh achieved independence. Rahman turned down the request 
that same month. No negotiations occurred and no agreement was reached.90 
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A leader’s decision to go public, make concessions, or sign an agreement in any given 
round of negotiations may be related to her decision to enter into that round in the 
first place. As such, it is necessary to test for possible selection bias in each of the 
statistical analyses presented in chapters 4 and 5. I do this by estimating a series of 
Heckman or censored probit models, the results of which are presented in this 
appendix.1 
These selection analyses focus only on the United States’ decisions for two 
reasons. First, the United States is almost universally the initiator of basing 
negotiations. Second, host-state leaders rarely turn down a proposal to hold talks. 
Accordingly, estimates for the United States’ decisions will provide better results for 
assessing possible selection bias. To conduct the selection analyses, a random sample 
of cases of potential negotiations – that is, instances when the United States could 
have pursued basing negotiations with a potential host state but chose not to – was 
added to the original dataset of negotiations that were pursued.2 To identify these 
                                               
1 Jeffrey A. Dubin and Douglas Rivers, “Selection bias in linear regression, logit and probit models,” 
Sociological Methods and Research, Vol. 18, No. 2/3 (November 1989), pp. 360-390. 
 
2 As any foreign territory is eligible to host a U.S. military base, the sample of potential hosts that did 
not receive a proposal was drawn randomly from the population of foreign territories, encompassing 
all sovereign states, colonies, and overseas territories. The primary sources of data used to identify this 
population include the State Department’s Country Lists for 1939-49, 1950-59, 1960-69, and 1970-72; 




non-cases, I follow Paul Huth and Todd Allee in using a “twelve-month rule.” 
According to this procedure, each twelve-month period in which the United States did 
not initiate basing negotiations with a potential host state is designated as a case in 
which no negotiations were sought. A random sample of such periods of inactivity 
was then included in the dataset as cases of potential negotiations.3 
The broader theoretical argument developed in this dissertation can speak to 
this prior stage and generate hypotheses about the conditions under which the United 
States is more or less likely to propose basing negotiations with potential host states. 
However, the current project sets this topic aside theoretically as a fruitful avenue for 
future analytical and empirical work. What follows, then, is not intended to be a 
thorough treatment of this prior stage but rather simply a sufficient assessment of 
possible selection bias in the main quantitative tests. 
 The results for each of the analyses are presented in Table 9. As this table 
demonstrates, I found no evidence of selection effects biasing the analyses. 
Specifically, each model’s estimated rho (ρ) parameter, which indicates the 
correlation of the disturbances across the two equations, did not approach standard 
levels of statistical significance. Moreover, the primary results remained consistent.
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Table 9: Heckman Probit Results for Going Public, Concessions, and Agreements during Basing Negotiations 
 Going Public Concessions Agreement 
 Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome 
INTERNATIONAL VARIABLES       
  Great Power -.710 (.227)*** -.719 (.394)* -.480 (.300) .655 (.346)* -.844 (.305)*** -.713 (.313)** 
  Subjugate .012 (.252) 4.68 (.722)*** -.090 (.447) -.412 (.552) .125 (.486) .545 (.387) 
  Adversary Border     .219 (.183) .082 (.199) 
     Adversary Border (U.S.) .403 (.177)** -1.65 (.540)*** .305 (.242) .628 (.327)*   
     Adversary Border (Host)   .010 (.193) .157 (.222)   
  Wartime     .610 (.192)*** .894 (.284)*** 
     Wartime (U.S.) .634 (.154)*** -1.19 (.416)*** .614 (.263)** -.056 (.222)   
     Wartime (Host) -.401 (.191)** .838 (.361)** -.333 (.433) .262 (.321)   
  Neutrality .888 (.194)*** -1.19 (.447)*** .650 (.332)*  .514 (.280)*  
  Technical Round -.551 (.199)*** -1.00 (.534)* -.636 (.190)***  -.720 (.216)***  
  Previous Public Round .499 (.231)** .769 (.302)**     
  Prior Access   -.592 (.183)*** -.738 (.318)** -.275 (.197) .283 (.236) 
  Previous Stalemate   .-361 (.214)* -.075 (.215) .255 (.261)*** -.019 (.565) 
  Ally   -.004 (.276) -.509 (.254)** .244 (.199) .621 (.200)*** 
  Regional Presence -.794 (.145)***  -.839 (.159)***  -.752 (.227)***  
  Round .367 (.056)*** .145 (.118) .479 (.082)*** .100 (.135) .319 (.077)*** .121 (.122) 
PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT       
  Host   .385 (.273) .801 (.221)*** .465 (.246)* -.503 (.229)** 
DOMESTIC VARIABLES       
  Large Coalition Size .738 (.267)*** -2.97 (.828)*** .525 (.357) .436 (.417) .701 (.337)** .632 (.245)** 
  Executive Constraints .115 (.257) 1.03 (.403)* .033 (.386) .044 (.303) -.287 (.401) -.257 (.305) 
  Election     -.467 (.187)** -.198 (.228) 
     Election (U.S.) .016 (.004)*** .005 (.010) .017 (.005)*** .005 (.008)   
     Election (Host) .001 (.042) .012 (.010) .002 (.005) -.012 (.006)**   
  Press Coverage .119 (.144) 1.60 (.392)*** .680 (.136)*** .260 (.298) .406 (.186)** -.041 (.277) 
Constant -1.58 (.221)*** -.898 (1.05) -1.50 (.342)*** .164 (.815) -1.32 (.350)*** -1.45 (.976) 
Observations 623 218 623 218 623 218 
ρ (Wald test of ρ) .221 (p = .634) -.315 (p = .514) -.537 (p = .337) 
Log pseudolikelihood -371.07 -419.79 -302.15 
NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering. 





SUPPLEMENTARY HYPOTHESES AND FINDINGS ON BARGAINING 







The argument developed in the second half of chapter 3 focuses on the effects of 
public acknowledgement on leaders’ bargaining behavior and the prospects of 
cooperation. However, the broader theory set forth in the first half of that chapter 
suggests several additional hypotheses beyond the effects of public acknowledgment 
that link variation in international power position and strategic context to leaders’ 
willingness to make concessions and their likelihood of reaching an agreement. This 
appendix briefly explores these supplementary expectations and discusses relevant 




The broader theoretical argument developed in this dissertation suggests that states’ 
power positions in the international system should affect their willingness to make 
concessions during basing negotiations and the overall prospects of reaching an 
agreement. As argued in chapter 3, a great power’s foreign policy choices are likely 
to receive more attention from a wider international audience because its behavior 




effects of concessions – whether positive or negative – are likely to be more 
expansive for great powers, given the scope of their other international relationships. 
As the decision by one great power to host another great power’s military forces on 
its territory may be perceived by international audiences as a signal of the former’s 
diminishing status as a major player, great power hosts should be more likely to 
bargain hard over the terms of agreement. For similar reasons, though, the sending 
state also should pursue a hard-line bargaining stance, given that fellow great powers 
are peer competitors.1 In light of these rigid bargaining positions and the fact that 
each state has less to offer the other, given their general power symmetry, the overall 
likelihood of cooperation should be lower for two great powers than for a great power 
sending state and a weaker host state. This argument suggests the first supplementary 
hypothesis. 
     SH1: When both sending and host states are great powers, 
(a) each state is less likely to make concessions during negotiations and  




Most basing relationships, however, are characterized by a dramatic asymmetry of 
capabilities between the sending and host states, with the former often enjoying a 
preponderance of material capabilities relative to the latter. Given that the nature of 
basing relationships is such that the host state almost always has an advantage in 
issue-specific power by virtue of its control of site-specific resources, the sending 
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state’s material predominance does not necessarily translate into a clear bargaining 
advantage, except in cases where its capabilities carry an explicit threat of coercion. 
Specifically, when the host state was forcibly subjugated by the sending state at some 
point in the recent past, the former’s contractive capacity is sufficiently impaired that 
she has little choice but to make any desired concessions. For the same reason, the 
sending state should be less inclined to make concessions. Overall, though, given the 
sending state’s general ability to impose cooperation on its terms, negotiations under 
these circumstances should be more likely to end in an agreement. This argument 
suggests the second supplementary hypothesis. 
     SH2: When the host state was recently subjugated by the sending state, 
(a) the host state is more likely to make concessions during negotiations,  
(b) the sending state is less likely to make concessions during negotiations, 
and 




A state’s ability to quickly project power declines with distance, while the threat 
posed by an adversary increases with proximity. A primary purpose of foreign 
military basing is to enhance the sending state’s ability to overcome the time-distance 
problem inherent to power projection by establishing a forward presence near 
potential theaters of operation ahead of time. Foreign basing relationships are 
perceived as security-enhancing by host states and provocative by adversaries, in 
turn, precisely because they bring the sending state’s military capabilities into closer 
proximity to both. Given that the strategic value of a basing relationship thus 




adversary, leaders should be more likely to make concessions and reach agreements 
when this is the case. This suggests the third supplementary hypothesis. 
     SH3: When the host territory shares a border with an adversary of their state, 
(a) the leaders of that state are more likely to make concessions during 
negotiations and  
(b) the two parties are more likely to reach an agreement. 
 
 Basing relationships also take on added strategic value during wartime. Thus, 
states engaged in war during the negotiations should be more likely to make 
concessions to ensure cooperation. Consequently, wartime negotiations also should 
be more likely to result in an agreement. This suggests the fourth supplementary 
hypothesis. 
     SH4: When a state is engaged in war, 
(a) the leaders of that state are more likely to make concessions during 
negotiations and  
(b) the two parties are more likely to reach an agreement. 
 
The Independent and Control Variables 
I start with the coding procedure for the principal independent variables and then turn 
to the control variables. Unless otherwise noted, the data for these variables are drawn 
from the last month of each round of talks. The data sources for variables featured in 
chapter 4 are the same and thus not provided below. 
 
Main Independent Variables 
GREAT POWER: For both the bivariate probit and the logit analyses in chapter 5, this 
indicator is dichotomous, coded 1 if the host state was a major power. The United 




SUBJUGATION: For both sets of analyses, this indicator is dichotomous, coded 
1 if the host state forcibly was subjugated by the sending state in the recent past – that 
is, defeated in war by the United States within the past five years, formerly occupied 
militarily by the United States, or formerly a U.S. colony. 
ADVERSARY BORDER: For the bivariate probit analysis of concessions, a 
separate dichotomous indicator is constructed for the sending and host states, coded 1 
if the host territory shares a land or sea border with a third state that is engaged in a 
militarized dispute with – or is a strategic rival of – the sending or host state, 
respectively. For the logit analysis of agreements, an aggregate dichotomous indicator 
is constructed, coded 1 if the host territory shares a border with an adversary of either 
state. 
WARTIME: For the bivariate probit analysis, a separate dichotomous indicator 
is constructed for the sending and host states, coded 1 if the state is engaged in an 
interstate war. For the logit analysis, an aggregate dichotomous indicator is 
constructed, coded 1 if either state is engaged in an interstate war. 
 
Control Variables 
ALLY: This indicator is included as a control for the effects of a preexisting 
cooperative security relationship, which previous scholarship suggests is positively 
associated with the likelihood of additional security cooperation.2 For both sets of 
                                               
2 See, for instance, Susan Werner and Douglas Lemke, “Opposites Do Not Attract: The Impact of 
Domestic Institutions, Power, and Prior Commitments on Alignment Choices,” International Studies 




analyses, this indicator is dichotomous, coded 1 if the sending and host states share a 
military alliance. The primary source of data is the Alliance Treaty Obligations and 
Provisions (ATOP) dataset.3 
PRIOR ACCESS: For both sets of analyses, this variable is dichotomous, coded 
1 if the sending state’s troops were granted access to the host state’s territory prior to 
the end of the negotiation round and thus prior to a formal agreement. This indicator 
essentially captures instances of tacit or de facto cooperation that carry “the 
superficial appearance of agreement but not its substance.”4 It serves as a control for 
the effects of such bargains on leaders’ subsequent willingness to make concessions 
and reach a formal agreement.5 The data were gathered from archival and secondary 
historical sources. 
                                                                                                                                      
International Crises, 1918-1988,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 42, No. 6 (December 1998), pp. 
744-770. 
 
3 Brett Ashley Leeds, Jeffrey M. Ritter, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, and Andrew G. Long, “Alliance 
Treaty Obligations and Provisions, 1815-1944,” International Interactions, Vol. 28, No. 3 (July – 
September 2002), pp. 237-260. 
 
4 Charles Lipson, “Why are Some International Agreements Informal?” International Organization, 
Vol. 45, No. 4 (Autumn 1991), p. 528. Also see Raymond Cohen, “Rules of the Game in International 
Politics,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 1 (March 1980), pp. 137-145. 
 
5 The United States’ negotiations with the United Kingdom for airbase rights on Ascension Island 
provide an example of this dynamic. When approached by American officials in early 1942, British 
officials expressed their willingness “to agree to this [project] being started immediately, leaving the 
discussions…to be undertaken as soon as is mutually convenient.” See Telegram 568 from London to 
Washington, 7 February 1942, in Foreign Relations of the United States: 1942, Vol. 1: General; The 
British Commonwealth; The Far East (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 560-
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drafts of the proposed agreement.” See Memorandum of Conversation, 24 April 1945, Subject: “Air 
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COALITION SIZE: This variable is included as a control for domestic regime 
type. Previous scholarship suggests that regime similarity – particularly among 
democracies – affects the probability of international cooperation.6 For both sets of 
analyses, this indicator is dichotomous, coded 1 if the host-state leader has a large 
coalition and 0 if not. This variable is coded only for the host state, as the United 
States had a large coalition during the entire coding period. I chose this 
operationalization because selectorate theory’s argument regarding coalition size and 
the provision of public versus private goods is particularly relevant to basing 
negotiations and informative of the types of concessions leaders are more or less 
likely to make.7 
EXECUTIVE CONSTRAINTS: This indicator measures the degree of 
institutionalized constraints on the power of the executive to determine policy. It is 
included as a control variable for the elements of democracy outside of the winning 
coalition: namely, legislative constraints. Previous scholarship suggests that high 
levels of such constraints affect both the probability and terms of international 
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cooperation.8 For both sets of analyses, this indicator is dichotomous, coded 1 if the 
host-state executive was in a position of parity or subordination to a relevant 
accountability group such as a legislature. This variable is coded only for the host 
state, as the United States had a value of 1 during the entire coding period. 
ELECTION: This variable is included as a control for cycles of political 
vulnerability in democratic states, as previous scholarship suggests that the 
occurrence and proximity of elections affects leaders’ willingness to make 
concessions and the prospects of international cooperation.9 For the bivariate probit 
analysis , a separate variable is included for the sending and host states. This indicator 
is coded as the number of months since the last relevant national election.  For the 
logit analysis, an aggregate dichotomous indicator is constructed, coded 1 if an 
election occurred in either state in the past twelve months. 
PRESS COVERAGE: This variable is included as a control for press speculation 
and leaks. For both sets of analyses, this indicator is dichotomous, coded 1 if the 
national press in either the sending or host state printed news stories reporting 
prospective U.S. military basing in the potential host territory during the negotiation 
round that were not officially acknowledged by either side. 
                                               
8 See, for instance, Helen V. Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and 
International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Lisa L. Martin, Democratic 
Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2000). 
 
9 See, for instance, Helen V. Milner and B. Peter Rosendorff, “Democratic Politics and International 
Trade Negotiations,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 1 (February 1997), pp. 117-146; 
Bahar Leventoğlu and Ahmer Tarar, “Prenegotiation Public Commitment in Domestic and 





PAST STALEMATE: For both sets of analyses, this variable is dichotomous, 
coded 1 if neither side made concessions in the previous round. This indicator 
controls for a history of stalemates, which numerous studies link to the development 
of hard-line stances during negotiations and thus possibly to a decreased likelihood of 
concessions and agreements in subsequent rounds.10 
ROUND: For both sets of analyses, this variable counts the number of previous 
rounds, as a control for the non-independence of observations. 
 
The Results 
The results of the bivariate probit and the logit analyses are presented in chapter 5 in 
Tables 5 and 7, respectively, providing support for most of the supplementary 
hypotheses. To aid interpretation of substantive effects, Tables 6 and 8 from chapter 5 
report the impact of changes in select significant variables on predicted probabilities 
for making concessions and reaching an agreement, respectively. Tables 10 and 11 
below provide a summary of the expected and observed relationships for the 
supplementary expectations and control variables. 
 The first supplementary hypothesis received mixed support.  As predicted in 
SH1(a), when the host state is a great power, it is significantly less likely to make 
                                               
10 See, for instance, Todd L. Allee and Paul K. Huth, “Legitimizing Dispute Settlement: International 
Legal Rulings as Domestic Political Cover,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 100, No. 2 (May 
2006), p. 227; Kyle C. Beardsley, “Pain, Pressure and Political Cover: Explaining Mediation 
Incidence,” Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 47, No. 4 (July 2010), p. 399; Paul K. Huth, Sarah E. 
Croco, and Benjamin J. Appel, “Does International Law Promote the Peaceful Settlement of 
International Disputes? Evidence from the Study of Territorial Conflicts since 1945,” American 





Table 10: Summary of Expected and Observed Relationships for Concessions 
 Sending State Decision 
To Make Concessions 
Host State Decision 
To Make Concessions 
 Expected Observed Expected Observed 
PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT     
  Host State + + – – 
INTERNATIONAL VARIABLES     
  Great Power – + – – 
  Subjugate – Ins. + + 
  Adversary Border (U.S.) + + NP Ins. 
  Adversary Border (Host) NP Ins. + + 
  Wartime (U.S.) + Ins. NP Ins. 
  Wartime (Host) NP Ins. + Ins. 
  Prior Access – – – – 
  Ally + – + Ins. 
  Previous Stalemate – Ins. – – 
DOMESTIC VARIABLES     
  Large Coalition Size + Ins. + Ins. 
  Election Year (U.S.) – Ins. – Ins. 
  Election Year (Host) – Ins. – Ins. 
  Press Coverage – Ins. – – 
  Executive Constraints – Ins. – Ins. 
NOTE: A positive sign (+) indicates a coefficient value greater than zero. A negative sign (–) indicates 
a coefficient value less than zero. The abbreviation “Ins.” indicates an insignificant coefficient. The 
abbreviation “NP” indicates no prediction. 
 
concessions during basing negotiations (see Table 5). Specifically, as shown in Table 
6, great power hosts are 37.5% less likely to adopt a flexible bargaining position than 
other host states. Contrary to expectations, though, the sending state is significantly 
more likely to make concessions when negotiating with a great power host. 
Specifically, the United States is 45.5% more likely to adopt a flexible bargaining 
position in such talks. This suggests that the host state’s hard-line bargaining strategy 
may put pressure on the sending state to compromise as a means to ensure 
cooperation, perhaps due to the host state’s advantage in issue-specific power. 
Consistent with the prediction of SH1(b), however, negotiations are significantly less 




Table 7). Specifically, as shown in Table 8, such talks are 73.1% less likely to result 
in formal cooperation. 
Table 11: Summary of Expected and Observed Relationships for Agreement 
 States’ Decision to  
Reach an Agreement 
 Expected Observed 
PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT   
  Host State – – 
INTERNATIONAL VARIABLES   
  Great Power – – 
  Subjugate + + 
  Adversary Border + Ins. 
  Wartime + + 
  Prior Access – – 
  Ally + + 
  Previous Stalemate – + 
DOMESTIC VARIABLES   
  Large Coalition Size + + 
  Election Year (U.S.) – Ins. 
  Election Year (Host) – Ins. 
  Press Coverage – Ins. 
  Executive Constraints – Ins. 
NOTE: A positive sign (+) indicates a coefficient value greater than zero. A negative sign (–) indicates 
a coefficient value less than zero. The abbreviation “Ins.” indicates an insignificant coefficient. 
 
 The second supplementary hypothesis also received mixed support. As 
predicted in SH2(a), host states are significantly more likely to make concessions 
when they were forcibly subjugated by the sending state in the recent past (see Table 
5). Specifically, as shown in Table 6, the host state is 11% more likely to adopt a 
flexible bargaining position when it was defeated in war by the sending state, 
formerly occupied by the sending state, or formerly a colony of the sending state. 
However, SH2(b) was not supported. The coefficient for this variable is in the 
hypothesized direction but not statistically significant. Thus, in explicitly coercive 
relationships, the United States is not in general less likely to make concessions to the 




host-state leaders are significantly more likely to reach an agreement when the host 
state recently was subjugated by the sending state (see Table 7). Specifically, as 
shown in Table 8, coercive relationships are 144% more likely to end in formal 
cooperation. 
 The third supplementary hypothesis similarly received mixed support. As 
predicted in SH3(a), leaders are significantly more likely to make concessions when 
the host territory shares a border with an adversary of their state (see Table 5). In 
particular, as shown in Table 6, the United States is 51.4% more likely to make 
concessions and the host state is 7.6% more likely under these circumstances. 
However, SH3(b) was not supported. The coefficient for this variable is in the 
hypothesized direction but not statistically significant (see Table 7). Thus, when the 
host territory shares a border with an adversary of either state, the parties are not in 
general more likely to reach an agreement. 
 Finally, the fourth supplementary hypothesis also received mixed support. The 
bivariate probit analysis does not support SH4(a). The coefficient for the host state 
variable is in the hypothesized direction but not statistically significant, whereas the 
coefficient for the sending state is in the opposite direction but also not statistically 
significant. Thus, when engaged in war, neither the United States nor the host state is 
in general more likely to make concessions during negotiations. Consistent with the 
expectations of SH4(b), however, sending- and host-state leaders are significantly 




(see Table 7). Specifically, as shown in Table 8, wartime negotiations are 386.1% 
more likely to result in a signed agreement. 
 Several of the control variables also generated significant results. The first set 
of findings concerns the effects of preexisting security cooperation. As indicated in 
Table 5, both sending- and host-state leaders are significantly less likely to make 
concessions when the sending state’s troops already have been granted access to the 
host state’s territory prior to the end of the negotiations and thus prior to reaching a 
formal agreement. Following the emergence of such tacit or de facto cooperation, the 
United States is 61.5% less likely to adopt a flexible bargaining position and the host 
state is 23.1% less likely to do so (see Table 6). However, prior access has no effect 
on the probability of reaching an agreement (see Table 7). Alternatively, common 
security ties in the form of preexisting alliance relationships significantly decrease the 
sending state’s willingness to make concessions during basing negotiations but have 
no effect on the host state’s bargaining behavior (see Table 5). Specifically, as shown 
in Table 6, the United States is 44.7% less likely to adopt a flexible bargaining stance 
in negotiations with allied host states. However, sending- and host-state leaders are 
significantly more likely to reach an agreement when they share alliance ties (see 
Table 7). In particular, as indicated in Table 8, talks between allies are 120% more 
likely to end successfully with formal cooperation. 
 A set second of findings touches broadly on the effects of domestic political 
factors. First, as indicated in Table 5, host states are significantly less likely to make 




basing. Specifically, as shown in Table 6, host-state leaders are 17.1% less likely to 
adopt a flexible bargaining position following such unintended attention. This finding 
is explicable by the simple fact that foreign military basing is one of the most 
controversial forms of security cooperation, often perceived internationally as a blight 
on host states’ sovereignty and domestically as a source of crime and pollution. 
However, press speculation and leaks have no effect on the sending state’s bargaining 
behavior or on the overall probability of cooperation. Second, though domestic 
coalition size does not have a statistically significant effect on bargaining behavior 
(see Table 5), basing negotiations between two large-coalition leaders are 
significantly more likely to end in an agreement than negotiations between a sending-
state leader with a large coalition and a host-state leader with a small coalition (see 
Table 7). In particular, as shown in Table 8, such talks are 114.9% more likely to 
culminate in formal cooperation. This finding is consistent with the popular claim that 



















This appendix reports the descriptive statistics for the main variables. 
 
 













Going Public (U.S.) 0 1 .247 .432 218 
Going Public (Host) 0 1 .293 .456 218 
Concessions (U.S.) 0 1 .596 .491 218 
Concessions (Host) 0 1 .701 .458 218 
Agreement 0 1 .270 .445 218 
Great Power 0 1 .188 .391 218 
Subjugate 0 1 .045 .209 218 
Adversary Border 0 1 .403 .491 218 
  Adversary Border (U.S.) 0 1 .174 .380 218 
  Adversary Border (Host) 0 1 .348 .477 218 
Wartime 0 1 .568 .496 218 
  Wartime (U.S.) 0 1 .490 .501 218 
  Wartime (Host) 0 1 .238 .427 218 
Neutrality 0 1 .376 .485 218 
Technical Round 0 1 .174 .380 218 
Ally 0 1 .348 .477 218 
Prior Access 0 1 .440 .497 218 
Large Coalition Size 0 1 .472 .500 218 
Executive Constraints 0 1 .389 .488 218 
Election 0 1 .339 .474 218 
  Election (U.S.) 0 48 23.5 14.0 218 
  Election (Host) 0 101 17.7 26.2 218 
Press Coverage 0 1 .532 .500 218 
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